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through formal legislative action in order to provide sufficient time for the complex work needed to revise 
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Additional information 
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order to be convicted of a crime) and the lack of a coherent, rational sentencing structure. 
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comprehensive revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. (The 
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Staff services for the Criminal Code Revision Commission and Criminal Code Revision Subcommission were 
provided by the Criminal Justice Center at University of Alaska, Anchorage (John Havelock, project executive 
director; Barry Jeffrey Stern, reporter/staff counsel; Sheila Gallagher, Reporter/Staff Counsel; and Peter Smith 
Ring, research director). The tentative draft proposed by the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission was 
substantially amended by the Alaska State Legislature prior to its approval as the Revised Alaska Criminal 
Code in June 1978 (effective January 1, 1980). 
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Preface 
Organization of The Commission 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was 
established by the first session of the Ninth Legislature 
through CS for Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5 as 
amended by the House: 
1.
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Original sponsor: Judiciary Committee 
IN THE SENATE 
Offered: 2/12/75 
Referred: Finance 
BY THE RULES COMMITTEE 
CS FOR SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 5 am H 
IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 
NINTH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION 
Relating to a revision of AS 11, the 
substantive criminal law of the state, 
7 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA: 
8 WHEREAS the criminal code of the State of Alaska represents a consider-
9 able and vital body of law which has not undergone substantive revision and 
10 is consequently vastly out of step with constitutional and social development 
11 of recent decades; and 
12 WHEREAS, each year since 1965, a revised criminal code for the state 
13 has been before the legislature but has failed to garner the necessary 
14 support for passage; and 
15 WHEREAS, once again, a criminal code revision which could serve as a 
16 basis for study by persons knowledgeable in the varying aspects of the 
17 criminal law is contained in the proposed legislation; and 
18 WHEREAS it is impossible during the course of a legislative session to 
19 devote the necessary man-hours required to refine and digest the proposed 
20 revision and to have the necessary expertise available to review the pro-
21 
22 
23 
24 
posal; 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Alaska State Legislature that the Legislative 
Council in cooperation with the Attorney General is requested to form a 
"blue ribbon" commission to study, refine, and to submit to the Second 
25 Session of the Ninth Legislature a revision of the proposed code the commis-
26 
27 
28 
sion recommends be favorably acted upon; and be it 
FURTHER RESOLVED that the membership of the commission should be repre­
sentative of all persons and groups vitally concerned with the administration 
29 and enforcement of the state's criminal laws, including but not limited to 
-1-
2. 
CSSCR 5 am H 
representatives of the bar, the bench, penologists, correction officers, 
2 social workers, and the like; and be it 
3 FURTHER RESOLVED that the Legislative Council is authorized to contract 
4 with a competent person or firm knowledgeable in the varying aspects of 
5 criminal law to oversee and direct the work of the commission, except that no 
6 person serving in the legislature who is a member of the bar may be so 
7 contracted with. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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3 . 
Pursuant to this resolution, the Alaska Legislative 
Council, Senator Genie Chance, Chairman, established the 
Commission with an initial membership as follows: 
Representing the House of Representatives, 
Terry Gardiner 
Representing the State Senate, 
Terry Miller 
Representing the Alaska Bar Association, 
Wendell Kay 
Cathy Chandler 
Representing the State Department of Public Safety, 
Colonel Pat Wellington 
Representing the National Association of Social Workers, 
Pam McMillan 
Representing the Division of Corrections, 
Charles G. Adams, Jr. 
Representing the State Department of Law, 
Dan Hickey 
Representing the Superior Court, 
Judge Ralph Moody 
Since many of these individuals could attend only 
irregularly, the following alternates were designated with 
full voting powers: 
William H. Fuld for Mr. Kay 
Ivan Lawner for Mr. Hickey 
Captain Robert Penman for Colonel Wellington 
4 • 
Walter B. Jones for Mr. Adams 
Subsequently the membership was broadened to include: 
Representing the Alaska District Court, 
Judge Laurel Petersen 
Representing the Anchorage Police Department, 
Captain Mark Hogan 
Representing the Anchorage Bar Association 
Bruce Bookman 
Representing the Public Defender, 
Beverly Cutler 
The Commission later designated a technical committee 
to support the work of the Commission including: 
Representing the Alaska District Court, 
Judge Nora Guinn 
Representing the Alaska Peace Officers Association, 
Captain Lowell Parker 
Representing the Division of Corrections, 
John Pugh 
Representing the Mental Health Association 
Joan Katz 
Ombudsman, State of Alaska, 
Frank Flavin 
Additional Attorneys, 
Leroy Barker 
James Gilmore 
5.
The Commission was not fully organized until August 21, 
1975, when the Commission received a proposal for staff services 
to be provided by the Criminal Justice Center of the University 
of Alaska. A formal contract was endorsed on October 1, 1975. 
Staff Support: 
John Havelock 
Sheila Gallagher 
Barry Stern 
Peter Ring 
Phyl Booth 
Project Executive Director 
Reporter/Staff Counsel 
Associate Staff Counsel 
Research Director 
Secretary 
In addition, some technical research support has been 
provided by the staff of the Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency, 
John Doyle, Director, under the specific direction of 
Joel Bennett, Staff Assistant. 
6.
Introduction 
Part I 
Why a Criminal Code Revision? 
Alaska, now possibly uniquely among the states, has 
never had a criminal code revision. Some twenty-two states 
have completed new revisions within the past five or six 
years. In doing so, they have been following the recommen­
dations of presidential Commissions which have examined 
broad problems in criminal justice administration in the last 
decade. 
Most recently the National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals recommended that "States whose 
codes have not been revised within the past decade initiate 
complete revision, including, when necessary, a revamped penalty 
structure". The National Advisory Commission also recommended 
the establishment "of state criminal law commissions to review 
new legislative proposals bearing criminal penalties". A 
Federal Criminal Code revision is now before the Congress. 
Many of Alaska's criminal statutes were adopted from 
the Oregon code around the turn of the century. Oregon 
completed its most recent revision two years ago. Over the 
past seventy years, Alaskan territorial and state legislatures 
have added new statutes or amended old sections, according to 
the inspiration of individual legislators, reacting to the 
7 • 
atmosphere of different times until today Alaska's criminal 
statutes are filled with obsolete language, inconsistent 
penalties and other provisions and outdated concepts. While 
Alaska's criminal statutes are still, for the most part, 
workable, they are difficult to understand and time has exposed 
many loopholes. 
Lawyers working with the Alaska criminal code on a daily 
basis, being long married to it, tend to overlook its defects, 
particularly those which others working with the law must 
contend with. A problem once hurdled is soon forgotten and 
the general impression left is that a statute or two may need 
fixing up but that the code is basically sound. While workable, 
it is not sound. A critical analysis of the code, section by 
section, reveals, time after time, confusion of language or 
purpose, overbreadth or overnarrowness, contradiction and 
overlap_arnong sections. Though references are frequently 
made to the body of interpretive law built up around the code, 
it is irregular at best. One of the advantages of code 
adoption is that we will gain the benefit of interpretive 
uniformity with other jurisdictions revising their codes, all 
of which have to a great degree used the Model Penal Code as 
a guide. A year or two of work with new provisions sharing 
common characteristics with other recently revised states 
will provide a deeper gloss of judicial interpretation than 
now exists from years of decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court 
8 . 
alone. 
The problems which the existing Alaska criminal law title 
pose with regard to fairness in sentencing were recently noted 
by the Alaska Judicial Council through its report on "Sentencing 
in Alaska" in March, 1975. The Council's sonclusions concerning 
the outmoded characteristics of Alaskan laws and the need for 
criminal code revision are set out at pages 13�, 135 of this report. 
Lanny Proffer, Special Assistant for Criminal Justice of 
the National Governor's Conference and the National Conference 
of State Legislatures reported in April of 1975: 
"Respect for the law derives from the understanding 
that people have for the law and their sense of fairness. 
There can be no sense of understanding and no sense of 
fairness unless the people know what is in the code and 
know what behavior is proscribed." 
The accessibility of criminal law to lawyers alone is not 
enough. 
Against a background of unanimous national clamor for more 
efficient, accessible and fair criminal laws, the Alaska Criminal 
Code Commission adopted the following purposes as the goals of 
the Commission: 
1. Eliminate obsolete language;
2. Eliminate inconsistent penalties;
3. Eliminate archaic provisions of law which appear to
be neither necessary nor desirable in today's society; 
4. Rearrange substantive provisions of law in an orderly
and logical grouping of subject matter; 
5. Eliminate overlap and duplication of substantive
9.
provisions; 
6. Create a simplified and more workable body of criminal
laws. 
This report contains the product of the Commission's 
efforts to February 1, 1976. 
10.
Part II 
The Work of the Commission 
The criminal code revision effort set in motion by CS for 
SCR No. 5 is by no means the first effort at criminal code revision 
in Alaska. In 1972 a revision based on the Model Penal Code was 
introduced as HB 524, reintroduced as HB 424 on 4/7/73 and last 
year HB 14 and SB 6 both involved proposed revisions along similar 
lines. But the key to the success of criminal code revision 
efforts nationally has not been so much in the form of the bill 
prepared but the process by which that forM was achieved. 
A criminal code involves hundreds of implicit value judgments 
which should bear some relationship to community norms. It is 
not enough that a brilliant criminal law expert be given pencil 
and paper, a library and staff to work out the formulae of justice. 
The Model Penal Code, though its overall structure has probably 
been adopted by every state that has considered criminal code 
revision since its adoption in 1962, has not been adopted in its 
every specific by any state. There is no model code for all 
states, each of which has its own particular social, economic and 
governmental structures and for whom a serviceable criminal code 
is part and parcel of the fabric of the regional society. 
Thus it is of critical importance that a criminal code be 
developed from the beginning with the active participation of 
legislative members particularly interested in law and issues in 
social control, with professionals from the law enforcement, judicial 
and correctional agencies who will have ultimate responsibility for 
11.
administering the code and with the interest groups and concerned 
citizens who feel they have a special stake in the forms and 
administration of the criminal law. This has never been done in 
Alaska and the Commission recognized early that it would try to 
follow this course. 
This immediately posed a dilemma. The joint resolution 
called for a criminal code revision to be delivered to the next 
session of the legislature. Allowing time for the legislative 
leadership to extract itself from the first session and sort out 
its interim committee work, the Commission really had no more 
than four working months. Other jurisdictions recently completing 
criminal code revision projects had taken years to complete such 
a task. Oregon, a favorite model for Alaska, had established a 
revision committee with a four year life without raising any 
objection that the task could be completed with greater dispatch. 
The Alaska Commission faced a dilemma and adopted a course 
of compromise. Since a final complete revision, including 
substantive, procedural and correctional law was out of the 
question, the committee felt it of the greatest importance that 
the work of the Commission and its continuity be preserved through 
formal legislation. The Commission would start on the easier, 
substantive code revision working towards a procedural revision 
as the last step. The Commission would plunge ahead on a 
substantive code revision, going as far as it could to complete 
12.
three basic units that could constitute a package: property 
crimes,general provisions (such as parties, special defenses, 
mental capacities, etc.) and a sentence structure. 
Though meetings of the Commission were open to the public, 
time circumstances foreclosed the possibility of extensive 
public hearings. The best that could be done would be to harness 
the best expert advice that could be obtained within the Alaska 
criminal justice community through a technical advisory committee 
and enlarged Commission membership. Public hearings would be 
left to the regular legislative process should the legislature 
choose to move ahead. 
Though several members felt uneasy about the effect and 
wisdom of piecemeal enactments - the ability to fit pieces 
together later on, the consequences of partial enactment for 
existing law, etc. - there was some reason and precedent supporting 
proceeding a step at a time, not the least of which was that it 
gives the legislature a manageable bite. Charles R. Work, LEAA 
Deputy Administrator for Administration recently told a conference 
of code revisers to "Break it into pieces. We need to avoid the 
possibility of having the whole thing turned down because of the 
unappealing nature of one or two parts of the package." Code 
revision specialist State Senator Luedtke of Nebraska urged, 
"You must remember not to give a legislature too much at one 
time because they will not be able to absorb it all and they 
will not pass it". 
Split on the wisdom of a partial enactment, the Commission 
13.
decided to go as far as they could towards a final draft of a 
manageable portion. They would ignore for this year the criminal 
sanctions not contained in Title 11. Nor would they attempt to 
conform all of Title 11 to the proposed sentencing structure. 
Subsequent to these determinations, a special task force of the 
executive branch has put forth proposals relating to mandatory 
minimum sentencing, the abolition of parole in certain cases and 
related recommendations, thus putting a greater sense of urgency 
behind proposals for change in the sentencing area. For if 
criminal penalties are now inconsistent they become even more 
inconsistent combined with a minimum mandatory sentence feature 
The options available to the Legislature, should it determine 
to act this year on establishing a system of this kind, are 
reflected in the following section on findings and recommendations. 
The Commission makes no claim for itself of omniscience in 
criminal justice matters. There is room for improvement in 
every provision and always will be. Differences in human values 
may bring other observers to other conclusions in one respect or 
another. The Commission does believe that the drafts presented 
here constitute a major improvement over existing Alaska Law on 
the subject. In the large view,criminal law should always be 
in a state of evolution, reflecting the changing values and needs 
of society, advances in justice science and the findings of 
social research. It is hoped that we will not postpone as long 
again the task of systematic oversight of such an important 
part of the fabric of our law and our society. 
14.
Part III 
Findings and Recommendations 
The usual life of State Criminal Code Revision Commissions 
is 4 - 6 years. In view of the considerable work on revision done 
in the other states in the past decade, the Alaska Commission has 
set a more ambitious schedule for itself, at least provisionally. 
It has been proposed that the Commission attempt to produce 
a finished revision of the subtantive criminal law of the state 
by February 1, 1977 and a similar revision of the code of criminal 
procedure by February 1, 1978. A tentative work schedule for the 
first stage, substantive revision is included as a part of this report. 
It is noted that work done pursuant to this 
schedule may suggest criminal rules revisions, a subject to be 
referred to the Supreme Court of Alaska and its committee on 
criminal rules. In addition, work relating to juvenile code 
revision may be undertaken concurrently or consecutively. 
The Commission makes the following specific recommendations
concerning the continuance of the Commission and its work to date: 
1. That the Criminal Code Revision Commission be continued
or reconstituted through formal legislative enactment. A draft 
bill for consideration by the legislature broadening the membership
to some extent is included as part of this report.
2. That the legislature and the respective committees of
reference for criminal law matters determine whether any part 
of thisreport concerning substantive law is to be adopted or 
15.
deferred for consideration by a later legislature. There are 
both pros and cons to the "piecemeal" approach. The Commission 
has attempted, with regard to Crimes of Property, General Provisions 
and Sentencing Structure to present its work in a way that lends 
itself to adoption as a unit should the legislature be disposed 
to act now. 
The provisions relating to sentence .structure have been 
shaped to apply to substantive offenses redefined under the 
revision. No attempt has been made to apply the classification 
scheme to all felonies or all felonies under Title 11. The task 
involved in doing so is not a substantial one from a technical 
perspective assuming that, for the time being, the Legislature 
chose to encompass all felony sentences under this structure 
based on their present value of seriousness. Problems arise 
only if one determines to reassess penalties according to 
contemporary views of the seriousness of the offense, a value­
oriented task which the Commission thought better to postpone 
until it was also considering revision in the definitions of 
the offenses themselves. 
The sentence structure could be considered for enactment 
only as applied to new offenses. This approach would give rise 
to apparent anomalies as when a person convicted of a second 
offense burglary would be subject to a mandatory minimum and a 
person convicted of burglary after a first offense assault with 
a deadly weapon would not be subject to the minimum. However, 
16.
this anomaly is more apparent than real since judicial discretion 
would still extend to permit the court to impose the same 
sentence, a very real probability under the circumstances 
prevailing if the sentence structure if partially enacted into 
law. 
Likewise, the principles underlying the sentence structure 
are fairly readily applicable to misdemeanor offenses, as a 
technical matter, should the Legislature decide to proceed now 
on a new system of sentence management for misdemeanors. However, 
for similar reasons, the Commission determined to postpone 
application of a sentence revision to misdemeanors until the 
Commission considered the substance of more offenses defined in 
the misdemeanor category. Some care should be taken, however, 
in applying mandatory minimums to misdemeanor offenses. The 
volume of cases at the misdemeanor level is so great and the 
psychopathology of recidivism in some offense categories suffi­
ciently clear, that the application of mandatory minimums without 
careful examination of the consequences could congest the system 
with in and out transactions and prisoners to the point of 
breakdown. 
The principal features of the proposed revisions are 
reflected in the draft proposals themselves and its accompanying 
commentary. 
17.
Article 1. Arson and Related Crimes 
Section Section 
10. 
20. 
30. 
40. 
5 ') • 
Definitions 
First degree arson 
Second degree arson 
Negligent use of 
combustible materials 
Reckless burninq 
GO. 
70. 
8 0. 
90. 
Offense by married person 
Criminal possession of 
explosives 
Failure to report or control 
dangerous fire 
Causing or risking catastrophe 
Sec. 11.20.010. Arson and related offenses : definitions. 
As used in �§ 010 - 060 of this Article, except as the 
context requires otherwise: 
(1) "Protected property" means any structure, place or thing
customarily occupied by people, including public buildings, 
defined as "a building in which persons congregate for civic, 
political, educational, religious, social or recreational 
purposes" and forest land, defined as"all lands on which grass, 
brush, timber and other natural vegetative material grows". 
(2) "Property of another" means property in which anyone other
than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest. If 
a building or structure is divided into separately occupied 
units, any unit not occupied by the actor is the property of 
another. 
Comments 
(1) "Protected property". This definition is similar
to the definition of building contained in the burglary and 
criminal trespass article so far as it relates to structures 
customarily occupied by people. However, it is broader in 
that it also includes public buildings and forest land, the 
intentional burning of which would constitute arson in the 
first degree under the provisions of§ 11.20.020. This 
definition is broader than the M P  C's "occupied structure" 
and broader than coverage in existing Alaska Statutes 11.20.010 -
11.20.050, which speak to "dwelling house", "building", 
18.
"structure" and "personal property". 
The purpose of this definition is to protect those structures 
and things which typically are occupied by people, and is 
consistent with the primary rationale of the crime of arson: 
protecting human life or safety. 
Forest fires ordinarily present a high degree of risk to 
human safety as well as causing economic loss to the state; 
therefore, the intentional starting of such a fire should be 
considered as one of the most serious arson offenses. This is 
a particularly relevant consideration in Alaska. There are 
pertinent sections in Title 41 (Public Resources). 
Arson of a public building would probably endanger human 
life as well as causing irreparable damage to property and 
public records and therefore deserves a stringent treatment. 
(2) "Property of Another" -- this is based upon MP C 220.1
and protects the lawful occupant of property, notwithstanding 
that the actor might have title or vice versa. 
Sec. 11.20.020. Arson in the first degree: 
(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if,
by starting a fire or causing an explosion, he knowing1y 
damages: 
(a) protected property of anotheri or
(b) any property, whether his own or another's, and such
act recklessly places another person in danger of physical 
injury or protected property of another in danger of damage. 
(2) Arson in the first degree is a Class A felony.
Comment 
Comments to §§ 020 - 050 follow§ 060. 
Sec. 11.20.030. Arson in the second degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the second degree
if, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, he knowingly 
19.
damages any building of another that is not protected property. 
(2) Arson in the second degree is a Class B felony.
Comment 
Comment for this section follows § 060. 
Sec. 11.20.040. Grossly negligent use of combustible materials. 
(1) A person commits the crime of negligent use of combustible
materials iE he with gross negligence causes a fire which 
results in physical harm to another person or in damage to 
the property of another. 
(2) Gross negligent use of combustible materials is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
Comment for this section follows § 060. 
Sec. 11.20.050. Reckless burning. 
(1) A person commits the crime of reckless burning if he
recklessly damages property of another by fire or explosion 
or causes a fire which results in physical harm to another 
person. 
misdemeanor. (2) Reckless burning is a Class
Comment 
Comment for this section follows § 060. 
Sec. 11.20.060 Offense by Married Person. 
Sections 020 - 050 of this chapter extend to and include 
a married person who commits any of the crimes specified, though 
the property burned or set on fire belongs wholly or in part to 
the person's spouse. 
20.
COMMENTS 
The primary rationale of this article is protection of 
human life and safety. The secondary rationale is the protection 
of cherished property. The draft in its present version pro­
vides for two ascending degrees of arson, graded according to 
whether or not "protected property" is involved or whether 
or not there is danger to human life. The draft also provides 
for the less serious crime of reckless burning. 
There is no separate section dealing with destroying 
property with the intent to defraud an insurer. Such activity 
would amount to either attempted theft by deception or theft 
by deception 1f the property damaged belonged solely to the 
actor. However, if anyone other than the actor has a possessory 
or proprietary interest in the property, such an act could violate 
§'11.20.030 and be punishable as 2nd degree arson, or even 
if the property damaged by fire were the exclusive property 
of the actor, it could amount to 1st degree arson if another 
person were recklessly placed in danger or bodily injury or 
protected property of another endangered as provided by para�raph 
(b) subsec. (1) of § 11. .20.020, The relatively severe 
penalties for arson would not apply for behavior which, while 
objectionable as part of a fraudulent scheme, has no element of 
danger to another's person or property. On the other hand, 
where such dangers are present, it should be punished accordingly. 
The elements of the crime of reckless burning, § 050 are: 
(1) reckless (2) damage of (3) property of another (4) by fire
or explosion. If there is no intent on the part of the actor 
to damage the property, but he "consciously disregards a sub­
stantial and unjustifiable risk" resulting from his conduct, 
he violates this section. Because there is no intent to damage 
property the crime does not carry the label, nor the onus, nor 
the penalty of arson. The reckless damage of property by means 
other than fire or explosion is covered by the criminal mis­
chief sections of the draft. 
The elements of the crime of arson in the 2nd degree, 11.20, 
030, are: (1) knowingly (2) damage of (3) a building of 
another (4) by fire or explosion and (5) the building is not 
"protected property." The type of buildings covered by this 
section would be those that are not "customarily occupied" by 
people. Since this degree of arson would not ordinarily threaten 
human life or safety it is treated as a less serious offense 
under thisdraft, but nonetheless is classified as a felony. 
carrying a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment under 
Oregon law. For example, if A intentionally sets fire to 
21.
B's barn he would be guilty of violating this section. If, 
however, the barn were in close proximity to B's house, A could 
be guilty of 1st degree arson under § 02a (ll (b). 
The elements of the crime of arson in the 1st degree, 
§ Q2Q �re� (1) knowingly (2) damage by (3) fire or explosion
of (4) protected property of another or (5) any property,
whether the actor's or another's and this results in (6) reck­
lessly placing another person in danger of physical injury or
(7) recklessly placing protected property of another in danger
of damage.
Intentionally damaging property of another by means other 
than fire or explosion is prohibited by the criminal mischief 
sections of the draft. Intentionally damaging property that is 
not a building or protected property, i.e., personal property, 
by fire or explosion is covered by§ 460 of this draft, criminal 
mischief in the 1st degree. However, if the conduct which 
would otherwise be criminal mischief, because the property 
dama0ed in personal property, results in violating § 11.20.020 
(1) (b) then the actor would be guilty of arson in the 1st
degree.
Note that under§ 02Q(l) (b) the mens rea with respect to 
the property the actor intends to burn is an intent to damage 
any property by fire or explosion, while the culpability of 
the actor with respect to another person who might be physically 
injured or to protected property of another that might be dam­
aged by his act is recklessness. If, for example, A, intending 
to defraud his insurer, intentionally sets fire to his own 
car which is parked in A's driveway but just a few feet from 
B's house, A would be "consciously disregarding a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk" of placing another person in danger of 
physical injury or of placing the protected property of another 
in danger of damage and would be guilty of arson in the 1st 
degree. Actual physical injury to B or actual damage to ¼'S 
house would not be required to prove A guilty under § 020� But 
the state would be required to prove that A intentionally' 
set fire to his car and that the other risks ensued from this 
act. 
It should be noted that§ 020 deals with arson, and under 
the above hypothetical, if B were actually physically injured 
as a result of A's arsonous act, A would be guilty of 1st 
degree arson. Reckless conduct, not involving an intentional 
act of arson, that causes physical injury to another or creates 
a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another would 
be covered under an assault provision. 
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The aim of the draft is to protect human life and safety 
by enhancing the degree of arson to 1st degree when the 
property involved is a building, structure or thing of a kind 
which is typically occupied by people. The risk to human life 
or safety is especially great where such property is set afire. 
Further, it recognizes the danger from fires which occur during 
riots or civil disturbances, and which occur in many types of 
structures, buildings or things which vary greatly due to the 
complexity of our urban society. Some types of things such as 
boats, campers, etc., are customarily occupied by people at 
some times and places and not at others. The following guide­
lines from the Oregon Comments are meant to aid in interpreting 
the phrase "customarily occupied by people" as it is used within 
the definition of "protected property" in § 010 of this article. 
"In instructing jurors, in ruling on motions for judg­
ment of acquittal, or wherever a determination must be made 
as to whether a certain structure, place or thing is "customarily 
occupied by people," we expect the following meanings to be used: 
for purposes of § 144 of this Code, (our § 0.2Q). a. bu.:j..'ldin9, 
structure or thing is customarily occupied by people if: 
(a) By reason of circumstances of time and place when the
fire or explosion occurs, people are normally in the building, 
structure or thing; or 
(b) Circumstances are such as to make the fact of occu­
pancy by persons a reasonable possibility. 
Because it will normally be a jury question whether the 
state has proved that the building, structure or thing is 
"customarily occupied," the jury will be appropriately instructed 
that if they find it is customarily occupied the crime would 
by tirst degree arson7 if they find it is not customarily 
occupied, the crime would be second degree arson.� 
§ 11.20.050 is based on Model Penal Code § 220.1, but�
the Model Penal Code proposal, requires actual damage to 
any property instead of threatened damage to a building. 
§ 030 is derived from ORS 164,020, second degree arson. § 020
subsection (1) (a) is Oregon Section 144 f but its purpose is
the same as that of the Model Penal Code, 220.1(2); however,
the section requires actual ''intentional damage" instead of a
"purpose of destroying" and in that particular is akin to
New York Revised Penal Law § 150 .15. Subsection (1) (b) is
based on Model Penal Code § 220.1.
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Relationship to Existing Law 
The crime of arson under Alaska and Oregon law requires 
the burning to be "wilful" and "malicious." The work "mali­
cious" is a necessary ingredient to charge arson, and also 
the act must be "criminal" and not just "carelessness." 
A "burning" of the building is an essential element of 
the crime of arson. To constitute a burning there must be 
an ignition of some part of the building resulting in a per­
ceptible change in its composition, at common law called a 
"charring." It is not necessary that the buildings should 
be consumed or materially injured. It is sufficient if fire 
is actually communicated to any part thereof, however small. 
Under the proposed sections any "damage" is sufficient, so 
the "charring" test would continue to be applicable. 
Alaska's 1st degree arson statute is A.S. 11.20.010. 
The statute condemns "A person who wilfully and maliciously 
sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, 
counsels or procures the burning of a dwelling house." The 
conjunctive requirement that the burning be both "wilful and 
malicious" is refined from common law. The showing of this 
criminal intent may be alleged and proved alternatively by a 
showing that the accused was actuated by a malicious purpose 
and that he set fire to the structure wilfully. The proposed 
Code substitutes the new terms, "knowingly" and "recklessly." 
The existing statute likewise condemns anyone who r;wil­
fully and maliciously aids, counsels or procures the burning 
of ... designated property." This construction merely includes 
within the scope of the statute those persons who, if not 
included specifically, would under the rules of common law be 
charged. State v. Case, 61 Or 265, 122 P304 (1912), recognized 
the proposition that a person who is not within the class of 
those by whom the crime may be directly perpetrated may, by 
aiding and abetting a person who is within the scope of the 
definition, render himself criminally liable. The proposed 
Code retains this rationale. Also in Tarnef v. State 512 P 2d 
923 (1973) Alaska Supreme Court states that the legislature 
used the words · 11 aids, counsels or procures" as synonymous with 
"aid" and "abet". 
The above sections do not cover the burning of personal 
property as is presently in A S  11.20.030 as that will be 
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covered in the Criminal Mischief section unless it is customarily 
occupied by people, i.e. a vehicle or boat, etc. adapted for 
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business 
therein. Then it can become arson. 
The existing AS 11.20.070 (Burning to Defraud Insurer) 
is covered under the theft by deception section. 
Sec. 11.20.070. Criminal Possession of Explosives. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal possession of
explosives if he possesses, manufactures, sends or transports 
any explosive substance or device; and 
(a) intends to use that explosive or device to commit
any offense, or 
(b) knows that another intends to use that explosive or
device to commit an offense. 
(2) Criminal possession of explosives is a crime of the same
degree as the result of the act or intended act would be. 
Comments 
This section is adapted from Illinois Criminal Code 
Sec. 20 - 2. Many crimes involving the use of explosives 
are covered under arson, homicide and assault. Because of 
the potential danger, it seems wise to penalize directly 
illicit manufacture, shipment, transportation or possession 
of explosives with intent to use them to commit an offense 
or with knowledge that someone intends to use them for the same 
purpose. 
Sec. 11�20.080� Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire. 
A person who knows that a fire is endangering life or a 
substantial amount of property of another and fails to take 
reasonable measures to put out or control the fire, when he 
can do so without substantial risk to himself or to give a 
prompt fire alarm, commits a Class misdemeanor, if 
(1) he knows that he is under an official, contractual
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or other legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or 
(2) the fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or
with his assent, or on property in his custody or control. 
Comment 
This section is an extension of existing federal law 
which protects federal forest land from endangerment of persons 
setting fires. AS 41,15.110 is a similar provision. 
Sec. 11.20.090. Causing or Risking Catastrophe. 
(1) Causing Catastrophe - A person is guilty of Class A felony
if he knowingly causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, 
avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison, radioactive 
material, bacteria, virus, or other dangerous and difficult­
to-confine force or substance, and is guilty of a Class B 
felony if he does so willfully. 
(2) Risking Catastrophe. A person is guilty of Class B felony
if he intentionally creates a risk of catastrophe in the 
employment of fire, explosives or other dangerous means listed 
in Subsection (1), although no fire, explosion or other 
destruction results. 
(3) Definition of Catastrophe. Catastrophe means serious 
bodily injury to ten or more people or substantial damage to 
ten or more separate habitations or structures or property 
loss in excess of $500,000. 
Comments 
This revision meets the objections of the Commission 
to the possible vagueness by defining catastrophe and 
requiring an intentional act. This section is proposed to 
deal with wide-spread destruction or injury caused not only 
by fire or explosion but also by other dangerous and difficult 
to confine forces and substances. As the provision deals 
with recklessly risking as well, it includes reckless conduct 
with respect to storage or handling of highly dangerous 
materials. 
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Sec, 
Article 2. Burglary and Criminal Trespass. 
Section 
100. Definitions 140. Second degree criminal
110. Second degree burglary trespass
120. First degree burglary 150. Unauthorized entry, use
130. First degree criminal trespass or occupancy of property
11.20.100. The following definitions are applicable to 
article ( §S 1a_o;�50_ ) , except as the context requires
otherwise: 
( 1) "Building", in addition to its ordinary meaning,
includes any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or other 
structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons 
or for carrying on business therein; each unit of a 
building consisting of two or more units separately 
secured or occupied is a separate building. 
this 
( 2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied
by a person therein at night, whether or not a person 
is actually present. 
(3) "Enter or remain unlawfully 11 means to enter or remain
in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of 
such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to do so. A person who enters or remains upon unimproved 
and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor 
otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude in­
truders, does so with license and privilege unless notice 
against trespass is personally communicated to him by 
the owner of the land or some other authorized person, 
or unless notice is given by posting in a conspicuous 
manner. 
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(4) "Premises" includes the term building as defined
in (1) and any real property. 
Comments 
Subsection (1) "Building". This definition is 
borrowed from Connecticut Penal Code§ 110 and closely 
resembles the definition of the term in New York Revised 
Penal Law§ 140.00 and the definition of "occupied 
structure" in Model Penal Code§ 221.0. Its purpose is 
to include those structures and vehicles which typically 
contain human beings for extended periods of time, in 
accordance with the original and basic rationale of the 
crime: protection against invasion of premises likely 
to terrorize occupants. The second sentence of the 
Oregon definition is simplified in this draft. 
Subsection (2) "Dwelling". This definition is 
based on the New York statute, § 140.00, and is much the 
same as the definition of "dwelling house" in A S  
11.20.130 -- "A building is a dwelling house within the 
meaning of§§ 80 - 120 of this chapter if a part of it 
has usually been occupied by a person lodging in it and 
any structure joined to or immediately connected with 
the building. 
Subsection ( 3) "Enter or remain unlawfully". This 
is another definition from New York Revised Penal Law 
§ 140.00. As applied to the burglary sections, the 
concept of one committing the crime by "remaining unlaw­
fully" represents a departure from the traditional notion 
that burglary requires a "breaking and entering" o-r an 
"unlawful entry". A S  11.20.080 through .110. However, 
A S  11.20.120 punishes as burglary the act of "breaking 
out" of a dwelling house after having committed or 
attempted to commit a crime therein, but prescribes a 
maximum penalty of three years imprisonment as compared 
to 15 years for burglary in a dwelling at night and 
5 years for burglary not in the dwelling. Under the 
proposed definition an initial lawful entry followed 
by an unlawful remaining would constitute burglary if 
accompanied by an intent to commit a crime, and would 
be criminal trespass if such intent were absent. 
Subsection (4) "Premises" This definition comes 
from New York Revised Penal Law§ 140.00. The term is 
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used in the substantive statement of the crime of criminal 
trespass. By incorporating the term "building", the 
definition of "premises" thereby covers not only the 
ordinary concept of trespass to land, but includes the 
structures, which would not be "real property", as well. 
This should make for more flexibility in applying the 
criminal trespass statutes to fit the facts of each 
particular case, because criminal trespass in the second 
degree thereby would be a lesser included offense of the 
first aegree offense. 
Sec. 11.20.110. Burglary in the second degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of burglary in the second
degree if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
with intent to commit a crime therein or leaves a building 
having committed a crime or attempted to commit a crime. 
(2) Burglary in the second degree is a Class C felony.
Comments 
The basic definition of burglary and the lowest 
degree of the crime is dealt with by this section. It 
amounts to nothing more than a form of criminal trespass 
with two aggravating factors: (1) the premises invaded 
constitute a "building"; and (2) the intruder enters 
or remains with intent to commit a crime therein. This 
section corresponds to New York Revised Penal Law§ 140.20. 
At common law the offense of burglary consisted of 
a breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another, 
in the nighttime, with intent to commit a felony. The 
statutory crime of burglary and its related "breaking 
and entering" offenses were probably developed in most 
jurisdictions to compensate for defects in the attempt 
law, consisting of definitions of attempts to commit 
other crimes. The traditional definition of burglary 
has been gradually expanded over the years to include 
acts which would not have been burglary in the common 
law sense. 
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Alaska's existing burglary statutes are A S  11.20.080 
to 11.20.130. The section as drafted combines these. 
Burglary in the second degree would occur if the intruder 
entered or remained unlawfully with intent to commit a 
crime in a non-dwelling building without any aggravating 
factors. The more serious crime of burglary in the first 
degree is defined in§ 120and differs from § llQ only in 
terms of aggravating factors. 
The basic definition of burglary required no "breaking" 
and is consistent with existing law in Alaska. Smith v. 
State 362 P. 2d 1071 (1961) Mead v. State, 489 P. 2d 738 
(1971). It eliminates the necessity of proving intent 
to steal or to commit a "felony" in the non-dwelling 
burglary as presently required under A S  11.20.100, 
making the intent element the same as now prescribed 
for burglary in a dwelling by A S  11.20.080, i.e., the 
intent to commit any "crime". The section also does 
away with the need for proving that property was kept 
in the building. Also eliminated is the requirement of 
proving that the intruder had the intent to commit the 
crime at the time of the entering. 
Sec. 11. 20 .  120 ._ Burglary in the first degree .. 
(1) A person commits the crime of burglary in the first
degree if he violates § 110 and the building is 
a dwelling, or if in effecting entry or while in the 
building or in immediate flight therefrom he: 
(a) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
(b) causes or attempts to cause physical injury
to any person; or 
(c) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.
(2) Burglary in the first degree is a Clas·s. B ;ee.lony.
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Comments 
This section incorporates the basic definition of 
burglary contained in§ 110 but aggravates it if the intruder 
is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or causes or 
attempts to cause physical injury to any person; or uses 
or threatens the use of a dangerous weapon. 
The language used in sub§ 120(1), "in effecting entry 
or while in the building or in immediate flight there­
from, he," is taken from the New York Revised Penal Law 
§ 140.25. The Model Penal Code employs the phrase 
"in the course of committing the offense" and defines it 
as meaning one that "occurs in an attempt to commit the 
offense or in flight after the attempt or commission." 
The New York version seems more precise and eliminates 
the need for further definition. Paragraphs (a) and (bl 
are patterned after Model Penal Code § 221.1. Paragraph (c) 
is taken from New York Revised Penal Law § 140.25. 
The section as drafted retains some of the features 
of present statutes which stamp certain kinds of "burglary" 
as constituting more aggravated crimes than others. 
Burglary in a dwelling house, including breaking and 
entering while armed with a dangerous weapon or assaulting 
any person lawfully therein, is now punishable under 
AS 11.20.080 by maximum penalty of 15 years imprison­
ment, if at night, or 20 if person present, 10 if daytime 
and no human being present, as compared to 5 years 
maximum for a nondwelling burglary under AS 11.20.100. 
Alaska statutes distinguish between a daytime or nighttime 
burglary. The proposed section applies the aggravating 
factors equally to dwelling and other buildings and 
treats daytime and nighttime burglaries alike. 
"Breaking out" of a dwelling house of another, 
after having committed or attempted to commit a crime 
therein, is now punishable under AS 11.20.120 by a 
maximum penalty of three years imprisonment. This 
statute would be repealed but this type of conduct would 
be covered by the draft. 
Alaska Statutes do not presently speak to burglary 
with explosives. The addition of explosives to Sec. 11.20.120 
would cover the "safecracker" for instance and reflects 
the possibility of greater harm. 
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The proposed Michigan Code does not follow the 
New York pattern as adopted by Oregon of aggravating 
burglary when physical injury is inflicted on a person 
within the building. Causing serious physical injury 
could be assault; therefore, under the Michigan rationale, 
it does not seem necessary to include this within burglary 
as well. It is even more incongruous to punish accidental 
or negligent infliction of any physical injury more 
severely than intentionally or recklessly inflicting 
serious injury; this is the result under the New York 
Revised Penal Law because first degree burglary is more 
severely punished than first degree assault. 
To handle this objection, the Michigan Code has 
three degrees of burglary. Its third degree burglary 
section corresponds with Oregon's and this proposal's 
second degree. 
The M P  C provides for injury to the person as 
part of burglary as a second degree felony. 
Commentators to the M P  C believed that logically 
burglary could be eliminated as an offense because its 
primary function as a criminal law concept is to serve 
as a crystallized doctrine of attempt and this could 
be handled in attempt provisions of a code. However, 
they realized that it's so firmly a part of our law 
that any attempts to eliminate it would be resisted and 
so they continued it in the M P  C. As Tentative Draft 
No. 11 stated 
"If we were writing on a clean slate, the best 
solution might be to eliminate burglary as a distinct 
offense . . .  But we are not writing on a clean slate. 
Centuries of history and a deeply embedded Anglo-American 
conception like burglary cannot be discarded. The 
needed reform must therefore take the direction of narrowing 
the offense to something like the distinctive situation 
for which it was originally devised: invasion of premises 
under circumstances specially likely to terrorize occupants." 
Pursuant to Commissions request, language was added 
to § 110 to specifically include purview of present 
A S  11.20.120. 
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Sec. 11.20.130. Criminal Trespass in the First Degree� 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in
the first degree if he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully 
in a dwelling. 
(2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.20.140. Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the
second degree if he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully 
in or upon premises. 
(2) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
Comment to follow AS 11.20.150. 
Sec. 11.20.150. Unauthorized Entry, Use or Occupancy of Property. 
(1) A person commits the crime of unauthorized entry,
use or occupancy of property if he enters, uses· or occupies 
any·unoccupied dwelling, or uses any personal property 
therein, except with the consent of the owner of the 
facility or his agent, unless 
(a) the entry, use or occupancy of any of the
facilities described in this subsection is for an emer­
gency in the case of immediate and dire need, and 
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(b) the person contacts the owner or agent within
15 days after using the facility or, if the owner is 
unknown, the nearest state or local police agency, and 
makes a report of the time of the entry, use or occupancy 
of the facility and any damage to the facility or personal 
property, unless notice waiving necessity of the report 
iS posted in the facility by the owner or his agent. 
(2) A person who violates l(a) of this section is guilty
of a Class misdemeanoP, 
Comment 
The basic rationale of the sections on criminal 
trespass taken from the Oregon Code is the protection 
of one's property from unauthorized intrusion by others. 
As with burglary this draft proposes two degrees of 
the crimes, one into premises, one into a dwelling. 
This proposal does not provide for a separate degree 
of trespass to cover property that is fenced or otherwise 
enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders. 
The proposal does not draw a distinction between the 
trespasser who goes through a fence and one who does 
not. The Oregon Commentators believed that the enforce­
ability of this section was more important than the 
severity of the punishment. 
Both the New York Revised Penal Law and the proposed 
Michigan Code speak in a separate section to those intru­
sions upon land which is fenced, etc. Contrary to Oregon, 
these states feel that this shows a much more deliberate 
invasion of other persons' property rights and is in 
many cases in fact the prelude to tortious or criminal 
conduct. The severity of the punishment is less than 
that for intrusion into a dwelling but more serious 
than the trespass in the second degree. 
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Trespass is committed in or upon "premises" as that 
term is defined in the definitions section. If the 
invaded premises is a dwelling, then that is criminal 
trespass in the first degree. The alarm caused to 
inhabitants by the entry and the likelihood of violence 
which may injure someone, including the intruder, is the 
justification for a heavier penalty. · A defendant who 
is charged with the more serious offense may properly 
plead to or be convicted of second degree trespass 
because of the broad definition of premises. 
The element of entering or remaining unlawfully 
in or upon the premises is identical to that required 
for burglary, i.e. "at the time of the entry or remaining, 
the premises are not open to the public and the defendant 
is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so". 
Existing Alaska law on trespass A S  11.20.630 - 650 
provides for posting which these proposed sections do 
not. With the large tracts of land often held in Alaska, 
the requirement of posting every 330' around the perimeter 
is onerous particularly when, as in the experience of the 
Anchorage School District, the signs are removed faster 
than they can be printed. But it seems as if there 
should be some posting when the premises is unimproved, 
unfenced land. This problem has been handled by adding 
to the definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" of the 
Model Penal Code the following language: 
"A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and 
apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor 
otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude 
intruders, does so with license and privilege unless 
notice against trespass is personally communicated to 
him by the owner of the land or some other authorized 
person, or unless notice is given by posting in a 
conspicuous manner." 
The M P  C speaks to posting "reasonably likely to 
come to the attention of the intruders". 
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The sections defining first and second degree 
trespass are the Oregon Code with the addition of the 
word knowingly and are based upon New York Revised Penal 
Law 140.05, 140.15. 
The proposed sections would replace existing sections 
A S  11.20.630 - 650 and the corresponding provisions in 
Title 38 regarding trespass on state land. 
Again because of special circumstances arising in 
Alaska, and pursuant to the Commissions direction, A S
11.20.135 which speaks to "unauthorized entry, use of 
occupancy of property'' with exemptions tor emergency 
conditions is included as Sec. 150. 
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Article 3. Theft and Related Offenses 
Section 
160. Definitions 270. 
170. Theft described
180. Consolidation of theft
offenses; pleading & proof 280.
190. Defenses to theft
200. Grading of theft offenses 290.
210. Theft of lost, mislaid
property
220. Theft by
230. Theft by
240. Theft by
250, Right o'.c
260. Theft of
extortion 
deception 
receivinq 
?Ossessio 11
services 
300. 
310. 
320. 
:n0. 
3L::(). 
Comment 
Theft by failure to make 
required nisposition of funds 
received 
Unauthorized use of a pro­
pelled vehicle 
Unauthorized occupancy of 
a propelled vehicle 
Removal of identifying marks 
Unlawful possession 
Bad checks 
"R.0hbery 
mheft from the person 
This section contains definitions only which do not 
themselves constitute the substantive crime. A section 
containing definitions makes it possible to utilize a shorter 
and clearer description of each crime and to ensure a 
uniformity in meaning through several succeeding sections. 
All definitions apply unless there is a plain inconsistency 
from the context. 
Sec. 11.20.160. Definitions. 
In this article, unless the context requires otherwise: 
Sub. (1) "Appropriate property of another to oneself or a third 
person" or "appropriate" means to: 
(a) exercise control over property of another or to
aid a third person to exercise control over property of 
another, permanently or for so extended a period or under 
such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of 
economic value or benefit of such property; or 
(b) dispose of the property of another for the benefit
of oneself or a third person. 
Comment 
"Appropriate" is the exact language of the revised Oregon 
Code. It also appears in the Massachusetts Code and the New 
York Revised Penal Law§ 155 but is not defined in the M P  C nor 
is it presently defined in Alaska Statutes. 
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This definition together with "deprive" retains the 
traditional distinction between larceny and some other offenses 
which, though similar, do not reach the stature of larceny 
because of a lesser intent to obtain temporary possession or 
use of the property or to cause temporary loss to the owner. 
These definitions are essential to a definition of larcenous 
intent as they connote a purpose on the part of the thief to 
exert permanent or virtually permanent control over the property 
taken or to cause permanent or virtually permanent loss to the 
owner of the possession and use thereof. 
( 2) "Deception means to knowingly:
(a) create or confirm another's false impression of law,
value, intention or other state of mind which the defendant does 
not believe to be true; or 
(b) fail to correct a false impression which the defendant
previously has created or confirmed; or 
(c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent
to the disposition of the property involved; or 
(d) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property
fa�ling to disclose a lien, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property whether that impedi­
ment is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) promise performance which the defendant does not intend
to perform or knows will not be performed. 
The term "deception" does not, however, include falsity 
as to matter having no pecuniary significance or puffing by 
statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed. 
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Comment 
"Deception" is derived from the Illinois Criminal Code 
§ 15-4. The qualification of coverage is taken from the 
MP C § 223.3 as is the addition of the language of false 
impression of "law, value, intention or other state of mind" 
in the proposed draft's Sec. 2(a). It includes representations 
as to future as well as present or past fact, law as contrasted 
with fact and opinion as contrasted with fact. It is broader 
than the traditional concept of false pretenses because 
traditionally the statement must have related to a past or 
existing fact so that a statement of "law" or a statement referring 
to a future event could not qualify. The definition of 
deception turns on the impression which the offender's total 
activity has on the victim and thus eliminates non-functional 
distinctions based on fact as against law or opinion or 
present or past as opposed to future. 
(3) "Deprive another of property" or "deprive" means to:
(a) withhold property of another or cause property of
another to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended 
a period or under such circumstances that the major portion 
of its economic value or benefit is lost to him; or 
(b) dispose of the property in such manner so as to
make it unlikely that the owner will recover it; or 
(c) to retain the property with intent to restore it
to the owner only if the owner purchases or leases it back, 
or pays a reward or other compensation for its return; or 
(d) to sell, give, pledge or otherwise transfer any
interest in the property; or 
(e) to subject the property to the claim of a person
other than the owner. 
Comment 
"Deprive" is a blending of the Illinois Criminal Code, 
the MP C, New York Revised Penal Law and the Oregon Code. 
The proposed draft's sections (a) and (b) are taken directly 
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from Oregon Sec. 164 .. 005(2) (a)&(b) the MP C §223.0(1) and 
New York Revised Penal Law §155.00 (3). The proposed draft's 
Secs. 3 (c) (d) and (e) are taken from the Illinois Criminal 
Code §15-3. In addition to the comments set forth for 
"appropriate", the utility of the definition is that it 
provides a single concept embracing both permanent and 
prolonged withholding of property from the rightful owner. 
Without this definition it would be necessary to provide 
separate sections dealing with permanent deprivations and 
prolonged or seriously prejudicial deprivations. 
(4) "Financial institution" means a bank, insurance company,
credit union, building and loan association, investment trust 
or other organization held out to the public as a place of 
deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective investment. 
Comment 
"Financial institution" is adopted from the MP C § 223.0(2) 
and is standard in most codes. 
(5) "Government" means the United States, any state or any
borough, municipality,or other political unit within territory 
belonging to the United States or any department, agency or 
subdivision or any of the foregoing, or any corporation or 
other association carrying out the functions of government 
or any corporation or agency formed pursuant to interstate 
compact or international treaty. 
Comment 
"Government" is a slightly expanded version of the 
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MPC §223.0(3). " . corporation or agency formed pursuant 
to interstate compact or international treaty" was added to 
reflect the possibility of Alaskan entities of Canadian 
origin. 
(6) "Obtain" means:
(a) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer
or a purported transfer of a legal interest in the property 
whether to the obtainer or another; or 
(b) in relation to labor or service to secure performance
thereof, without payment therefor or by imposing payment on 
a third person who did not request or use the services; or 
(c) obtains or exerts control or obtains or exerts
unauthorized control over property. 
Comment 
Sec. 6 (a) is taken from the Oregon Code § 164.005 (1), 
6 (b) is taken from the MPC §223.0(5) and the Illinois 
Criminal Code § 15-7 with the second clause being taken 
from the Massachusetts Criminal Code §17 (a) (4). Sec. 6 (c) 
is taken from the Proposed Revised Michigan Criminal Code. 
The additional language re "obtains or exerts control" 
eliminates any contention under the extortion section that 
the control was authorized because the victim voluntarily 
handed over his property, even though it was because of fear. 
It also extends the concept of a taking to include the 
constructive acquisition of property and is consistent with 
the ensuing definition of property which includes real property. 
Transportation or "carrying away" of the property is not 
required. 
41.
(7) "Owner" means any person who has a right to possession
thereof superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder. 
A secured party as defined in § 9105 (i) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code is not an owner in relation to a defendant 
who is a debtor, as defined in§ 9105(d) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, in respect to property in which the secured 
party has a secured interest as defined in §1201(37) of the 
ucc. 
Comment 
The first sentence of§ 160(7) is taken from the Oregon 
Code. The second sentence is taken from the proposed Revised 
Michigan Code and serves to eliminate overlap between theft 
and crimes involving secured creditors. The theory of this 
section is also contained in the MPC §223.0(7) definition of 
"property of another". The term "owner" is not used in the 
basic Alaska larceny statute A S  11.20.140 but the phrase 
"the property of another" is used and under the common law 
definition means ownership. 
( 8) "Property" means any article, substance or thing of
value, including, but not limited to, money, tangible and 
intangible personal property, real property, choses-in-action, 
evidence of debt or contract. 
Commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, 
electricity, steam, and water constitute property but the 
supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside 
source by means of wires, pipes, conduits or other equipment 
shall be deemed a rendition of a service rather than a sale 
'12. 
or delivery of property. 
Comment 
The first sentence of this section is taken from the 
Oregon Code and the MPC §223.0(6). The second sentence is 
based upon the M P  C and the definition of property in the 
Illinois Criminal Code § 15-1 and is directly taken from 
the proposed Revised Michigan Criminal Code. The second 
paragraph is intended to avoid overlap between theft and 
theft of services. 
By specifically including intangible property within its 
scope, the definition remedies the type of problem that 
occurred in the Oregon case of State v. Tauscher 227 Or. 1 
(1961) wherein it was held that only property that is 
tangible and capable of being possessed may be the subject 
of larceny or embezzlement under the existing statutes and 
an agent who, without authorization and for her own purposes, 
drew a check on her principal's account, was guilty of neither 
crime. This definition is broad enough to contain all the 
things enumerated in A S  11.20.140. 
(9) "Receiving" includes but is not limited to acquiring,
possession, control or title or lending on the security of the 
property. 
Comment 
"Receiving" applies to receiving stolen property and 
means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on 
the security of the property. The definition of receiving is 
taken from the Oregon Code and the MPC § 223.6(1). The 
essential idea to be expressed is that of acquisition of 
control whether in the sense of physical dominion or of legal 
power to dispose. The definition is broad enough to cover 
"constructive possession" and the activities of those who 
buy stolen property as well as persons who acquire title 
thereto otherwise than by purchase, and who make loans and 
advances on such property. The existing Alaska Statute on 
receiving A S  11.20.350 does not define receiving. 
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Sub. ( 10) "Threat" means a menace however communicated, to: 
(a) cause physical harm in the future to the person
threatened or to any other person; or 
(b) cause damage to property; or
(c) subject the person threatened or any other person
to physical confinement or restraint; or 
(d) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
(e) accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal
charges to be instituted against any person; or 
(f) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact,
whether true or false tending to subject any person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule or to impair his credit or 
business repute; or 
(g) testify or provide information or withhold
testimony or information with respect to another's legal 
claim or defense; or 
(h) use or abuse his position as a public official
by performing some act within or related to his official 
duties or by failing or refusing to perform an official 
duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or 
(i) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other
collective action, if the property is not demanded or 
received for the benefit of the group in whose interest 
the actor purports to act; or 
(j) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the
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person making the threat. 
Comment 
"Threat" - this definition taken from the MP C, Oregon 
and closely paralleling although not identical to the existing 
Alaska statute A S  11.20.345 on Extortion, covers most of 
the common situations in which property is extracted on the 
basis of threat. By limiting physical harm to "in the future" 
(not presently in A S  11.20.345) a clearer definition of the 
crime of extortion separate from robbery is possible. 
Sub 10 (a) covers threat to injure anyone, on the theory 
that if the threat is in fact the effective means of compelling 
another to give up property, the nature of the relationship 
to the victim and the person he chooses to protect is immaterial. 
The issues are whether the threat is intended to intimidate and 
whether it is effective for that purpose. 
Paragraph (b) is aimed at the threat to cause damage to 
someone's business, home or other property. A common example 
would be the selling of "protection" to a store owner. 
Paragraph (c) re confinement is separately specified to 
eliminate the possibility that "physical harm" in Sub§ (a) 
might not be held to cover kidnapping or confinement in a 
jail or mental institution. 
The provisions of paragraph (d) of draft are taken directly 
from New York Revised Penal Law and are similar to the Model 
Penal Code which employs the language "commit any other criminal 
offense." Commentary to Model Penal Code indicates its purpose 
is to cover a situation like this: A racketeer obtains property 
from another racketeer by threatening to operate houses of 
prostitution or illegal gambling enterprises in competition with 
him. Threat to compete would not ordinarily be criminal because 
the right to compete is one which, in our society, may be 
bargained away. However, where the competition itself would 
be criminal activity, there is no need to immunize a threat 
to engage in that activity when it is used for the purpose of 
extortion. (Tent. Draft No. 2 at 76). 
Paragraph (e) resembles closely the language now appearing 
in A. S. 11.20.345 and is common to most extortion statutes. 
Paragraph (f) of draft amounts to a threat to defame. 
Unlike defamation actions, the truth of the matter threatened to 
be exposed would not constitute a defense to a prosecution 
under this subsection. The prohibition is directed against 
"selling'' forbearance from defamation and not against the 
publication of defamation itself. It is emphasized, however, 
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that the subsection is not intended to make it criminal to 
conduct legitimate negotiation or to agree to settlement of 
an asserted claim as consideration for a promise to forbear 
from civil litigation. 
Paragraph (g) is self-explanatory. 
Paragraph (h) is aimed at extortion committed under 
cover of public office and is close to the "bribery'' type of 
crimes now incorporated in A. S. 11.30.040 - 11.30.070. 
The provisions of paragraph (i) of draft are aimed at 
racketeering, but do not in any way jeopardize the collective 
bargaining process, since even menaces are not criminal if the 
benefits are to be received by the group on behalf of which 
the "bargaining" is conducted. The group representative or 
official who threatens such action unless he gets a "kickback" 
would be reached by this subsection, however. 
Paragraph (j) is a statement of the general principle 
on which other threats are to be included within extortion. 
Examples suggested by Model Penal Code are: (a) The foreman in 
a manufacturing plant requires the workers to pay him a percentage 
of their wages on pain of dismissal or other employment discrim­
ination; (b) A close friend of the purchasing agent of a 
corporation obtains money from an important supplier by 
threatening to influence the purchasing agent to divert his business 
elsewhere; (c) A professor obtains property from a student by 
threatening to give him a failing grade. 
The draft follows Model Penal Code§ 223.4 and is a blend 
of that section and New York Revised Penal Law§ 155.05 (e). 
The New York statute proscribes larceny of property by threat 
to cause physical injury to some person in the future. The 
Model Penal Code punishes obtaining of property by a threat 
to inflict bodily injury on anyone. It is submitted that the 
New York provision is preferable because it more clearly 
distinguishes between this type of theft and robbery, which 
is the threatening of immediate use of physical force unon 
another. Illinois CriT"linal Co<le and Michigan Proposed .Re.vised. 
Criminal Code.contain·comparable statutes. 
A. S. 11.20.345 "extortion" law, provides that any 
person who threatens any injury to the person or property of 
another or threatens to accuse another of any crime or to 
compel him to do any act against his will shall be Punished. 
The crime is committed by making the th:i:-eat, ahd obtaining pra.perty 
thereby is an element. Thi� �s .also.the case in the
.
proposed
draft, A S  11.20.220. 
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There was nothing in the Oregon Commentaries to indicate 
why the phrase "unofficial" as contained in 10 (i) was 
omitted in the Oregon Code, although the M P  C comment (p. 78) 
No. 10 speaks to why it is included in the M P  C. It is 
possible that Oregon thought that "collective action" covered 
both official and unofficial as the commentaries state that 
the official who demands a kickback would be reached by the 
section. 
Sub. (11) "Value means the market value of the property at the 
time and place of the criminal act unless otherwise specified. 
or, if such cannot reasonably be ascertained, the cost of 
replacement of the property within a reasonable time after 
the crime. 
Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, 
certain written instruments, not including those having a 
readily ascertained market value such as some public and 
corporate bonds and securities shall be evaluated as follows: 
(a) the value of an instrument constituting an evidence
of debt, including, but not limited to, a check, draft or 
promissory note, shall be considered the amount due or 
collected thereon or thereby; 
(b) the value of any other instrument that creates,
releases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal 
right, privilege or obligation shall be deemed the greatest 
amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument 
might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instru-
ment; 
(c) when property has value but that value cannot be
ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth above, the 
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value shall be deemed to be an amount not exceeding $250.00. 
Amounts involved in thefts committed pursuant to one 
course of conduct, whether from the same person or several 
persons ) may be aggregated in determining the grade of the 
offense. 
Comment 
"Value" - this definition is taken from the New York 
revised Penal Code § 155.20 with the deletion of the New York 
provision dealing specifically with airline tickets. With 
this deletion, the proposed definition is identical to that 
of the Oregon Code. The comment to the New York Code indicated 
that the specific reference to airline tickets was probably 
not necessary therefore I deleted it. This definition is more 
specific than that of the MP C which establishes value as 
"the highest value by any reasonable standard of the property 
or services". Market value is customarily used by the courts 
in determining the value of property affected by theft. The 
second paragraph gives guidelines as to how t6 value certain 
intangibles which do no have an easily ascertainable market 
price. 
The third paragraph is to cover the situation where 
something of value has been taken but it's impossible to 
arrive at a satisfactory evaluation of what has been taken. 
This ensures that the taking is criminal although no specific 
value is given to the property. $250.00 is suggested to 
allow a balance between the need to protect owners of certain 
specialized kinds of property against-deprivation and the 
avoidance of excessive punishment. 
The main change is in allowing the aggregation of small 
amounts taken from the same or several persons pursuant to 
one scheme or course of conduct. It is possible that an 
employer, citizen and the community could incur substantial 
financial loss. Aggregation of amounts allows the felony 
range of punishments. 
This provision is taken from the M P  C and is not part 
of the Oregon Code. 
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Sec. 11.20.170. Theft described. 
A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive another 
of property or to appropriate property to himself or to a 
third person, he: 
(1) takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds such property
from an owner thereof; or 
( 2) commits theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by
mistake as provided in § 210; or 
( 3) commits theft by extortion as provided in § 220; or
( 4) commits theft by deception, § 230; or
( 5) commits theft by receiving as provided in § 240.
Comments to§ 170 follow§ 180. 
Sec. 11.20.180. Consolidation of Theft Offenses; pleading and proof. 
(1) Except for the crime of theft by extortion, conduct
denominated as theft under§ 170 constitutes a single offense. 
(2) If it is an element of the crime that property was taken
by extortio� an accusation of theft must so specify. In all 
other cases an accusation of theft is sufficient if it alleges 
that the defendant committed theft of property of the nature 
or value required for the commission of the crime charged 
without designating the particular way or manner in which the 
theft was committed. 
(3) Prcof that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting
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theft as defined in AS ll,2Q.170 is sufficient to support 
a conviction based upon any indictment, information or 
complaint for theft other than one charging theft by extortion, 
subject only to the power of the Court to ensure fair trial 
by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where 
the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of 
fair notice or surprise. A conviction based upon an accusation 
of theft by extortion must be supported by proof at trial 
establishing theft by extortion. 
Comment 
Source 
These sections are taken from the Oregon Code with this 
additional language from the MP C "subject only to the power 
of the court to ensure fair trial by granting a continuance 
or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense 
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or surprise". 
The additional language met with the approval of the majority of 
the technical committee as it was felt that it states what in 
fact would be the law. 
Purpose 
The chief aims in drafting these sections and those 
which follow have been (1) to eliminate the confusing 
distinctions between larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by 
conversion, embezzlement of different kinds, and obtaining 
property by false pretenses perpetuated in the present 
statutes, (2) to define with greater clarity and in light of 
modern economic circumstances the line between criminal and 
non-criminal acquisitive conduct and (3) to lay the ground 
work for a more rational classification of offenders in the 
property crimes area to reduce unwarranted disparity in 
punishments. 
5 0. 
Advantage over Existing Law 
The chief advantage is that by the simple definition 
of theft in§ 170,incorporating as it does the definitions 
of "deprive", "obtain", "appropriate", the artificial distinc­
tions between the several kinds of larceny, embezzlement and 
obtaining property by false pretenses are swept away. The 
gravamen of the offense will be the obtaining of control 
over property in which another has an interest and the 
deliberate diversion of it for the offender's own purposes. 
A unitary definition will enable the courts to examine 
predatory conduct against property much more realistically 
than has the multitude of overlapping and inconsistent statutes 
which now exist in Alaska. 
The use of a single definition of theft also will work 
a procedural advantage both to the state and to the defendant. 
The state will be protected to a substantial degree against 
a finding of a variance when a conviction is appealed. The 
defendant, however, will no longer be in the position of 
having to defend against an array of statutory crimes when 
any one of them is alleged against him. 
Sec. 11�20.l�O. Defenses to Theft. 
(1) In a prosecution for theft, it is a defense that
the person acted under an honest claim of right in that: 
(a) he is unaware that the property is that of another; or
(b) he believes that he is entitled to the property or
that he is authorized to dispose of it as he does; or 
(c) he takes property exposed for sale, intending to
purchase and pay for it promptly, or reasonably believing that 
the owner, if present, would have consented. 
(2) In a prosecution for theft by extortion committed by
instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person 
would be charged with a crime, it is a defense that the defendant 
reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that 
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his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take 
reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject 
of the threatened charge. 
(3) In a prosecution for theft by receiving, it is a
defense that the defendant received, retained, concealed or 
disposed of the property with the intent of restoring it to 
the owner. 
(4) If the owner of the property is the actor's spouse,
no prosecution for theft may be maintained unless: 
a) the property which is obtained or over which
unauthorized control is exerted does not constitute household 
belongings; or 
b) the property constitutes household belongings but is
taken or subjected to unauthorized control while the parties 
are maintaining separate households and without a claim of it 
made in good faith. 
"Household belonqings" means furniture, personal effects, 
vehicles, money or its equivalent in amounts customarily used 
for household purposes and other property usually found in 
and about the common dwelling and accessible to its occupants. 
(5) It is not a defense in a prosecution for theft to
have an interest in property when the owner also has an interest 
to which the defendant is not entitled. 
Comment 
This section is taken from the Oregon Code with an 
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additional provision 4(1) (c) taken from the MP C. 4(1} (a&b) 
states existing law. 4(4) has the objective of r�moving 
domestic squabbles from the criminal court yet allows redress 
for a confidence man who fleeces his new bride\ 4(5) 
clarifies that a person can have criminal responsibility for 
theft even though he has a part interest in the property 
affected. It embodies the policy that co�owners should be 
as well protected against depredations by other co..-.owners 
as they are against outsiders. This concept is again 
referenced in AS 11.20.250. 
4(4) does not change existing· Alaska law. 
Sec. 11.20.200. Grading of Theft Offenses 
(1) Theft constitutes a Class C felony if the amount
involved exceeds $500 or if the property stolen is a firearm 
or explosive or is taken from the person of another or by 
threat. 
(2) Theft not within the preceding paragraph constitutes a
Class misdemeanor, except that if the property was not 
taken from the person or by threat, and the amount involved 
was less than $50, the offense constitutes a Class 
misdemeanor. 
(3) The amount involved in a theft shall be deemed to be
the value of the property or services which the 
actor stole or attempted to steal at the time or place of 
the criminal act unless otherwise specified. 
Comments 
Source 
The source of this provision is 223.1(2) of the MP C 
with the substitution of the figure of $500 pursuant to 
Commission direction and the addition of explosives which 
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is an addition from the Revised Code of Massachusetts. 
Automobiles have been deleted and will be treated according 
to value or as in 11.20.280 and 11.20.460, .470. 
In 1962, the M P  C used $500 as the dividing line; Oregon, 
in 1971 retained $250. Massachusetts, in 1972, used $1,000. 
The Commission set the figure of $500 as the dividing line at 
the meeting of January 6 and 7, 1976, based in part upon the 
per cent of crimes that fall within the $0 - 500 range. In a 
sample of 523 reported complaints, only 43 reported a value 
over $1,000 and about 20% were $500. 
Existing Alaska law has diverse dividing lines, i.e. 
11.20.140 is $100, 11.20.160, and 11.20.240, $50 for example. 
Differentiation of theft into degree$ takes account of 
the diverse circumstances involved in individual theft offenses 
and permits the severity of the sanctions authorized to be 
correlated with the aggravating circumstances. Value is still 
the basis for the penalties with the addition of firearms and 
explosives, where the potential for harm exceeds the value of 
the article stolen. 
Sec. 11.20.210. Theft of Lost, Mislaid Property. 
(1) A person who comes into control of property of another
that he knows to have been lost, mislaid or delivered under 
a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the 
identity of the recipient, commits theft if, with intent to 
deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures 
to restore the property to the owner. 
(2) ''Reasonable measures" includes but is not necessarily
limited to notifying the identified owner or any peac officer. 
(3) Theft of lost property constitutes a Class
misdemeanor unless the value of the property exceeds $500, 
in which case, it is a Class C felony. 
Comment 
This section is taken from the Oregon Code with the 
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addition of (2) which is a simplification of the "reasonable 
measures" which is presently in AS 11,20 1 260, § 260 uses 
value to determine penalty. Most codes ascribe a lesser 
penalty to this offense regardless of value because of the 
difference in attitude and deqree of dangerousness between 
the individual who decides to take advantage of unexpected 
opportunity and the premeditating thief. 
However, most Commission members wished to retain value 
as a dividing line between misdemeanor/felony so the section 
has been revised to reflect that thinking, No dividing line 
value has been included as it should be the same as for the 
standard theft provision. Note has been taken of the police's 
problem in disposal of property. A separate statute is being 
drafted to handle this problem. 
Sec. 11.20.220. Theft by Extortion. 
(1) Extortion means to obtain by threat control over property
of the owner with intent to deprive the owner permanently of 
the property. 
(2) Theft by extortion is a Class B felony.
(3) No person commits a crime based upon a threat as defined
in AS 11.20.160 (10) (e) if he reasonably believed the threatened 
charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or 
induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the 
wrong which was the subject of the threatened charge. 
Comment 
This section draws a clearer line between robbery and 
extortion as previously pointed out in the comment regarding 
the definition of threat and is based upon the MP C, Oregon 
Criminal Code and AS 11.20.345. 
The Commission has questions regarding 11.20.220(3) as 
to what "honestly claims" means. "Honestly claims" is not 
referred to at all in the MP C comments, nor is it defined in 
the general definitions section of the MP C. Oregon's 
defense to extortion is framed as "reasonably believed" and 
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relates only to the proposed§ ll,20�160(10) (el in de�initions 
while AS 11. 20. 345 refers. agai·n to "honestly clairns 1'. 
The proposed Michigan Code uses "Honestly claims"· but in 
the comments talks in terms of "believing he is- legally 
justified". An honest claim has been defined in the Restatement 
on Restitution as "a claim which the claimant does not know 
is unsubstantial or such that he does not know facts which show 
that his claim is a bad one". 
It is a policy question as to whether anyone should be 
allowed a defense in §§ 11,20,160(10) (e) ,. (f), (h) as the 
MP C does. The revised proposal tracks the Oregon statute 
regarding a defense to extortion for the reason that a person 
should not be coerced into handing over property by most of 
the varieties of threat listed in § 160(10). The defendant 
should not be permitted to use this kind of leverage whether 
or not he may believe he is legally justified in receiving or 
holding the property he demands. This revised proposal, as 
Oregon, allows a defense only to a threat� to "accuse any 
person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted 
against any person". Because civil litigation can give rise 
to acrimony which in turn can lead to threats of one kind 
or another, and because statements made as a prelude to an 
out-of-court settlement might later be characterized by the 
losing party as threats, it appears appropriate to authorize 
a defense when the offense falls within 11.20.160 (10) (e). 
Sec. 11.20.230. Theft by Deception 
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains property
of another by deception. 
(2) In a prosecution for theft by deception, the defendant's
intention or belief that a promise would not be performed 
shall not be established by or inferred from the fact alone 
that such promise was not performed, 
(3) Theft by deception constitutes a Class misdemeanor 
unless the value of the property exceeds $500, in which case 
it is a Class C felony. 
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Comment 
§ 230, together with the definition of deception in
§ 160 (2) (a-e), defines the crime of theft by deception.
This section is based upon Oregon law with the elimination
of the bad check provisions and the MP C. Subsection (2)
is existing law and is taken from the MP C § 223.3 and the
New York Revised Penal Law§ 155.05.
Sections 230 and 160 (2) (a-e) define the crime of theft 
by deception. The section is restricted to include only those 
instances wherein there exists an intent to defraud and to 
exclude cases essentially civil in nature and mounting to little 
more than breaches of contract. 
Section 160(2) (a) retains the traditional false pretenses 
concept of creating a false impression, and broadens the scope 
to include the act of confirming another's false impression 
which the actor does not believe to be true. If the actor 
confirms the false impression for the purpose of inducing consent 
and obtains property thereby, he will commit theft. The false 
impression may relate to law, value, intention or other state of 
mind of the victim. The traditional restriction to "existinc:J 
fact" is rejected. There is no "false token' requirement 
retained. 
If the actor fails to correct a false impression which he 
previously created or confirmed and obtains property thereby, 
he would commit theft under 11.20.160 (2) (b). 
A person who prevents another from acquiring information 
pertinent to the disposition of the property would commit 
theft if he does so with frRudulent intent and obtains property 
of another as the result. 11.20.160 (2) (c) 
If with like intent and with like result the actor sells, 
transfers or otherwise encumbers property and fails to disclose 
a lien or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property 
he would be guilty of theft under the provisions of§ 160 (2) (d). 
(AS 11.20.400) 
AS 11. 20 .16 0 ( 2) (e) covers theft committed by "false 
promise" and represents a significant departure from the familiar 
limitation to misrepresentation of fact and includes promises 
of future performance which the actor does not intend to 
perform or knows will not be performed. However, mere non­
performance alone would not be sufficient to establish that 
the actor intended or believed that a promise would not be 
performed. 11.20.230 (2). 
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The exception contained in 11.20.160 (2) is designed to 
deal with the problem of mass advertising and "commendation of 
wares" that would be considered unlikely to deceive ordinary 
persons, and to institutions wherein a misrepresentation may 
be made during the "bargaining" but the person deceived 
nonetheless gets everything he bargained for. For example, 
a salesman who misrepresents his political or lodge affilia­
tions to make a sale. 
AS 11.20.230 and 11.20.160(2) (a-e) are from Oregon and are 
derived from Illinois Criminal Code § 15-4 and Michigan 
Proposed Revised Criminal Code § 3201. 
In Paragraph (a) the phrase,"of law, value, intention or 
other state of mind," which modifies the word "impression", 
is taken from Model Penal Code § 223.3. This language seems 
desirable because it clearly indicates the intent to eliminate 
needless distinctions based on "fact" as contrasted with 
"opinion" or "present or past fact" as opposed to future events." 
The exception contained in 11.20.160(2) (e) is taken from the 
Model Penal Code § 223.3. 
Subsection .230 is similar to provisions contained in 
Model Penal Code § 223.3 (a). 
The section brings what is now the crime of obtaining 
property by false pretenses, A. S. 11.20.360, within the ambit 
of theft and greatly broadens the scooe of the offense to 
include conduct not now covered. 
Deception would include, also, the 
type of fraudulent activity which presently would be prose­
cuted as "larceny by trick''. Eliminated is the tricky 
question of whether "title" as opposed to "possession" passes. 
Obtaining property by means of a bad check also could be 
prosecuted as theft by deception. 
In response to questions regarding the possible overlap 
of this section and A. S. 45.50.471, the Consumer Protection 
Division of the Attorney General's office was queried and the 
response was that this section would be most helpful in 
Consumer Protection prosecution as presently �1t1e 4� provides 
only a misdemeanor penalty for the criminal offense under the 
statute. Most of their actions now are through the civil 
side but more criminal prosecutions would be brought if they 
had a felony penalty clout with increased possibilities for 
extradition. 
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Another question raised by the Commission was whether 
businesses would be unjustly subjected to criminal liability 
where they make contracts, intending in the alternative, to 
perform or to pay liquidated damages or such damages as the 
law allows the promisee. This fear appears to be unfounded. 
Not every promise implies an unequivocal intention to perform. 
A provision for liquidated damages would obviously be relevant 
evidence to show that the actor had not purposefully created 
the false impression that he would in all events perform. 
Among businesspersons, especially in certain trades, there would 
be a general understanding that words of promise mean only 
that the promisor will perform or pay damages. In that event, 
the promisor could be held guilty only if he did not intend to 
do either. In short, the actor is to be understood in the 
sense in which he expected and desired his hearer to understand 
him, and it is only where he did not believe what he purpose­
fully caused his victim to believe that he can be convicted 
of theft. 
Sec. 11.20.240. Theft by Receiving. 
(1) A person .commits theft by receiving if he buys,
receives, retains, conceals or disposes of property of another 
knowina or having good reason to know that the property was the 
subject of theft, unless the property is received, retained, con­
cealed or aisposed of with the purpose to restore it to the owner. 
(2) A person or his agent, employee, or representative whose
principal business is dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, who buys or 
receives property which has been stolen is rebuttably presumed 
to have bought or received the property knowing it was stolen 
if a person in his capacity should have reasonably inquired 
as to whether the person from whom the property was bought or 
received had the legal right to sell or deliver it, and he 
failed to make the inquiry. 
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(3) The fact that the person who stole the property has
not been convicted, apprehended or identified is not a defense 
to a charge of receiving stolen property. 
( 4) Theft by receiving constitutes a Class misdemeanor 
unless the value of the property exceeds $500, in which case 
it is a Class C felony. 
(5) A person who violates this section is liable in a civil
action to the owner of the stolen property for three times 
the amount of actual dollars sustained by him for the loss of 
the property, as well as all costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
(This language from existing AS 11.20.350.) 
Comment 
This section is based upon existing Alaska law (11.20.350) 
and the MPC § 223.6. Sub§ (b) is aimed at the professional 
fence and reflects that a higher burden should be placed on 
dealers than on casual receivers. This incorpoates the 
traditional distinct crime of receiving stolen property as part 
of the new comprehensive "theft offense". It is not unlikely 
that the crime of receiving stolen property owed its separate 
existence to circumstances which no longer exist, especially 
the historic restriction of larceny to cases of "trespass" 
against another's possessions. The receiver acquires the 
property by voluntary delivery of the original thief. 
From a practical standpoint it is important to punish 
receivers in order to discourage theft. The existence and 
functioning of a fence, a dealer who provides a market for 
stolen property is an assurance , especially to professional 
thieves, of ability to realize the unlawful gain. 
Consolidation of receiving with other forms of theft 
provides the same advantages as other aspects of the unification 
of theft concept. It reduces the opportunity for technical 
defenses based upon legal distinctions between the similar 
activities of stealing and receiving the fruit of the theft. 
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Consolidation is favorable to the defendant by making it 
impossible to convict of two offenses based on the same 
transaction. 
The Oregon commentaries reflect that the "having good 
reason to know" is tougher than the M P  C's actual awareness 
but says under the M P  C version, proof of reason to believe 
would authorize a jury to draw an inference of actual knowledge 
so difference is academic. 
Sec. ll.20�25Q. Right of"Possession 
Right of possession of property is as follows: 
(1) For purposes of this chapter, a person who has
obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal 
means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior 
to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds the property 
from him by means of theft. 
(2) A joint or common owner of property shall not be
deemed to have a right of possession of the property superior 
to that of any other joint or common owner of the property. 
(3) In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary,
a person in lawful p�ssession of property shall be deemed to 
have a right of possession �t:perior to that of a person having 
only a security interest in the property, even if legal title 
to the property lies with the holder of the security interest 
pursuant to a conditional sales contract or other security 
agreement. 
Comment 
This section is taken from Oregon and spells out the 
right of possession of property. Sub§ (1) is consistent 
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with the definition of "owner" contained in § 160 (7) by 
providing that one who obtained possession of property by 
theft or other illegal means has a right of possession 
superior to that of one who takes, obtains or withholds 
it from him by means of theft. This is a codification of 
a generally accepted principle in the larceny area. 
Subsec. (2) defines the rights of joint or common owners, 
such as partners and is a restatement of the generally accepted 
principle that one cannot "steal" from the other if the taker 
has a right to possession at the time of the taking. 
Subsec. (3) deals with the difficult cases in which there 
is some sort of security agreement between the parties, and 
provides that in the absence of a specific agreement to the 
contrary, a person in lawful possession of property has a right 
of possession superior to one having only a security interest 
therein. The gist of the subsection is to protect lawful 
possession. This section represents basically a codification 
of existing common law principles. 
Sec. 11.20.260. Theft of Services. 
(1) A person commits the crime of theft of services if:
(a) he knowingly obtains services, known by him to be
available only for compensation, by deception, force, threat, 
or other means to avoid payment for the services; or 
(b) having control over the disposition of services of
others to which he is not entitled, he knowingly diverts those 
services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another not 
entitled thereto. 
(2) "Services" includes but is not necessarily limited to
labor, professional services, transportation, telephone or 
other public services, accommodation in hotels, restaurants 
or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions and the supplying of 
equipment for use. 
(3) Absconding without payment or offer to pay for hotel,
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restaurant or other services for which compensation is custom­
arily paid immediately upon the receiving of them is prima 
facie evidence that the services were obtained by deception. 
(4) Theft of services is a Class misdemeanor unless the 
value of the services exceeds $500, in which case it is a 
Class C felony. 
Comments 
The starting point of this section is the MP C § 223.7. 
The purpose of this section is to protect commercial enterprises. 
The definition of property in Section 11.20.160(8) prevents 
overlap between this section and ordinary theft. To aid 
enforceability, absconding without payment is prima facie evidence 
deception. Some commentators have suggested that the punishment 
for this theft should be less because often the actual loss 
incurred is small. In addition, many of the complaining 
businesses do not exercise diligence and wish to profit from 
their lack of safeguards. Because of this, many jurisdictions 
treat it as a one degree crime. Pursuant to Commission direction, 
this concept was rejected and the degree of crime will depend 
upon the value of services stolen. 
Sec. 11.20.270. Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of 
Funds Received. 
(1) A person commits the crime of failure to make required
disposition of funds received or held when 
(a) he knowingly obtains property from anyone or personal
services from an employee upon agreement or subject to a known 
legal obligation to make specified payment or other disposition 
to a third person, whether from that property or its proceeds 
or from one's own property to be reserved in equivalent amount; 
and 
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(b) when he deals with the property as his own and
knowingly or recklessly fails to make the required payment 
or disposition. 
(2) It does not matter that it may be impossible to
identify particular property as belonging to the victim at the 
time of the defendant's failure to make the required payment or 
disposition. 
(3) An officer or employee of the government or of a
financial institution is presumed 
(a) to know any legal obligation relevant to his
criminal liability under this section and 
(b) to have dealt with the property as his own if he
fails to pay or account upon lawful demand, or if an audit 
reveals a shortage or falsification of accounts. 
(4) Theft by failure to make required disposition of
funds received or held is a Class misdemeanor 
unless the value exceeds $500.00 , in which case it is a Class C 
felony• 
Comment 
This section has no equivalent in Alaska law. The content 
derives from the MPC 223.8 and is necessary because traditional law 
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provides no protection against one who receives property not 
by deception, but subject to an obligation to dispose of it 
or an equivalent in a given way, and one who fails to fulfill 
his obligation to his own benefit (i.e., employer who withholds 
taxes or United Fund contributions). This section makes it 
criminal to either purposefully or recklessly fail to make the 
required payment or disposition. A mistake of law defense is 
not available to officers or employees of the government or 
a financial institution because people in this position should 
be under a duty to determine the legal requirements affecting 
their conduct when citizens' or depositors' money is at stake. 
There is no presumption here against private fiduciaries . 
. The presumption based on failure to pay or account arises 
only on lawful demand and subsequent refusal. As set out here, 
punishment would vary according to the value affected by the 
criminal act although one might wish to consider setting out 
specific, stringent penalties regardless of value because of 
the breach of trust. 
Because of Commissioners' questions as to whether Sec. 270
is needed, this comment contains additional reasons why it is 
a valuable section. There is no common-law coverage of the 
situation in which a man receives title to property or other 
funds subject to an agreement to make certain disbursements 
at a future time. Nor did the common law anticipate the use 
of paychecks instead of cash and the device of "withholding" 
in which no property as such ever changes hands. If the 
particular transaction could be viewed as a bailment of spe�ific
property, then sometimes embezzlement or larceny by conversion
might lie; but very often it was clear that no fraud had been 
practiced, title to property had been unconditionally transferred 
in return for a promise of counter-performance and thereafter 
the obligor for reasons of his own decided to refrain from 
compliance to his own advantage. The withholding situation 
amounted to a general debtor-creditor relationship only. A 
finding of these facts would not support a conviction o� larceny, 
embezzlement or obtaining property by false pretenses either 
because of doctrines of "possession" or because no property was
involved. 
This section does not really overlap the theft provision 
because it is relatively rare for specific property to be 
received on the understanding that the same property is to be 
disposed of in a particular way. 
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In the usual instance, there will be only a general debtor­
creditor relationship, as in the case of the employer who 
"withholds", the merchant who sells "on consignment", the 
contractor who must "reserve" money to pay subcontractors or 
the property owner who must "retain intact" a stated per cent 
of the contract or contract price pending final certification 
of completion by an architect. 
The chief difference between this proposal and the M P  C 
223.8 is that the latter refers only to property while this 
draft refers to "property from anyone or personal services 
from his employees". It is not clear that "property" as 
defined in either MP C 223.0 (6) or Sec.160(8) of this draft, 
includes for example, the value of labor or service performed 
for the economic benefit of an employer. Therefore the phrase 
"from his employee" was added to prevent overlap with the 
theft of services section. 
Sec. 11.20.280. Unauthorized Use of a Propelled Vehicle.
(1) A person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a
propelled vehicle if:
(a) knowing that he does not have the consent of the owner,
he takes, operates, exercises control over or otherwise uses 
another's propelled vehicle; or 
(b) having custody of a propelled vehicle pursuant to
an agreement between himself or another and the owner thereof 
whereby he or another is to perform for compensation a specific 
service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair or use 
of such a vehicle, he intentionally uses or operates it, without 
the consent of the owner, for his own purpose in a manner 
constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or 
(c) having custody of a propelled vehicle pursuant to
an agreement with the owner thereof whereby it is to be returned 
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to the owner at a specified time, he knowingly retains or 
withholds possession thereof without the consent of the owner 
for so lengthy a period beyond the specified time as to render 
the retention or possession a gross deviation from the agreement. 
(2) The consent of the owner of a propelled vehicle to its
use shall not be presumed or implied because of the owner's 
consent on previous occasions to its use by the same or a 
different person. 
(3) Definition of propelled vehicle. A propelled vehicle
means a device upon which or by which a person or property is or 
may be transported, and which is self-propelled. It shall 
include but not be limited to autos, vessels, airplanes, motor­
cycles, snow machines, ATV's, sailboats and construction equipment. 
(4) Unauthorized use of a propelled vehicle is a Class
misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of this section 
shall be a Class C felony. 
(5) When a minor is accused of violations under this section,
he may be charged, prosecuted and sentenced in the same manner 
as an adult except that a parent, guardian or legal custodian 
shall be present at all proceedings against the minor. 
Comment 
Comment follows § 11.20.290. 
Sec. 11.20.290. Unauthorized Occupancy of a Propelled Vehicle. 
(1) A person commits the crime of unauthorized occupancy of 
a propelled vehicle if he knowingly rides in a propelled 
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vehicle which at the time he entered the vehicle, he knew or 
had been informed had been stolen or was being used 
or was to be used in violation of§ 280. 
(2) Unauthorized occupancy of a propelled vehicle is a
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
Section 280 defines the offense known as ''joyriding" 
which has the intent of borrowing rather than that of depriving 
or appropriating as in theft. Sec. l(a) covers the ordinary 
taking of a vehicle. The situation where one or more persons 
who may or may not have or�ajnallv taken it are found riding in 
it is covered in§ 290. 
Sec. l(b) and (c) define offenses of the embezzlement 
variety, involving excessive misuse or withholding of a vehicle 
by a person who originally obtained possession or custody 
thereof legally. In order to exclude frivolous charges, this type 
of offense has been limited to two kinds of situations. The 
first, l(b), is exemplified by a garage attendant who without 
authorization uses a patron's car to go on a spree. The 
second, L(c), is illustrated by a person who borrows a car in 
Anchorage for an afternoon and drives it down the AlCan. In 
each case, the conduct must constitute a "gross deviation" 
from the agreement or the agreed purpose of the bailment. 
In this proposal, a first offense is classified as a 
misdemeanor. Genuine theft cases would be prosecutable as 
felonies depending upon the value of the vehicle. 
This proposed section is taken from New York Revised 
Penal Law § 165. 05. Secs. (2) (5) and the felony provisions 
of (4.) are taken from the proposed revision prepared by the 
Alaska Traffic Code Revision Committee. 
Existing Alaska Law A S  28.35.010 and 11.20.145 provide 
a misdemeanor penalty. Unauthorized use would be a lesser 
included offense to theft of an automobile. A S  11.20.146 
presently provides for this. 
Damage to the vehicle is covered under§§ 460 -480 of 
this draft, Criminal Mischief. 
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Sec. 11.20.300. Removal of Identification Marks. 
(1) A person commits the offense of removal of identification
marks if he, with intent to cause interruption of the owner­
ship of another, defaces, erases, or otherwise alters any 
serial number or identification mark placed or inscribed on 
any bicycle, firearm, moveable or immoveable construction 
tool or equipment, appliances, merchandise or other article 
or its component parts. A person removes identification marks 
if he attempts to, or succeeds in erasing, defacing, altering, 
or removing a serial number or identification mark or part 
thereof, on the property of another. 
(2) Removal of the identification marks is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
Comment of this section follows Section 11.20.310. 
Sec. 11.20.310. Unlawful Possession. 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to possess any
bicycle, firearm, moveable construction tool or equipment, 
appliance, merchandise or other article, ar any part thereof 
knowing the serial number or identification mark placed on 
the same by the manufacturer or owner for the purpose of 
identification has been erased, altered, changed or removed 
for the purpose of changing the identity of the foregoing items. 
(2) Unlawful possession is a Class misdemeanor. 
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Comment 
The type of statute reflected in AS 11.20.300 and 
11.20.310, modeled on Hawaii, is present in at least Michigan, 
New York, and Ohio Statutes. The strict liability concept 
where possession of the vehicle or mechanical device is proof 
of a violation even with no knowledge or motivation specified, 
has been upheld in Michigan. 
It is a felony in New York but a misdemeanor in Hawaii, 
Ohio and Michigan. 
The Hawaii alternative appears to answer some of the 
Commission's problem regarding handling of one's own property 
as it speaks to "with intent to cause interruption of owner­
ship of another" in the section on removal of marks. It still 
makes possession of any property including one's own a 
misdemeanor if 
(1) there is knowledge that the marks have been removed and
(2) the purpose was to change the identity of the item.
There is no Alaska Statute directly on point. As stated 
in the New York Commentaries and the comments to the first 
proposal, the statute is in response to the fact that vehicles, 
certain kinds of machinery and other particular articles are 
vulnerable to organized rings who steal, attempt to render 
unidentifiable and resell. 
If there is still concern that the statute is overbroad, 
the following provision based on the New York statute covers 
more specific articles of commerce: 
Alternate Sec. 11.20.300. Forgery of a vehicle identification number. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery of a vehicle identification
number when:
(a) he knowingly destroys, covers, defaces, alters or
otherwise changes the form or appearance of a vehicle identifi­
cation number on any motor vehicle or motorcycle or component 
part thereof, except tires; or 
(b) he removes any such number from a motor vehicle or
motorcycle or component part thereof, except as required by 
the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law; or 
(c) he affixes a vehicle identification number to a motor
vehicle or motorcycle except in accordance with the provisions 
of the vehicle and traffic law. 
(2) Forgery of a vehicle identification number is a Class C
felony.
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Alternate Sec. 11.20.310. Illegal Possession of a Vehicle 
Identification Number Plate. 
(1) A person is guilty of illegal possession of a vehicle
identification number plate when:
(a) he knowingly possesses a vehicle identification number
plate which has been removed from the motor vehicle or motor­
cycle to which such plate was affixed by the manufacturer or 
in accordance with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic 
law; or 
(b) he knowingly possesses a motor vehicle or motorcycle
to which is attached a vehicle identification number plate 
which has been destroyed, covered, defaced, altered, or 
otherwise changed; or 
(c) he knowingly possesses a motor vehicle or motorcycle
with a vehicle identification number plate which was not 
affixed by the manufacturer or in accordance with the provisions 
of the vehicle and traffic law. 
(2) Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number plate
is a Class C felony.
Practice Comments from the New York Code. The provisions of 
§170.65 and 170.70 are part of a plan "designed to crack down
on professional auto thieves in New York State. The first bill 
is directed at the use of ownership documents and vehicle 
identification numbers from junked and wrecked vehicles to 
obtain apparently "clean" ownership documents for stolen 
vehicles. This is one of the two principal ways in which 
professional car thieves are able to get stolen cars registered 
in this state. This section should make this mode of operation 
much more difficuit by requiring the surrender of the vehicle 
identification number plate and the proofs of ownership of 
junked vehicles to the Superintendent of State Police and by 
requiring the notification of the State Police as to the 
disposition and destruction of vehicles sold or referred as junk 
or salvage . In addition it is a Class E felony to tamper 
with or remove a motor vehicle identification number or affix an 
improper vehicle identification number to a motor vehicle, or 
to knowingly possess a vehicle identification number plate or 
to knowingly possess a vehicle with a tampered vehicle identi­
fication number plate". 
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Sec. 11.20.320 Bad Checks 
* 
(1) A person is guilty of issuing a bad check if he:
a) issues a check as a drawer or representative drawer,
knowing that he or his principal, as the case may be, has 
insufficient funds with the drawee to cover the check, an� he 
knows at the time of issuance that payment will be refused 
by the drawee upon �resentation; or 
b) passes a check, knowing that the drawer thereof
has insufficient funds with the drawee to cover the check, and 
he knows at the time the check is passed that payment will 
be refused by the drawee upon presentation and payment in fact 
is refused by the drawee upon presentation. 
(2; An issuer is presumed to believe that the check or 
order, other than a post-dated check or order, will be refused 
by the drawee upon presentation, if payment was refused by 
the drawee for insufficient funds, upon presentation within 
thirty days after issue and the issuer failed to make full 
satisfaction of the amount of the check within ten days after 
receiving notice of such refusal. 
( 3) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution
for issuing a bad check that the defendant or a person acting 
in his behalf made full satisfaction of the amount of the 
check with cost and fees within ten days after dishonor by the 
drawee. 
(4) As used in this section:
a) "drawer" means a person whose name appears on a
*This provision must be correlated with the affirmative uefense
provision in the General Provision Section.
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check as the primary obligor, whether the actual signature be 
that of himself. or of a person purportedly authorized to draw 
the check in his behalf; 
b) "representative drawer" n·cans a person who signs a
check as drawer in a representative capacity or as agent o� 
the person whose name appears thereon as the principal drawer 
or obligor; 
c) "in.sufficient funds' means funds with the drawee in
an amount less that that of the check; 
d) a person "issues" a check when, as a drawer or
representative drawer thereof, he delivers it or causes it to 
be delivered to a person who thereby acquired a right against 
the drawer with respect to such check; provided, however, that 
one who draws a check with intent that it be so delivered is 
deemed to have issued it if the delivery occurs; 
e) a person "passes" a check when, being a payee,
holder or bearer of a check which previously has been or 
purports to have been drawn and issued by another, he delivers 
it, for a purpose other than collection, to a third person who 
thereby acquired a right with respect thereto. 
( 5) The offense shall be punishable as a Class
Conunent 
misdemeanor. 
This section is primarily the Massachusetts law and is 
designed to cover the issuance or passing of bad checks where 
no property or services are obtained and which therefore docs not 
amount to theft. The detinitinn of deception in§ 160(8) makes 
it possil::,le to prosecute the ty,,ical bad check passer on the 
basis ot" the Doney or pro:Jerty obtained in return for the check. 
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The punishment could depend upon the amount (including aggrega­
tion) or, as here, on the number of checks passed within a stated
tim�� 
The presumption of knowledge is probably the most important 
practical reason for retaining bad check provisions. Consider 
the merchant who finds that a chec� he cashed is drawn on a 
fictitious or inadequate account. It 
is possible but highly improbable that the transaction was 
innocent: the drawer may absentmindedly have put the name of 
the wrong bank on a blank check or he may have intended to 
open an account before the check was presented. In the case of 
checks on real but inadequate accounts, the chance of innocence 
is greater but is negated by a refusal to make the check good 
promptly. 
Based upon Commission discussion, no specific stale check 
�revision was adopted as the consensus was that it was implicit 
in the proposed language. Also the Massachusetts provision 
making a bad check violation a felony if there were three previous 
convictions has been dropped. 
The existing Alaska Statutes are AS 11.20.210 - .250. 
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Sec. 11.20.330. Robbery. 
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if in the course of commit-
ting a theft, he knowingly takes property from the person or the 
immediate presence and control of a person and uses force or 
the threat of causing immediate bodily injury 
a) to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking
of the property or to the retention of the property immediately 
after the taking; or 
b) to compel the other person to deliver up the
property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the taking 
or carrying away of the property. 
(2) Robbery is a Class A felony if in the course of
committing or attempting to commit it, or in immediate flight 
after such attempt or commission, either the defendant or 
another participant 
a) is armed with a dangerous weapon or represents
that he or another partkipant is then and there so armed; or 
b) causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to
another person. 
(3) Robbery, if not punishable as Class A felony, is
punishable as a Class B felony. 
(4) The Court or jury before which any person indicted
for robbery is tried may find him guilty of theft in any degree. 
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Comment 
This definition of robbery, based primarily upon Massachusetts 
and Oregon law, draws the line clearly between robbery and 
extortion and also provides for increased penalties by reason 
of increased danger to the victim. The line is clear because, 
in robbery, it involves threat of immediate force whereas threat 
in extortions cover a threat to cause future harm. The entire 
section emphasizes the concern for physical danger or the 
appearance of physical danger to the citizen as opposed to the 
actual taking of property. That is why the common law defense 
of claim of right was eliminated in the previous draft since the 
danger to the citizen is present no matter what the origin of 
the claim by the defendant may be. Pursuant to Commission 
direction, the claim of right language has been eliminated as 
it was felt by the Commission that it would be an invitation 
to prosecutors to charge robbery and perhaps it should be allowed 
as a defense. 
Relationship to existing law: 
A S  11.15.160 
11.15.240 
11.15.250 
(assault with intent to commit robbery) 
(robbery) 
(larceny from person) 
The present statutes prohibit forcible taking of property 
from another and unless property is actually taken from the 
person or presence of the victim, there is no robbery. If the 
actor tries to rob and is unsuccessful, it must now be treated 
as attempted robbery or assault with intent to rob. 
This emphasizes the property aspects of the crime and treats 
it as an aggravated form of theft. This proposed section 
emphasizes danger to victim and adopts the view that the 
repression of violence is the principal reason for being guilty 
of robbery. 
2(a) covers the robber who creates the impression that 
he is armed. This covers the type of robbery in which the actor 
is iri fact una�med but conveys to the victim the impression 
that he has a weapon. While such a threat may not create any 
greater risk to the person of the victim, it does heighten the 
terror and is also persuasive in overcoming resistance to the 
robbery. (This covers a note with hand in pocket or fake
weapon.) 
76.
Sec. 11.20�340. Theft from the Person 
A person who, other than by force and violence or by 
putting in fear, steals and takes from the person of another 
anything of value is guilty of a Class C felony. 
Comment 
Pursuant to Commission direction, the existing Alaska 
statute 11.15.250 (larceny from person) has been specifically 
placed in this draft as§ 340. Other jurisdictions treat 
it as follows: 
Massachusetts and Oregon - under general theft provisions 
with value of property stolen determining whether misdemeanor 
or felony. 
New York§ 155.30 - Grand Larceny in 3rd Degree to steal 
property from the person (a class E felony). 
Illinois§ 16-1 - A specific subsection under theft and 
carries a felony penalty. 
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Article 4. Forgery and Fraud 
Section Section 
350. Definitions
360. Forgery
370. Criminal possession
a forged instrument
380. Criminal possession
a forgery device
390. Criminal simulation
Sec. 11.20.350. Definitions 
400. 
of 410. 
of 420. 
430. 
440. 
Obtaining signature by 
deception 
Offering a false instrument 
for recording 
Unlawfully using slugs 
Criminal impersonation 
Fraudulent use of a credit 
As used in this section unless the context requires 
otherwise: 
(1) "written instrument" means any paper, document,
instrument or article containing written or printed matter 
or the equivalent thereof, whether complete or incomplete, 
used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or 
recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence 
of value, right, privilege or identification, which is 
capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of 
some person; 
card 
(2) "complete written instrument means one which purports
to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to 
every essential feature thereof; 
(3) "incomplete written instrument" means one which contains
some matter by way of content or authentication but which 
requires additional matter in order to render it a complete 
written instrument; 
(4) to "falsely make" a written instrument means to make
or draw a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an 
incomplete written instrument which purports to be an authentic 
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creation of its ostensible maker, but which is not, either 
because the ostensible maker is fictitious or because, if real, 
he did not authorize the making or drawing thereof; 
(5) to "falsely complete" a written instrument means to
transform, by adding, inserting or changing matter, an incomplete 
instrument into a complete one, without the authority of 
anyone entitled to grant it, so that the complete written 
instrument falsely appears or purports to be in all respects 
an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or authorized 
by him; · 
(6) to "falsely alter" a written instrument means to
change, without authorization by anyone entitled to grant it, 
a written instrument, whether complete or incomplete, by means 
of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter, 
transposition or matter or in any other manner, so that the 
instrument so altered falsely appears or purports to be in all 
respects an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or 
authorized by him; 
(7) to "utter" means to issue, deliver, publish, circulate,
disseminate, transfer or tender a written instrument or other 
object to another; 
(B) "forged instrument" means a written instrument which
has been falsely made, completed or altered; 
(9) "intent to defraud" means
a) a purpose to use deception as defined in Sec. 160 12)
or to injure someone's interest which has value as defined in 
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§ 16 0 ( 1) ( 11) ; or
(b) knowledge that the defendant is facilitating a
fraud or injury to be perpetrated or inflicted by someone else 
(10) property is defined in Sec. 11.20.160(8);
(11) services . . .  §160 (11) (b);
(12) government is defined in §160(5).
Comments 
The definitional section defines terms only, not criminal 
activity itself. The definitions arP. taken fr0m O RS 165.002 
and are based upon the MP C. Sec. 9, (a) & (b) is based 
upon a phrase in M P  C 224.1. The reasoning for setting out 
forgery as a separate offense distinct from theft was stated 
by the drafters of the MP C as follows: 
"In drafting a Model Penal Code, it is necessary to ask 
ourselves why this expanded concern for authenticity is not 
satisfied by the penal law dealing with false pretense and 
fraud. In earlier days the law of false pretense might well 
have been necessary to prove that property was obtained by the 
misrepresentation, which would not be the case if a forged 
deed were given as a gift. In addition, the limitations of 
traditional attempt law would have prevented punishment of a 
forger or counterfeiter apprehended after the false documents 
had been made, but before any attempt to pass them off. It 
is obviously even more important to convict the forger, often a 
highly skilled professional criminal, than the individuals to 
whom he sells or gives the forgeries to be palmed off by 
them. 
"If the shortcomings of other branches of the criminal 
law are remedied in a modern code that deals effectively with 
fraud, attempt, complicity, and professional criminality, the 
need for a separate forgery offense is much diminished. We 
�etain forgery as a distinct offense partly because the concept 
j_s so embedded in statute and popular understanding that it 
would be inconvenient and unlikely that any legislature would 
completely abandon it, and partly in recognition of the special 
effectiveness of forgery as a means of undermining public 
confidence in important symbols of commerce, and of perpetrating 
large scale frauds . . " [ Ten ta ti ve Draft No. 11, pp. 7 9-8 0 
(1960)]. 
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Sec. 11.20.360. Forgery. 
A person commits the crime of forgery as a Class C 
felony if, with intent to injure or defraud he: 
(1) falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument;
or 
(2) utters a written instrument which he knows to be forged.
AS 11.25.010, 020 presently make forgery a felony. 
The original proposal derives from the Oregon Code and 
the Model Penal Code (224.1). 
In some cases forgery and uttering may have been considered 
two separate crimes. This makes it clear that forgery is a 
single crime that may be committed by falsely making, completing 
or altering a written instrument or by uttering a forged 
instrument with knowledge it is forged. This section combines 
the existing AS 11.25.010 and 020. 
Sec. 11.20.370. Criminal possession of a forged instrument with 
intent to utter. 
A person commits the crime of criminal possession of a 
forged instrument as a Class C felony if, knowing it to be 
forged and with intent to utter same, he possesses a forged 
instrument. 
Comments §§ 360, 370 
These sections continue the traditional separation 
between forgery on the one hand and possession and uttering 
on the other. The MP C combines all of these but since as 
far as pleading and proof they would be treated separately, 
they are set out in separate sections. This recognizes the 
transition from a preparatory stage to an advanced one or the 
completed offense. It also recognizes the possibility that 
the forger and the person who uses the forged instrument may 
not be accomplices. This also recognizes that the threat to 
the community is essentially the same in either forgery or 
possession. These sections are Oregon law. 
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Sec. 11.20.380. Criminal possession of a forgery device 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal possession
of a forgery device if: 
a) he makes or possesses with knowledge of its
character any plate, die or other device, apparatus, equipment 
or article specifically designed for use in counterfeiting or 
otherwise forging written instruments; or 
b) with intent to use, or to aid or permit another to
use, the same for purposes of forgery, he makes or possesses 
any device, apparatus, equipment or article capable of or 
adaptable to such use. 
(2 ) Crisinal possession of a forgery device is a Class c 
felony. 
Comment 
This section reaches back to a point before actual forgery 
begins. Here again this is an area for professional criminals. 
The proposed section is broader than the existing Alaska 
Statute (AS 11.25.030). § 380 (1) (a) designates the manufacture
or possession of devices or articles specifically designed for 
criminal use as criminal per se. 
(1) (b) requires the additional element of an intent to
use unlawfully with respect to items de�igned for legitimate 
use but adaptable to criminal purposes. 
In (1) (a) the state must prove knowledge by the defendant 
but need not prove an intent to use as is required in (1) (b). 
AS 11.25 .030 speaks to possession or making of tools or 
material designed for counterfeiting and AS 11.25 .050 speaks 
to making or possession of tools. This section combines 
these. 
Sec. 11.20.390. Criminal simulation. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal simulation if:
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(a) with intent to defraud, he makes or alters any
object in such a manner that it appears to have an antiquity, 
rarity, source or authorship that it does not in fact possess; or 
(b) with knowledge of its true character and with intent
to defraud, he utters or possesses an object so simulated. 
(2) Criminal simulation is a Class misdemeanor if the value 
of what it purports to represent is under $500, otherwise it 
is a Class C felony. 
Comment 
This section is Oregon law and is based on the MP C. 
Its chief application is to art objects, manuscripts, etc. It 
reaches preparation for what may ultimately prove to be theft 
by deception when the thing to which the deception relates is 
not a written instrument. 
This kind of crime shows careful advance planning and 
often the monetary stakes are high. This is additional justifi­
cation for making this a separate offense. The dividing line 
between misdemeanor/felony corresponds to the other theft 
provision in the draft. 
Sec. 11.20.400. Obtaining signature by deception. 
(a) A person commits the crime of obtaining a signature by
deception if with intent to defraud or to acquire a substantial 
benefit for himself or another and by deception he causes 
another to sign or execute a written instrument. 
(b) Obtaining a signature by deception is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This section covers conduct which is not forgery but 
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which is in most instances preparatory to the commission of theft 
by deception, or if not, is conduct which should be punished 
in its own right. 
A signature is not "property" within the meaning of 
§ 11.20.160(8) so that obtaining a signature by fraud is
probably not either theft or extortion. Forgery does not cover
the resulting written instrument because it is precisely what
it purports to be - a document executed by one who has the
authority to do so. The deception merely means that under other
circumstances the authentic instrument would not have been made
or signed. A phrase in AS 11.20.360 appears to be the only
Alaska Statute directed to the problem.
The source of this provision is the Oregon Code. 
Sec. 11.20.410. Offering a false instrument for recording. 
(1) A person commits the crime of offering a false
instrument for recording if knowing that a written instrument 
relating to or affecting real or personal property or directly 
affecting a contractual relationship contains a materially false 
statement or materially false information and with intent to 
defraud, he presents or offers it to a public office or a public 
employee with the knowledge or belief that it will be registered, 
filed or recorded or become a part of the records of that public 
office or public employee. 
(2) Offering a false instrument for recording is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This section covers the presentation of an instrument 
containing false statements or information to a public agency 
for filing if the instrument relates to real or personal 
property or contractual relationships and requires intent to 
defraud. This is a combination of the N Y  Revised and Michiaan 
proposed codes. 
- � 
Examples of this - a corporation official might offer 
false information in a report submitted to a state official with 
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the expectation of using the material to mislead future purchasers 
of stock in the corporation. A property owner might file a deed 
containing a misdescription of property subject to a lien 
intending to mislead a future purchaser. The ultimate fraud, if 
successful, constitutes theft but otherwise there is no crime 
until the perpetration. This intends to cover the preparatory 
stages. Because it is limited to property or contractual 
relationships, it would not reach someone lying about his age on 
a driver's license. 
A S  11.20.440 speaks in part to this except it does not 
include recording. 
Sec. 11.20.420. Unlawfully using slugs. 
(1) A person commits the crime of unlawfully using slugs
if: 
(a) with intent to defraud the supplier of property or
a service sold or offered by means of a coin machine, he inserts, 
deposits or otherwise uses a slug in such machine; or 
(b) he makes, possesses, offers for sale or disposes of
a slug with intent to enable a person to use it fraudulently 
in a coin machine 
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "coin machine" means a coin box, turnstile, vending
machine, or other mechanical or electronic device or receptacle 
designed to receive a coin or bill of a certain denomination 
or a token made for such purpose, and in return for the 
insertion or deposit thereof, automatically to offer, provide, 
assist in providing or permit the acquisition or use of some 
property or service. 
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(b) "slug" means an object, article or device which, by
virtue of its size, shape or any other quality is capable of 
being inserted, deposited, or otherwise used in a coin machine 
as a fraudulent substitute for a genuine coin, bill or token. 
(c) "value" of the slug means the value of the coin,
bill or token for which it is substituted. 
(3) Unlawfully using slugs is a Class misdemeanor if the 
value is under $500; a Class C felony if greater than $500. 
Comment 
This section again is primarily .Oregon and was utilized 
as a section separate from theft because of the problem of 
no face-to-face dealing with the owner or supplier. 
The purpose of this section is to prevent the use of slugs 
and the manufacture of slugs or other devices. AS 11.25.040 
speaks to counterfeit coins but Alaska does not have any statute 
dealing specifically with slugs other than AS 11.20.495 -­
fraudulent use of telecommunication service. 
Sec. 11.20.430. Criminal impersonation. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal impersonation if
he: 
(a) assumes a false identity and does an act in his
assumed character with intent to gain a pecuniary benefit for 
himself or another or to injure or defraud another; or 
(b) pretends to be a representative of some person or
organization and does act in his pretended capacity with intent 
to gain a pecuniary benefit for himself or another or to injure 
or defraud another. 
( 2) Criminal impersonation is a Class misdemeanor. 
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Comment 
This section prevents misrepresentation of identity which 
is exposed to light before theft is committed or which does not 
produce something which is property or services. This type 
of statute appears to be aimed at preventing either activities 
preliminary to fraud or the assumption of status that waters 
down the public image of a veterans group or fraternal 
organization. There must be an intent to gain a pecuniary 
benefit and not just unauthorized use. This provision is based on 
the New York Revised Statutes and the Michigan Proposed Statutes. 
A S  11.20.450 - false pretenses on soliciting for 
organizations. 
A s  11.20.460 - definition of false representation in 
.450. 
A S  11.20.500 - unauthorized use of badge or emblem of 
societies - does not require pecuniary benefit. 
The Commission discussed the possibility of including a 
subsection regarding impersonation of a police officer but 
decided to reserve that situation to a separate section in 
the offenses against Public Justice. 
Reference was made to A S  11.30.220 but it was concluded 
that this is a very narrow circumstance and that a more 
general section was needed. 
Sec. 11.20.440. Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card. 
(1) A person commits the crime of fraudulent use of a credit
card if, with intent to injure or defraud, he uses a credit 
card for the purpose of obtaining property or services with 
knowledge that: 
(a) the card is stolen or forged; or
(b) the card has been revoked or canceled; or
(c) for any other reason his use of the card is
w�µthorized by either the issuer or the person to whom 
the credit card is issued. 
(2) "Credit card" means a card, booklet or other identifying
symbol or instrument evidencing an undertaking to pay for 
property or services delivered or rendered to or upon the order 
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of a designated person or bearer. 
(3) Fraudulent use of a credit card is:
(a) a Class misdemeanor if the total amount of 
property or services the peyson obtains or attempts to obtain 
is under $500.00; 
(b) a Class C felony if the total amount is $500 or more.
(4) Unauthorized possession of a credit card is a Class
misdemeanor. 
(5) The unauthorized sale of a credit card is a Class C felony.
Sale shall include the exchange, barter, gift or offer thereof. 
Comments 
§ 440 is intended to cover instances that probably do not
constitute either theft or theft of services, and in which it 
is not the actual supplier of goods or services, but some organi­
zation remote in time and place, that incurs the actual loss. 
The content of the section is taken from the MPC 224.6. 
Commentary to Sec. 224.6 indicates the reasons for having a 
separate section on the subject; 
"This is a new section to fill a gap in the law 
relating to false pretense and fraudulent practices. Secs. 
223.3 and 223.7 cover theft of property or services by 
deception. It is doubtful whether they reach the credit 
card situation because the user of a stolen or cancelled 
credit card does not obtain goods by any deception practiced 
upon or victimizing the seller. The seller will collect 
from the issuer of the credit card, because credit card issuers 
assume the risk of misuse of cards in order to encourage 
sellers to honor the cards readily. Thus it is the non­
decei.ved issuer who is the victim of the practice." 
Though one may question whether in fact use 0£ credit 
cards to obtain goods or services cannot possibly amount to 
theft of services, it is true that a local merchant may 
never know of the deception practiced on him, or may not care 
even if he does learn of it later, if the credit card issuer 
has paid the amount of the sale. Therefore, there is probably 
no great danger of overlap between this section and sections 
involving theft by deception and theft of services. 
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A S  11.22.010 - 11.22.140 are the Alaska Credit Car� 
Crimes Act. These sections overlap existing sections in the 
proposed draft of theft and forgery, i.e., the card itself 
would constitute "property"; consequently stealing it would 
be "theft". Possession of a stolen card would probably amount 
to ''theft by receiving." Forging a credit card or possession 
of a forged card is prohibited by the forgery sections of 
the draft. Therefore, there are not separate sections relating 
specifically to theft or forgery of credit cards. 
§ 440 encompasses basically A S  11.22.070. There is 
an intent to defraud in both. The dividing line between a 
misdemeanor and a felony should correspond to the line the 
Commission draws in the general theft sections. The M P  C 
and Alaska iaw presently draw the line at $500 with an 
additional proviso in the Alaska law of "within a six month 
period". The total amount under the proposed draft, involved 
in the fraudulent use of a credit card committed pursuant to 
one scheme or course of conduct could be aggregated in 
determining the grade of the offense. 
The sections regarding unauthorized possession without 
use and the sale or trade of a credit card have been added 
pursuant to CoffiIT'.ission suggestion. 
Article 5. Criminal Mischief and Criminal Tampering 
Section Section 
450. Criminal Mischief-
Definitions 490. Intentional
460. Criminal mischief in the to animals
or wanton injury 
first degree 500. Criminal tampering -. definitions
470. Criminal mischief in the 510. Criminal tampering in the
second degree first degree
480. Criminal Mischief in the 520. Criminal tampering in the
third degree second degree
Sec. 11.20.450.Criminal Mischief Definitions. The definitions contained in 
AS 11.20.160 (Theft and Related Offenses) are applicable in this 
article unless the context otherwise requires. 
Sec. 11.20.460. Criminal Mischief in the first degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the
first degree, who, knowingly, intentionally or recklessly 
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having no right to do so, damages any property: 
(a) valued in an amount exceeding $500.00; or
(b) by means of an explosive.
(2) Criminal Mischief in the first degree is a Class C felony.
Comment 
Comment follows AS 11.20.480. 
Sec. 11.20.470. Criminal Mischief in the second degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the
second degree who, knowingly, intentionally or recklessly, 
having no right to do so, damages any property valued in an 
amount less than $500.00 but exceeding $50.00. 
(2) Criminal Mischief in the second degree is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.20.480. Criminal Mischief in the third degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the
third degree who, knowingly, recklessly or intentionally, having 
no right to do so damages property of any value not exceeding 
$50.00. 
(2) Criminal mischief in the third degree is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.20.490. Intentional Injury to Animals. 
(1) A person commits the crime of intentional injury to
animals who knowingly, recklessly or intentionally wounds, 
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disfigures or injures any animal which is the property of 
another or the state or wilfully administers poison to any 
animal or maliciously exposes poison with intent that it be 
taken by an animal. 
(2) Intentional injury to animals is a Class 
misdemeanor. 
Comments 
The many sections in AS 11.20.520 - 590, AS 11.20.620, 
all repealed by the 1975 legislature, and AS 11.20.670 - 690 
and in other titles of the statutes are replaced here by three 
sections under the general heading of criminal mischief. 
AS 11.20.515 is covered in substance but the form was changed 
to conform to other provisions of the draft. § 460 penalizes 
one who either intentionally or recklessly damages property 
when he has no right to do so, and no reasonable basis to believe 
that he has such a right. Careless or negligent destruction 
of property is not criminal under this definition. Reckless 
destruction is the lowest degree of criminal mischief because 
there is no intent to damage the property of another. Under 
this draft, one who honestly but unreasonably believes he has 
a right to deal with property in the way he does is covered. 
Under § 470, the penaltv for criminal mischief is 
aggravated if the intent is to destroy property without a 
right or reasonable belief in the existence of a right to 
do so when the value of property exceeds a certain amount. 
This value should be coordinated with the dividing lines 
in the theft section. This standard reflects the objective 
of these sections to protect property owners against 
deliberate destruction of their property, a destruction not 
substantially different from loss through theft. 
§ 480 would provide for a greater increase in penalties
because of value of property or if damaged through explosives. 
Destruction or injury by explosives is singled out because of 
the greater danger to human life which that method poses in 
comparison to other means. 
The definition 
valuation in § 160 
show the functional 
theft in protecting 
of property and the standards for 
(Theft) are incorporated by reference to 
relationship that the sections bear to 
property owners against loss. 
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These sections are all derived from the New York 
Revised Penal Law§ 145 et seq and are almost identical to 
the Oregon Code with the exception that the Oregon Code 
attempts to combine criminal tampering in its Criminal Mischief 
sections and this proposal will set out special sections for 
criminal tampering. 
In addition, this proposal incorporates specifically 
A S  11.20.520 as§ 490; This section was enacted by the 
legislature last year and because of this it was set out 
specifically although the definition of property is probably 
broad enough to cover animals. 
MP C 220.3 covers Criminal Mischief. It makes it a 
third degree felony if the loss exceed $5000 or a substantial 
interruption or impairment of public utilities results. 
Otherwise it's a misdemeanor in excess of $100, petty 
misdemeanor in excess of $25 and violation below. 
Sec. 11.20.500. Criminal Tampering, Definitions. 
The following definitions apply to§§ 11.20.510 and 52J. 
(1) "'ro tamper" means to interfere with something improperly,
meddle with it, or make unwarranted alterations in its 
existing condition. 
(2) "Utility" means an enterprise which provides gas,
electric, $team, water, sewer, communications services, or 
other public service and any common carrier; it may be either 
publicly or privately owned or operated. 
Comment 
Comment follows AS 11.20.520. 
Sec. 11.20.510. Criminal Tampering in the first degree.
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal tampering in the
1st degree if, having no right to do so or any reasonable 
guound to believe that he has such a ri0ht, and with intent 
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to cause a substantial interruption or impairment of a 
service rendered to the public by a utility or by an institu­
tion providing health or safety protection, he damages or 
tampers with property or facilities of such a utility or 
institution, and thereby causes substantial interruption or 
impairment of service. 
(2) Criminal tampering in the first degree is a Class B felony.
Comment 
Comment follows AS 11.20.520. 
Sec. 11.20.520. Criminal Tampering in the second degree. 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal tampering in the
second degree, if having no right to do so or any reasonable 
ground to believe that he has such a right, he: 
(a) tampers with property of another person with intent
to cause substantial inconvenience to that person or to another; or 
(b) tampers or makes connection with property of a utility.
(2) Criminal tampering in the second degree is a Class
misdemeanor. 
Comment AS 11.20.500 - 520 
This section is adapted from the New York Revised Penal 
Law§ 145.15 and 145.20. Some of the activities covered in 
these sections fall within the common law concept of 
criminal mischief. Interference which results in physical 
damage to or destruction of property also amounts to malicious 
destruction of property. There is some overlap with§§ 460 -
480. However, not all acts of tampering or interference produce
physical damage or destruction, and in some instances in which
minor physical damage is inflicted, it is actually the inter­
ference with services rendered to the public which is the primary
basis for concern.
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Some of the Alaska Statutes cited in the previous section 
overlap here, i.e. 11.20.580 (repealed in 1975). All of these 
sections are drawn together into just two degrees of criminal 
tampering. Tampering must be intentionally done; the only 
basis for criminality based upon a form of negligence is an 
unreasonable belief that one has a right to do the act which 
he is about to do. To tamper means to interfere with under 
circumstances in which the equipment is not damaged; pulling a 
power switch is an example. 
AS 11.20.510 is a felony under New York law, the proposed 
Michigan Cod� and the M P  C because of the potential harm that 
could be done. 
The Oregon Code as stated earlier does not set forth 
specific criminal tampering, believing that property rights 
were amply protected by their proposal. The phrase "tampers 
with" appears in Sec. 145 of the Oregon Code. Because of the 
disruption that could be caused, particularly in the area of 
public utilities, the Commission felt it important enough to 
set out separate tampering sections. 
AS ll.20.515(b) speaks to tampering. The Alaska 
section does not speak specifically to utilities and in fact 
repealed the sections which dealt specifically with utilities. 
No provision in Title 42 would conflict with these provisions. 
Oregon in its last legislative session amended their 
criminal mischief section to set out specifically an offense 
of tampering or interfering with utilities. Because of the 
widespread impact of utilities and the affect on the general 
populace that tampering with a utility would have, specific 
reference to utilities should be retained. 
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DRAFT GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The following draft general provisions have been 
reviewed by the Commission. They do not include all the 
general provisions which would constitute a finished code 
but have been selected first for their relevance to the 
crimes already under review. Some, such as the mens rea 
definitions, are indispensible to the adoption of many 
crimes of property and related crimes. 
If they are adopted and their application confined 
to use with the other new statutes proposed to be adopted 
herewith, no difficulties should be posed for present law 
or future law making and a number of valuable landmarks 
of use to future draftsmen will have been established. 
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Section 1--Short Title 
This Act shdll be known and may be cited as "Alaska 
Criminal Code of 19 II 
COMMENT 
This section refers to revised Title 11 as the "Alaska 
Criminal Code of 1976." Currently, there is no comprehensive 
Criminal Code in Alaska. Instead, Title 11 is for the most 
part taken from the Oregon statutes originally en�cted in 
the l850's. These statutes were substantially revised by 
the Oregon Legislature during a complete revision of their 
statutes in 1971. 
Section 2--General Purposes 
Section 2(1). The general purposes of the Alaska Criminal 
Code of 1976 are: 
(a) To insure the public safety by preventing the
commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the 
sentences authorized, the correction and rehabilitation of 
those convicted, and their confinement when required in the 
interest of public protection. 
(b) To prescribe conduct that unjustifiably and inex­
cusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or 
public interest. 
(c) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct
declared to constitute an offense and of the sentences author­
ized upon conviction. 
(d) To define the act of omission and accom�anying mental
state that constitute each offense and limit the condemnation 
of conduct as criminal when it is without fault. 
(e) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between
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serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate 
penalties for each. 
(f) To avoid excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary
punishments. 
COMMENT 
This section, taken with minor changes from ORS 161.025, 
is intended to state the general philosophy on which the 
Criminal Code is founded. The statement is included as an 
explanation of the underlying legislative premises and also 
as an aid in the interpretation of particular provisions and 
in the exericse of the discretionary powers vested in the 
courts and in the organs of correctional administration. 
There is no comparable formulation in the current Alaska 
statutes. However, in the large part the section may be said 
to be based on Article I §12 of the Constitution, which pro­
vides as follows: 
Penal administration shall be based on the 
principle of reformation and upon the need for 
protecting the public. 
Section 5--Application of Criminal Code 
(1) The provisions of this Code shall govern the construc­
tion of and punishment for any offense defined in this Code and 
committed after the effective date hereof, as well as the con­
struction arid application of any defense to a prosecution for 
such an offense. 
(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided, or unless
the context requires otherwise, the provisions of this Code 
shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense 
defined outside this Code and committed after the effective 
date thereof, as well as the construction and application of 
any defense to a prosecution for such offense. 
(3) The provisions of this Code do not apply to or govern
the construction of and punishment for any offense committed 
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prior to the effective date of this Code, or the construction 
and application of any defense to the prosecution for such an 
offense. Such an offense shall be construed and punished 
according to the law existing at the time of the commission of 
the offense in the same manner as if this Code has not been 
enacted. 
(4) When all or part of criminal statute is amended or
repealed, the criminal statute or part thereof so amended or 
repealed remains in force for the purpose of authorizing the 
accusation, prosecution, conviction and punishment of a person 
who violated the statute or part thereof before the effective 
date of the amending or repealing act. 
COMMENT 
This section is taken from ORS 161.035. Subsections (1) 
and (2) are intended to make clear that there is no ex p�s�
facto application of the Code, but that after the effective 
date of the Code it is the Code that is to control matters of 
criminal law in the Code itself and in other provisions that 
define crime. While there is currently no provision in the 
Alaska Statutes similar to subsection (2), the current "general 
provisions" have been applied to criminal offenses defined out­
side Title 11. 
Subsections (3) and (4) are restatements of AS 01.05.021: 
Section 01.05.021. Effect of repeal on prior 
offenses and punishments. (a) No fine, forfeiture, 
or penalty incurred under laws existing before the 
time the Alaska Statutes take effect is affected by 
repeal of the existing law, but the recovery of the 
fines and forfeitures and the enforcement of the 
penalties are effected as if the law repealed had 
still remained in effect. 
(b) In the case of an offense committed before
the time the Alaska Statutes take effect, the 
offender is punished under the law in effect when 
the offense was committed. 
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Section 6--Limitations of Applicability 
(1) This Code does not bar, suspend or otherwise affect
any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other 
remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a 
civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved in 
the proceeding constitutes an offense defined in this Code. 
(2) No conviction of a person for an offense works a
forfeiture of his property, except in cases where a forfeiture 
is expressly provided by law. 
COMMENT 
This section sets forth additional limitations of the 
proposed Code. 
Subsection (1) is taken from ORS 161.045(3). The 
substance of this section is currently found in AS 11.75.110 
which provides as follows: 
The omission to specify or affirm in this 
title liability for damages, penalty, or for-
feiture, or other remedy imposed by law for an 
act or omission punishable in this title and to 
allow damages, penalty, forfeiture or other 
remedy imposed by law to be recovered or enforced 
in a civil action or proceeding does not affect 
the right to recover or enforce the liability. 
Subsection (2) is taken from ORS 161.045(4). The sub-
stance of this section appears in AS ll.0S.130: 
A conviction of a person for a crime does 
not work a forfeiture of property, except in 
cases where a forfeiture is expressly provided 
by law. However, in all cases of the commission 
or attempt to commit a felony the state has a lien, 
from the time of the commission or attempt, upon 
all the property of the defendant for the purpose 
of satisfying a judgment which may be given against 
him for a fine and for the costs and disbursements 
in the proceeding against him for the crime. 
The portion of this statute allowing the state to have a 
lien for costs against a defendant appears to be in conflict 
with AS 12.80.030 which provides: 
No costs may be taxed to the defendant in 
a criminal action or proceeding begun or pro-
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secuted in any of the courts of the state unless 
otherwise ordered by supreme court rule. 
The issue of whether costs should be assessed under such 
circumstances will be examined in the sentencing provision of 
this Code. 
Section 9--Definitions with Respect to Cul�bility 
As used in this Code, unless the context requires 
otherwise: 
(1) "Act" means a bodily movement, and includes the
possession of property. 
(2) "Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed
consciously as a result of effort or determination, and 
includes the possession of property, if the actor was aware 
of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient 
period to have been able to terminate it. 
(3) "Omission" means a failure to perform an act the
performance of which is required by law. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission and its accompany­
ing mental state. 
(5) "To act" means either to perform an act or to omit
to perform an act. 
(6) "Culpable mental state" means intentionally, know­
ingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence as these terms 
are defined in subsections (7), (8), (9), and (10) of this 
section. 
(7) "Intentionally" or "with intent," when used with
respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute 
defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious 
objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so 
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described. 
(8) "Knowingly" or "with knowledge," when used with
respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute 
defining an offense, means that a person acts with an aware­
ness that his conduct is of a nature so described or that a 
circumstance so described exists. 
( 9) "Recklessly," when used with respect to a result
or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an 
offense, means that a person is aware of and consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk 
must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof con­
stitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation. 
(10) "Criminal negligence" or "criminally negligent,"
when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance des­
cribed by a statute defining an offense, means that a person 
fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The 
risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be 
aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. 
COMMENT 
Traditional criminal law has required both an act and an 
accompanying state of mind before criminal penalties may be 
imposed, though there are no definitional provisions which 
define these terms in the current statutes. Because the 
Criminal Code is intended to be comprehensive, the Draft follows 
the lead of recent codifications and includes definitions of 
these terms. Subsections (1) and (2) are taken from New York 
Revised Penal Law §15.00. The remaining definitions are 
taken from ORS 161.085. 
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Subsection (1) requires bodily movement, but includes 
possession of property as an act in legal contemplation. 
Subsection (2) defines a voluntary act to be a bodily move­
ment done volitionally and consciously. Possession is included 
in the concept, provided the person knew he had physical con­
trol long enough to have been able to terminate that control 
had he chosen to do so. This means, for example, that one 
who picks up the wrong coat, and does not know that there are 
narcotics in the pocket does not "possess" the narcotics until 
or unless he discovers them. Whether "discovery" means know­
ledge that he has an object of unknown composition or knowledge 
that it contains narcotics does not turn on the language in 
this subsection, but on the definitions of culpable mental 
states and on the mental culpability requirements in the 
statute under which the prosecution is maintained. 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that omissions are included, 
a matter stressed also in subsection (4) defining ''conduct" 
and in subsection (5) defining "to act." 
Subsection (6) indicates that the only formal classifi­
cations of mental states are those in Paragraphs (7) - (10). 
Subsections (7) - (10) change Alaska law concerning what 
constitutes "mens rea" only in the sense that it no longer gives 
currency to inherently misleading terms like "malice" or 
"willfulness" -- misleading, at least, if viewed in their 20th 
and not their 16th century popular meanings. (For example, 
see California Jury Instruction §1.22 which defines malice as 
"wish to vex, annoy or injure another person, or an intent to 
do a wrongful act.") Whether the four terms change the mens 
rea content of a particular crime can be determined only be 
looking at the particular section of the Draft to see what 
term is used, and by comparing that section with existing 
legislation or case law. Only these terms are used in the 
Code to promote clarity and uniformity in giving jury instruc­
tions and in interpreting individual sections in relation to 
other sections bearing on the same subject matter. 
One of the main defects of the former �laska Statutes 
defining offenses involving culpability was their use of a host 
of largely undefined and frequently hazy adverbial terms, such 
as "willfully," "maliciously," "wrongfully," and "with culpable 
negligence." The revised section designates only four culpable 
mental states, defines each, and stipulates that, unless an 
offense is one of strict liability, at least one of these 
particular mental states is essential for commission of the 
offense; the four terms in question are "intentionally," 
"knowlingly," "recklessly" and "criminal negligence." 
In defining the kinds of culpability, a distinction is 
drawn between acting intentionally and knowlingly. Knowledge 
that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common 
element in both conceptions. "What is essential is not an 
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awareness that a given conduct is a "wrongdoing" in the sense 
that it is prescribed by law, but rather an awareness that 
one is committing the specific acts which are defined by law 
as a "wrongdoing." Caley v. State, 484 P.2d 677 (AK 1971). 
However, action is not intentional with respect to the nature 
or the result of the actor's conduct unless it was his conscious 
objective to perform an action or to cause such a result. This 
is similar to "purpose" as appearing in the current first 
degree murder statute. 
It is to be noted, however, that the term "knowingly" is 
restricted to awareness of the nature of one's conduct or of 
the existence of specified facts or circumstances (e.g., that 
property is stolen, that one has no right to enter a building, 
etc.) Under the forumlations of the Model Penal Code 
(§2.02[2bii]) and the Illinois Criminal Code (§4-S[b]),
"knowingly" is, in one phase, almost synonymous with "intention­
ally" in that a person achieves a given result "knowingly" when
he "is practically certain" that his conduct will cause that
result. The distinction between "knowingly" and "intentionally"
in that context appears highly technical or semantic, and the
statute does not employ the word "knowingly" in defining result
offenses.
Conceptually more intricate are the terms "recklessly" 
and "criminal negligence," which are designed to crystalize an 
area of culpability long fraught with uncertainty. The common 
denominators of these two terms are that the underlying conduct 
must, in each instance, involve (1) "a suLstantial and unjusti­
fiable risk" that a result or circumstance described by a penal 
statute will occur or exists as the case may be, and (2) "a 
gross deviation," (and not the "mere ina.c1vertence or simple 
neglect" criticized as a basis for liability in Alex v. S!,ate, 
484 P.2d 677 (AK 1971), from the standard of conduct or care 
that a reasonable person would observe. The reckless offender 
is aware of that risk and "consciously disregards" it. The 
criminally negligent offender, on the other hand, is not aware 
of the risk created and, hence, cannot be guilty of consciously 
disregarding it. His liability stems from a culpable failure 
to perceive it. His culpability, though obviously less than 
that of the reckless offender, is appreciably greater than that 
required for ordinary civil negligence by virtue of the "sub­
stantial and unjustifiable" character of the risk involved and 
the factor of "gross deviation" from the ordinary standard of 
care. 
Section 11--Requirernents of Culpability 
(1) The minimal requirement for criminal liability is
the performance by a person of conduct which includes a volun­
tary act or the omission to perform an act which he is capable 
of performing. 
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(2) Except as provided in §19(a) a person is not guilty
of an offense defined in this Code unless he acts with a cul­
pable mental state with respect to each material element of 
the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. 
COMMENT 
This section is taken from ORS 161.095. 
Subsection (1) requires that criminal liability be based 
on conduct, and that conduct which gives rise to liability 
includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act 
which was physically possible to have performed. This excludes 
all "involuntary" acts such as reflex actions, acts committed 
during hypnosis, etc. 
Subsection (2) states that a culpable mental state is 
required for each material element "that necessarily requires 
a culpable mental state." The quoted phrase was included at the 
suggestion of the Commission and is designed to make it clear 
that the draft does not require scienter with respect to an 
element relating solely to the statute of limitations, juris­
diction, venue and the like. The effect of this section 
would be to eliminate all "strict liability" offenses from 
the Code. 
This section does not address itself to the following 
issues: 
(1) If the Commission established non-criminal offenses
in a Revised Code, will the prosecution be required to show 
that the defendant acted with a culpable mental state in vio­
lating the statute. 
(2) Should crimes defined outside the Code be made subject
to subsection (2). 
Section 12--Construction of Statutes with Respect to 
Culpability Requirements 
(1) If a statute defining an offense describes a culpable
mental state but does not specify the element to which it 
applies, the prescribed culpable mental stnte applies to each 
material element of the offense that necessarily requires a 
culpable mental state. 
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(2) If a definition of an offense prescribes criminal
negligence as the culpable mental state, it is also established 
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When 
recklessness suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it 
is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. 
When acting knowingly suffices to establish a culpable mental 
state, it is also established if a person acts intentionally. 
(3) Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense, or
knowledge of the existence, meaning or application of the 
statute defining an offense, is not not an element of an 
offense unless the statute clearly so provides. 
COMMENT 
This section is derived from ORS 161.115. It provides a 
statutory f�amework for constructing penal statutes as regards 
their culpability content, and the application of the culpable 
mental state requirement to specific offenses. 
GENERAL PURPOSES OF §16-23 
The objective of the following sections is to declare 
that criminal liability is based upon behavior and to delineate 
all situations in which criminal liability may be based in whole 
or part upon behavior of another. The section defines those 
general principles of liability which determine legal accounta­
bility for actions of another. The main areas of existing law 
thus covered are those where liability for the substantive 
crime rests on (1) the behavior of an innocent or irresponsible 
agent [§18] and (2) joint criminality or accessorial partici­
pation [§19]. The field of accessories after the fact (currently 
covered by AS 12.15.020), is not included; such behavior is an 
interference with the administration of justice and should be 
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dealt with as such, not as a basis of complicity in crimes that 
by hypothesis have been previously committted uefore the actor 
takes part. Special problems involved in the liability of 
corporations are considered in Sections 22 and 23. 
Section 16--Liability Based upon �ehavio� 
A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by 
his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which 
he is made legally accountable, or both. 
COi\llMENT 
This section is based on ORS 161.150. The section affirms 
the basic principle that liability is based upon behavior, coup­
led with the equal affirmation that one may be acco�ntable for 
the behavior of another. When such accountability exists, it 
is and should be immaterial whether defendant's own behavior, 
the behavior of a person for which he is accountable, or both 
in combination, present the elements of the charge. This is 
consistent witl1 present Alaska law, insofar as the distinction 
between accessories before the fact and principles has been 
abolished. [See AS 12.15.101] 
AS 11.10.0G0 provides as follows: 
A person is not punishable for an omission 
to perform an act where the act has been performed 
by another person acting in his behalf, and competent 
by law to perform it. 
It is felt that the retention of this statute is not 
necessary in the Code. In most situations, liability would not 
exist unless an offense has been committed. If the act is in 
fact done by a "person acting" in the person's behalf, no 
omission, and hence no offense has occurred. However, there 
may be situations in which the Legislature may wish to impose 
criminal liability upon a person for his failure to personally 
perform an act. In the event of such a situation, the legis­
lative intention should not be frustrated by the presence of 
this statute. 
Section 19--Liability Based upon the Behavior of Another; 
Complicity 
A person is legally accountable for the behavior of 
another person constituting an offense if: 
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(a) He is made legally accountable by the statute defining
the offense; or 
(b) With intent to promote or facilitate the commission
of the offense: 
(i) he solicits such other person to commit the
offense; 
(ii) he aids or abets such other person in planning
or committing the offense; or 
(iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission
of the offense, he fails to make an effort he is legally 
required to make. 
COMMENT 
There is no comparable statute to §19 in Title 11 which 
sets forth the basis of accomplice liability. However, a sub­
stantial number of cases have been decided in Alaska which have 
examined this subject. This section, which is substantially 
based on ORS 161.155, and the Alaska cases on this subject, 
sets forth the mode and extent of complicity in criminal behavior 
by another, delineating both the type of action or omission 
required and the mental state necessary. 
Subsection (a) (originally presented to the Commission 
as Section (17) of Tentative Draft (A)) allows the Legislature 
to impose an extraordinary measure of accountability for the 
behavior of another. Insofar as this would allow liability to 
be imposed without the requirement of proving that the person 
acted with a culpable mental state, an exception has been made 
in §11(2) to allow liability to be imposed under such circum­
stances. An example of such a statute would be one which 
places vicarious criminal liability on a tavern owner for the 
act of an employee resulting in sale of liquor to a minor. 
Subsection (b) confines the scope of liability to those 
crimes that the accomplice had the intent of promoting or 
facilitating. This is consistent with current case law which 
recognizes accomplice liability only in the event that the 
accomplice has "criminal intent." See Gordon v. State, 
533 P.2d 25 (AK 1975). This does not mean that the precise 
means used in the commission of the crime must have been fixed 
or contemplated. Neither does it mean that liability is 
limited to the precise crime contemplated. One who intentionally 
aids the achievement of an illegal end may be said to have inten­
ded whatever means may be employed, insofar as they constitute 
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or result in the commission of an offense clearly envisaged 
in the achievement of the illegal end. But when a wholly 
different crime has been committed, involving conduct not in 
the range of contemplation, the accomplice is not liable for 
such conduct. The assumption here is that if some activity 
was reasonably foreseeable as a likely incident to achieving 
the objective sought, then the accomplice can be assumed to 
have intended to facilitate the particular activity. 
Paragraphs (i) - (iii) define the nature of the activi­
ties which ought to suffice for liability as an accomplice. 
Currently, accomplice has been defined in the case law "one 
who in some manner, knowingly and with criminal intent, aids, 
abets, assists or participates in a criminal act." See 
Galauska v. State, 527 P.2d 459 (AK 1974); Tel_!er v.--m:ate, 
391 P.2d 950 (AK 1964). 
Paragraph (i) provides for accomplice liability in the 
event that one "solicits" another person to commit an offense. 
While it is possible that the use of the term "abet" would be 
broad enough to encompass solicitation as a basis for accom­
plice liability, it is nevertheless felt that a specific 
reference to solicitation should be made in paragraph (i). 
What is criminal solicitation in §41 and will provide guide­
lines for determining accomplice liability. 
Considering the fact that the draft will recognize the 
crime of solicitation (the current statutes provide for the 
separate crime of solicitation in AS 11.10.070), the question 
might arise why it is necessary to provide for accomplice 
liability in addition. It is felt that although the crime of 
solicitation could be utilized as a basis for prosecution 
even where the substantive crime was actually committed, it 
is anticipated that solicitation will be employed primarily 
where the solicitation was unsuccessful and that prosecution 
as an accomplice will be the normal course in cases where 
the solicitation did lead to the commission of the crime. 
With regard to Subsection (ii), the terms "aids" and 
"abets" have been included without definition since they have 
been interpreted in a number of cases. [See, for example, 
Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (AK 1971)] .--
It should also be noted that Subsection (ii) as originally 
presented to the Commission would have included as an accom­
plice one who "agrees or attempts to aid or abet." The Model 
Penal Code, in approaching this issue, observed as follows: 
The inclusion of attempts to aid may go in part 
beyond the present law, hut attempting complicity 
or to be criminal and to distinguish it from effec­
tive complicity appears unnecessary when the crime 
has been committed. Where complicity is based upon 
agreement or encouragement, one does not ask for 
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evidence that they were actually operative psycho­
logically on the person who committed the offense; 
there ought to be no difference in the case of aid. 
The Commission agreed with the observation of the Model 
Penal Code drafters that the language of their propsoal "may 
go in part beyond the present law," but concluded that the 
imposition of accomplice liability based in such activity 
could not be justified. 
Paragraph (iii) refers to the failure to act by one 
having a legal duty to do so. In such situations, if the 
omission is undertaken with the intent to facilitate the com­
mision of a crime, it should make the individual as much as 
accomplice as one who gives affirmative aid. This subsection 
would cover the facutal situation set forth in a case such as 
People v. Chapman, 28 NW 896 (Mich. 1886), where a husband 
seeking grounds for a divorce, hired a man to commit adultery 
with his wife. The wife did not cooperate and instead was 
raped by the husband's accomplice. The husband was in the 
next room but made no effort to come to the aid of the wife. 
Paragraph (iii) would make the husband liable as an accomplice 
for the wife's rape. 
Section 18--Liability Based upon the Behavior of Another; 
Conduct of an Innocent Person 
(1) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of
another person when, if acting with the culpable mental state 
sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an 
innocent person to engage in such conduct. 
(2) As used in this Section, an "innocent person" includes
any person who is not guilty of the offense in question, des­
pite his behavior, because of: 
(a) Criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapac­
ity or exemption. 
(b) Unawareness of the criminal nature of the con­
duct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose. 
(c) Any other factor precluding the mental state
sufficient for the commission of the offense. 
110.
COMMENT 
Paragraph (1) is substantially derived from MPC §2.06(2) (a). 
The definition of "innocent person" is taken from New York 
Revised Penal Law, §20.05. 
This section is based upon the principle that one is no 
less guilty of the commission of a crime because he uses the 
overt behavior of an innocent or irresponsible agent. A per­
son in this situation should be accountable as if the behavior 
were his own. In most jurisdictions, as in Alaska, there arc 
no statutes specifically adopting this principle. It is, 
however, well recognized at common law [See, e.g., United 
States v. Kenofskey, 37 s.ct. 438, 243 u:S:- 440, GlL�Ed:- 836 
(1917) (mail fraud; mailing by innocent person); People�-
Monks, 133 Cal.App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (1933), (incompetent 
induced to draw check against insufficient funds)] 
While it would be possible to treat the defendant in such 
a case as an accessory on the ground that he had "procured" 
the commission of the crime, this reasoning is not persuasive. 
It is somewhat paradoxical to talk of procuring the commission 
of a crime when the activity of the innocent or irresponsible 
person by hypothesis is not in itself criminal. Indeed, §19, 
the general complicity section, requires as a preliminary 
basis to accomplice liability that a crime be committed. It 
seems preferable to treat this type of situation apart from 
the usual question of accomplice liability. This is done in 
this section which sets up a separate basis of accountability 
apart from §19 dealing with complicity. 
It should be noted that there is no requirement of an 
intent to cause the resulting criminal act. It will be suffi­
cient that the responsible person had whatever culpable mental 
state that was needed for the crime. Thus, one who recklessly 
leaves car keys with an irresponsible, known to have a penchant 
for mad driving, should be accountable for a homicide due to 
such driving if the irresponsible uses the car in that way. 
On the other hand, if the defendant's culpable mental 
state is less than that of the irresponsible agent, then his 
liability should only extend as far as his own mental state 
will permit. One who directs a child to kill is guilty of 
intentional homicide if death results, because he himself 
meant to kill. Yet, if the defendant recklessly caused the 
child to kill intentionally, the child's intent to kill is 
not imputed to him; he may be guilty of manslaughter for his 
recklessness, but he is accountable for nothing more. In 
other words, even if the defendant is accountable for the 
behavior of an innocent or irresponsible person, lie must have 
caused the action of that verson with the intent, knowledge, 
recklessness or negligence that the law requires to commit the 
crime with which he has been charged. The defendant's liability 
is thus determined by his own state of mind, coupled with the 
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overt behavior he has caused another person to perform. As 
noted by the Model Pena.l Code, "this . . . probably is now the 
law; even more clearly it should be the law." [Model Penal 
Code, Tentative Draft No. 1, page 18]. 
The definition of "innocent person" appE:,aring in para-· 
graph 2 of this section is designed to encompass those who 
are not responsible either because of mental disease or youth, 
and those who are responsible but act without the necessary 
culpable mental state because they lack information to 
appreciate the criminality of their action. 
Section 20--Exemptions to Criminal Liability for Conduct 
of Another 
Except as otherwise provided by the statute defining the 
offense, a person is not legally accountable for the conduct 
of another constituting an offense if: 
(1) he is the victim of that offense; or
(2) the crime is so defined that his conduct is inevitably
incidental to its commission; 
(3) he terminated his complicity prior to the commission
of the crime and 
(a) wholly deprived it of effectiveness in the
commission of the crime; or 
(b) gave timely warning to the law enforcement author­
ities or otherwise made proper effort to prevent the commission 
of the crime. 
COMMENT 
Subsections (1) and (2) of this section are based on ORS 
161.165. Paragraph (3) is taken directly from MPC §2.06. A 
very similar provision appears in New York Revised Penal Law 
§40.10(1).
This section deals with various exceptions to the general 
principles suggested in §16-19. These are cases in which 
there should be an exemption from liability. The first two 
exemptions are well recognized in general common law throughout 
the United States. The third deals with a problem on which 
there is a greater division. 
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The justification for subsection (1) is well stated in the 
commentary to the first draft of the Model Penal Code: 
It seems clear ttiat the victim of a crime 
should not be held as an accomplice in its pre­
paration, though his conduct in a sense assists 
in the commission of the crime. The businessman 
who yields to the extortion of a racketeer, the 
parent who pays ransom to the kidnapper, may be 
unwise or even may be thought immoral; [but] to 
view them as involved in the commission of the 
crime confounds the policy embodied in the pro­
hibition; it is laid down, wholly or in part, for 
their protection. So, too, to hold the female 
an accomplice in a statutory rape upon her per­
son would be inconsistent with the legislative 
purpose to protect against her own weakness in 
consenting, the very theory of the crime. [�odel 
Penal Code Commentary, 'l'entative Draft No. 1, 
supra at 35]. 
The justification for paragraph (2) also is well stated 
in the Model Penal Code commentary: 
Exclusion of the victim does not wholly 
meet the problems that arise. Should the man 
who has intercourse with a prostitute be viewed 
as an accomplice in the act of prostitution, the 
purchaser an accomplice in the unlawful sale, the 
unmarried party to a bigamous marriage an accom­
plice of the bigamist, the bribe-giver an accomplice 
of the taker. 
The commentary to the i1odel Penal Code concluded that the 
question of whether accomplice liability should exist in such 
instances is a legislative decision to be made when the crime 
is defined. 
If legislators know that buyers will not 
be viewed as accomplices in sales unless the 
statute indicates that this behavior is included 
in the prohibition, they will focus on the prob­
lem as they frame the definition of the crime. 
And since the exception is confined to behavior 
"inevitably incident to'' the commission of the 
crime, the problem we repeat, inescapably pre­
sents itself in defining the crime. [!'-1odel 
Penal Code, suora at 35-36). 
It is felt that the Model Penal Code and Oregon �pproach 
to this subject is the proper one. Indeed, the Alaska case 
law recognizes that in certain instances con<luct "inevitably 
incident" to the commission of the crime is not necessarily 
an offense. See, Howard v. State, 496 P.2d 657 (AK 1972). 
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Paragraph (3) is based on the premise that even though 
action that suffices for complicity may have occurred, the law 
should contemplate that liability may be averted if the reason 
for its imposition disappears before the crime has been committed. 
In other words, a renunciation combined with appropriate steps 
to deprive one's complicity of all its effectiveness should be 
effective to relieve one of liability. Of course, the requisite 
action needed in order to achieve that purpose will vary with 
the accessorial behavior. For example, if the accomplice pro­
vided guns, a statement of withdrawal ought not be sufficient. 
What is important is that he get back the arms. 
It is contemplated that there will be some situations 
where the only way that the accomplice can deprive his conduct 
of its effectiveness is to make independent efforts to prevent 
the crime. This section provides that if the accomplice gives 
"timely" warning to the police he will avoid liability for the 
crime. "Timely" warning refers to notification to the police 
before the commission of the crime. The specific time period 
will vary with each particular crime, but warning must be given 
early enough to allow the police to prevent the commission of 
the crime if they act upon the information. 
Finally, an accomplice may also avoid liability by making 
"proper effort to prevent the commission of the crime." For 
example, the accomplice who supplies a gun to be used in a 
planned bank robbery can avoid liability by notifying the bank 
manager of the planned crime a day before·it is to occur. Of 
course, a warning ten minutes before the robbery would not be 
sufficient. 
The basic rationale supporting the adoption of a renuncia­
tion provision, as well as its relationship to existing law, is 
discussed at length in the commentary to §39(b), applying a 
similar provision in the area of attempts. The discussion there 
is equally applicable to §20(3). 
Section 21--Liability Based upon the Conduct of Another: 
No Defense. 
In any prose�ution for an offense in which criminal lia­
bility is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to 
this chapter, it is no defense that: 
(1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or con­
victed of any offense based upon the conduct in question or has 
been convicted of a different offense or degree of crime or 
(2) The offense, as defined, can be committed only be a
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particular class or classes of persons to which the defendant 
does not belong, and he is for that reason legally incapable 
of committing the crime in an individual capacity. 
COMMENT 
This section is taken from ORS 161.160. Similar provisions 
appear in the New York Revised Penal Law §20.05(2) and MPC §2.06(5). 
Paragraph (1) eliminates the accessor's common law defense 
of the lack of the prior conviction of the principal. Alaska, 
like most jurisdictions, had previously abolished the distinction 
between principal and accessories before the fact and with it 
this form of defense [See AS 12.15.010]. It should be noted 
that the absence of this defense does not relieve the prosecu­
tion of the requirement of showing that the crime was actually 
committed by one person or the other. 
Paragraph (2) merely points to the generally accepted 
principle that a person who is not capable in his individual 
capacity of committing an offense may nevertheless be liable 
for the behavior of another who has the capacity to commit 
that crime. For example, even though a husband has no legal 
liability for the forcible rape of his wife, he may be liable 
for the rape of his wife by another whom he aided and abetted. 
Section 22--Criminal Liability o� _ _.s_:9_!J2_9rations 
(1) A corporation is guilty of an offense if:
(a) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged
in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope 
of his employment and in behalf of the corporation and the 
offense is a misdemeanor or a violation, or the offense is one 
defined by a statute that clearly indicates a le�islative in­
tent to impose criminal liability on a corporation; or 
(b) The conduct constituting the offense consists
of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative 
performances imposed on corporations by law; or 
(c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged
in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or knowingly 
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tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial 
agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf 
of the corporation. 
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "Agent" means any director, officer or employee
of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to 
act in behalf of the corporation. 
(b) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a
corporation who exercises authority with respect to the formu­
lation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial 
capacity of subordinate employees, or any other agent in a 
position of comparable authority. 
Section 23--Criminal Liability of an Individual for 
Corporate Conuuct 
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an 
offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name 
of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such 
conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. 
COMI1ENT--Sections 22 and 23 
Section 22 is taken directly from ORS 161.170. Similar 
provisions appear in New York Revised Penal Law §70.20, and 
Model Penal Code §2.07. 
Section 23 is taken directly from ORS 161.175 and New 
York Revised Penal Law §20.15. 
Section 22 indicates the circumstances under which a cor­
poration may be held criminally liable. 
Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) indicates the offenses for 
which a corporation may be held criminally liable for the con­
duct of an agent acting within the scope of his employment. 
It adopts the agency principle of respondeat superior, qualified 
by the additional requirement that the conduct be ''in behalf of 
the corporation." Liability based upon respondeat superior is 
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limited to offenses that are misdemeanors or violations. The 
only exceptions to this limitation would need to be cl8arly 
indicated by the Legislature in the statute defining a felony 
that imposed corporate liability. 
Paragraph (b) affirms the responsibility of corporations 
for the commission of an offense through omission of a duty 
specifically imposed on corporations by law. 
Paragraph (c) also states a basis for liability that re­
lates more to the actual responsibility of the corporation 
than the theory of respondeat superior. It applies to those 
activities which were known specifically to high corporate 
executives. 
Section 17 assures that a person is not exempted from 
personal criminal liability performed through or in the name 
of a corporation. 
The policy issues to be considered are well staterl in 
Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft 110. 4, at 148-150 (1955). 
At present there is no specific statutory provisions deal­
ing generally with corporate criminal liability. However, 
AS 11.75.070 contains definitions of terms used in statutes 
relating to crimes and criminal procedure and includes "(11) 
'Person' includes corporations as well as natural persons." 
Section 31--Duress 
(1) In any prosecution for an offense, it is a defense
that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because 
he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened use of unlaw­
ful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a reasonable person in his situation would 
have been unable to resist. 
(2) The defense of duress as defined in Subdivision (1)
of this section is not available when a person intentionally 
or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is 
probable that he will be subject to duress. 
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C0�1MENT 
This section is a modified version of New York Penal Law 
§40.00. Currently, there is no Alaska statute that recognizes
the defense of duress, though Commission members cited cases
where the defense was raised at trial. It is clear then that
the defense of duress is recognized in Alaska, but neither the
statutes or the case law provide any clue that such is the case.
This section codifies the defense.
In recognizing the duress defense the Code will serve to 
limit its applicability to the circumstances defined in this 
section. 
The Commission has limited the duress defense to situa­
tions where a person was coerced to act by "the use or threatened 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person." 
Beyond this limitation to coercive force or threats against 
the person, the Commission perceived no valid reason for 
demanding that the threat be one of death or even of great 
bodily harm, that the imperiled victim be the actor rather 
than another, or that the injury portended be immediate in 
point of time. 
The Commission felt that these factors would be given evi­
dential weight along with other circumstances in determining 
whether a "reasonable person" in the situation of the actor 
would have been unable to resist the commission of the crime. 
The Commission also felt that the defense should not be 
limited by the type of crime committed. For example, ORS 161.270 
provides that "the commission of acts which would otherwise 
constitute an offense, other than murder'' [emphasis added] may 
be justified by showing duress. The Commission agreed with 
the New York formulation and concluded that the defense should 
apply to all crimes. 
Subsection (2) is probably a sufficient guarantee against 
the claim of justification being raised by a criminal acting 
in concert, e.g., when one criminal says that he fired a wea­
pon during a hold-up only because another criminal threatened 
to shoot him if he did not, and that in most instances the jury 
would conclude that the defendant had intentionally or reck­
lessly placed himself in that situation. 
If the Commission decides to recognize affirmative defenses, 
and if duress is treated as such a defense, an appropriate 
change will be required in subsection (1). 
Section 36--Intoxication: Drug Use as a Defense 
(1) Voluntary intoxication, or the use of a drug is not,
as such, a defense to a criminal charge; but in any prosecution 
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for an offense, evidence of intoxication or drug use may be 
offered whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the 
crime that requires a culpable mental state. 
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the
offense, if the defendant, due to voluntary intoxication or 
the use of a tlrug, is unaware of a risk of which he would have 
been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. 
COMMENT 
This section restates the rule now contained in AS 11.70.030 
in terms consistent with the language used in the Code. 
The statute currently provides: 
(a) An act committed by a person while in a state
of voluntary intoxication is no less criminal because he was 
intoxicated. However, when the existence of a particular motive, 
purpose or intent is a necessary element to constitute a par­
ticular species, or degree of crime, the jury may take into 
consideration the fact that the defendant was intoxicated at 
the time in determining the purpose, motive or intent with 
which he committed the act. 
(b) l\.s used in this section, "intoxication" refers
to intoxication from the use of a drug in violation of AS 17.10 
or AS 17.12 as well as to intoxication from alcohol. 
One substantive change is made in the proposed section 
from the current statute. Presently, a drug use defense could 
not be raised unless the drug was used in violation of AS 17.10 
or AS 17.12. The Commission does not believe that the defense 
should be so limited. If the drug use negatives an element of 
the crime that requires a culpable mental state, the defense 
should be available regardless of the legality of the drug use. 
Subsection (2) provides, in effect, that a defendant may 
be guilty of reckless conduct, although he is unaware of a risk, 
if his unawareness is the result of voluntary intoxication. The 
reckless offender is aware of and "consciously disregards" it 
(§9(9). The criminally negligent offender is not aware of the
risk created; therefore he cannot be guilty of disregarding it
(§9(10). The New York commentary suggests this illustration of
how an offender can act with both forms of culpability: "The
driver of a car who stops at a bar, drinks heavily, continues
on his way and then runs over a pedestrian whom he fails to
see in his intoxicated condition and whom he undoubtedly would
have seen had he been sober. Here, his culpability goes well
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beyond his failure of perception at the time of the accident. 
By getting drunk in the course of his automobile trip, he con­
sciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
accident and, hence, in the overall setting, he acted 'recklessly'." 
Section 32--Entrapment 
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting
in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment 
if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of 
an offense, he solicits or encourages another person to engage 
in conduct constituting such offense by employing methods of 
persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that 
such an offense will be committed by persons other than those 
who are ready to commit it. 
(2) A person prosecuted for an offense shall have the
charge brought against him dismissed if the entrapment defense 
is sucessfully raised. The issue of entrapment shall be tried 
by the court in the absence of the jury. 
comrnnT 
This section is based on Model Penal Code §2.13. Though 
there is currently no Alaska statute on entrapment, the Alaska 
Supreme Court recognized the defense in Grossman v. State, 457 
P.2d 226 (1969), where the Court, (at p. 229) adopted the
"objective" approach to entrapment:
Unlawful entrapment occurs when a public 
law enforcement official, or a person work­
in cooperation with him, in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission of an offense, 
induces another person to commit such an 
offense by persuasion or inducement which 
would be effective to persuade an average 
person, other than one who is ready and 
willing to commit such an offense. 
In Grossman, the court observed that the minority opinion 
in Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369 (1950), written by Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, dealt with both the policy behind the law of 
entrapment and the way in which that policy can best be effec­
tuated. The Alaska court, (at p. 228), quoted from that opinion: 
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The courts refuse to convict an entrapped 
defendant, not because his �onduct falls 
outside the proscription of the statute, 
but because, even if his guilt be admitted, 
the methods employed on behalf of the 
Government to bring about conviction can-
not be countenanced. Insofar as they are 
used as instrumentalities in the adminis­
tration of criminal justice, the federal 
courts have an obligation to set their face 
against enforcement of the law by lawless 
means or means that violate rationally vin­
dicated standards of justice, and to refuse 
to sustain such methods by effectuating them. 
They do this in the excercise of a recogni?.ed 
jurisdiction to formulate and apply 'proper 
standards for the enforcement of the federal 
criminal law in the federal courts,' McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, 87 L.Ecf73r9, 
824, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 356 U.S., at 380, 78 
S.Ct., at 824.
The minority then stated that the bRtter way 
to further this policy is t� focus the deter­
mination upon the character of the police 
conduct rather than upon the defendant's 
predisposition. To rest the determination 
on the origin of intent is irrelevant because, 
'In every case of this kind the intention that 
the particular crime be committed originates 
with the police, and without their induce­
ment the crime would not have occurred.' 
356 u.s., at 382, 78 s.ct., at 825. 
The Grossman Court then concluded: 
We feel that the proper solution is the 
objective test which focuses the determin­
ation upon the particular conduct of the 
police in the case presented. Inducements 
should be limited to those measures which, 
objectively consiaered, are likely to pro­
voke to the commission of crime only those 
persons, and not others, who are ready and 
willing to commit a criminal offense. 
The Commission is in agreement with the Alaska Supreme 
Court's approval of the minority opinion in Sherman, and have 
therefore adopted the "objective" approach to entrapment. The 
language of this section is almost identical to that formulated 
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Grossman. 
Subsection (2) provides that the defendant who sucessfully 
raises the entrapment defense "shall have the charge brought 
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against him dismissed." This is in conformity with current 
procedure in Alaska. See, Grossman, (at p. 231.) 
Subsection (2) also provides that the entrapment defense 
"shall be tried by the court in the absence of the jury." 
This also restates current Alaska procedure. See, Grossman,
(at page 230) where the court held: 
--
It is obvious that the issue of entrapment 
can be litigated either before or during 
trial and should be determined by the court 
and not the jury. 
Section 39--Attempt 
(1) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when with intent to 
commit a crime, he engages in conduct which constitutes a sub­
stantial step toward the commission of the crime. 
(2) [Classification of Crime of Attempt]
COJ\1MENT 
This section is partially taken from New York Revised 
Penal Law §110.00 and partially from ORS 161.405. The current 
Alaska statute on attempt appears in AS 11.05.020 and provides 
as follows: 
'A person who attempts to commit a crime, 
and in the attempt does any act toward 
the commission of the crime, is prevented 
or intercepted in the perpetration of the 
crime, when no other provision is made by 
law for the punishment of the attempt, upon 
conviction, is punishable as follows.' 
[punishment is then listed] 
Culpable Mental State Required 
One major problem with the present statute is that it 
fails to make reference to the culpable mental state required 
for the crime. However, the statute was taken directly from 
the now repealed Oregon provision, ORS 161.090. Under this 
statute, the crime of attempt was defined as necessarily 
including an intent to commit the attempted crime. State v. 
Duffy, 295 P. 953 (Ore. 1931). Thus, the Duffy formulat1on 
would support both the Revised New York and proposed Alaska 
statutes. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Revised Oregon 
Code felt that their revised attempt statute, now appearing 
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in ORS 161.405, was ''generally in accord with existing Oregon 
law." The Duffy decision was not cited. ORS 161.405 defines 
attempt in the following manner: 
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit 
a crime when he intentionally engages in 
conduct which constitutes a substantial step 
towards the commission of the crime. 
The Commission has concluded that generally the crime of 
attempt should require the showing of a "specific intent" to 
commit a c,rime and has adopted the New York language on this 
matter. Thus, pursuant to this section, where criminal lia­
bility rests on the causation of a prohibitive result, the 
actor must have an intent to achieve that result even thougl1 
violation of the substantive offense may require some lesser 
culpable mental state. For example, reckless driving would 
not constitute attempted manslaughter. A person charged with 
the substantive crime of manslaughter may be liable as a re­
sult of negligence or recklessness causing death, but the same 
recklessness would not be sufficient if the victim did not 
die and the actor were only charged with attempt; here, the 
State would have to show an intent to achieve the prohibited 
end result - death of the victim. 
The Oregon drafters felt that this approach was an over­
simplification to the method of dealing with the problem of 
attempt and cited the comments of the tentative version of the 
Proposed California Code in support of their formulation: 
The intent requirement should be satisfied 
where the defendant intends to engage in the 
conduct which will constitute the crime. He 
need not necessarily contemplate all the 
surrounding circumstances included in the 
definition of the crime. Assume the raping of 
a 15-year-old girl. Assume also that negli­
gence as to the age of the victim suffices 
for that element of the crime. Is there not 
an aggravated attempt where a 15-year-old is 
attacked, even if it can be shown that the 
defendant was only negligent as to the age 
of the victim? 
The draft deals with this problem by 
requiring an intent to engage in conduct 
which constitutes the crime not in a 
specific intent to commit the crime. 
Doing this, it follows the Model Penal 
Code and the Wisconsin statute (§939.32) 
which requires that the defendant intend 
'to perform acts which attain a result which, 
if accomplished, would constitute the crime.' 
The other new codes ignore this problem. 
California Tent. Draft, 2 (1968). 
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The Alaska Commission felt that this concern was a valid 
one. However, the Commission also felt that the Oregion pro­
posal presented a major problem by only requiring the prosecu­
tion to show in an attempt prosectuion that the actor "inten­
tionally engaged in conduct." Under this formulation an 
attempt conviction could be obtained under circumstances not 
now sufficient for a conviction. For example, in Gargan v. 
State, 436 P.2d 968 (AK 1968), the Court held that a necessary 
eTement for conviction of attempted larceny was "intent to 
commit the crime of larceny." Under the revised Oregon statute, 
the prosecution would only be required to show that the actor 
"intentionally engaged" in the conduct which amounted to an 
attempt to commit larceny. Apparently it would not be required 
to show that the actor also intended to commit the crime. 
Nevertheless, while disagreeing with the Oregon approach, 
the Commission felt that under some circumstances the prosecu­
tion should not be required to prove that the defendant intended 
to commit a crime in order to obtain a conviction for attempt. 
Therefore, this section specifically provides that a conviction 
for attempt may be based on an alternative showing if provision 
is specifically made elsewhere in the coae - presumably in the 
statute defining the crime. 
l\ct Requirement 
This Section also deals with the always troublesome prob­
lem of distinguishing acts of preparation from an attempt. In 
Gargan, supra, the court cited Lemke v. United States, 211 F.2d 
73 (9th Cir.) for the elementary proposition that "mere 
preparation to commit a crime, not followed by an overt act 
done towards its commission, does not constitute an attempt." 
The Oregon statute handles this problem by requiring that 
conduct must be a "substantial step" towards the commission of 
the offense to constitute an attempt. This approach leaves 
with the Court or the jury the duty to decide what actions 
qualify as "a substantial step." The Commission believes that 
specificity beyond this point would be self-defeating. However, 
in §5.01(2), the Model Penal Code supplies a �artial explanation 
of what is meant by a "substantial step." 
The Model Penal Code requires that the Act relied upon to 
show an attempt must be "strongly corroborative of the actor's 
criminal purpose." The Code then lists the kind of act which 
could be held to be substantial steps in light of the "strongly 
corroborative" provision. The Commission believes that the 
listing of these acts more properly belongs in the section 
comments as a matter of legislative history. In keeping with 
this view, the Model Penal Code examples of acts which should 
not be held insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a sub­
stantial step are approved and are set out as follows: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following
the contemplated victim of the crime; 
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(b) enticing or seeking to entice the con­
templated victim of the crime to go to the place 
contemplated for its commission; 
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated
for the commission of the crime; 
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle
or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the 
crime will be committed; 
(e) possession of materials to be employed
in the commission of the crime, which are specially 
designed for such unlawful use or which can serve 
no lawful purpose of the actor under the circum­
stances; 
(f) possession, collection or fabrication
of materials to be employed in the commission of 
the crime, at or near the place contemplated for 
its commission, where such possession, collection 
or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the 
actor under the circumstances; 
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage
in conduct constituting an element of the crime. 
Currently the Alaska Statute addresses itself to the act 
requirement by requiring the prosecution to prove "any act 
towards the commission of the crime." It is felt that this 
definition is not satisfactory since it does not emphasize 
that the act must go beyond "mere preparation." 
It should be noted that under this formulation the 
attempt to commit the principal offense need not fail as a 
prPrPq11iRi�P �n �nnui��inn nf �n ���Pmp� 0h�rg0. Currently, 
AS 11.05.020 requires that the attempt fail in order for a 
conviction of attempt to result. This rule arose historically 
out of the unrelated problems of merger of misdemeanors in 
felonies. These early English merger restrictions have long 
since lost their relevancy to the modern law of attempt. 
See Perkins, Criminal Law, 552-57 (1969). This rule, if in 
fact it is the law in Alaska, is abolished by this section. 
The Commission conclud<:c!d that to require the prosecution 
to prove that the attempt failed would put an unnecessary, 
and unjustifiable, burden upon it. For example, under the 
current statute the prosecution is faced with a real dilemma 
should it decide to prosecute an individual for a crime that 
may or may not have been completed, but for which there is 
no doubt that "a substantial step" sufficient for an attempt 
conviction has occurred. The rape example was discussed where 
there is a reasonable doubt whether the penetration necessary 
for conviction of the substantive crime has occurred. Under 
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such circumstances the prosecution should be allowed to pro­
secute for the crime of attempted rape without being required 
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that crime failed because 
of lack of penetration, especially when there is already 
"reasonable doubt" as to this issue. 
Under the present attempt statute the defendant is likely 
to escape conviction of rape because the prosecution cannot 
prove that the crime was completed, while at the same time 
will escape conviction of attempt to commit rape because the 
prosecution cannot show that the crime failed. Under this sec­
tion, and under both the Oregon and New York Codes, the defen­
dant will not have the benefit of this advantage. The prosecu­
tion will not be required to prove the failure of the rape if 
it decides to seek an attempt conviction against the defendant. 
Further, an attempt conviction may be obtained even though the 
substantive crime was committed. (Sec. 43) 
Section 39--Attempt to Commit a Crime--No Defense 
(2) If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise con­
stitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to (1), it is 
no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime 
charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circum­
stances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such 
crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances 
been as such person believed them to be. 
COMMENT 
This subsection, taken from New York Penal Law §110.10, 
recognizes that neither legal or factual impossibility is a 
defense to attempt. 
Though there is currently no Alaska statute addressing 
itself to this issue, the Alaska Supreme Court has specifically 
recognized that "factual impossibility" is not a defense to 
an attempt prosecution. See, Gargan v. State,436 P.2d 968, 
9 71 ( AK 19 6 8 ) • 
The law of attempt is now recognized as being more pro­
perly directed at the dangerousness of the actor--the threat 
of the actor's personality to society at large. The emphasis 
of the old view was that the nature of the act should be deter­
minant of the guilt of the actor. Pursuant to this view it 
ha� been held, for instance, that if an actor tried to receive 
property he believed stolen when the property was in fact not 
stolen, his act was not legally criminal because it was 
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impossible to commit the crime of attempt to conceal that 
which was not stolen. His act was viewed objectively as no 
threat to society because it was "a legal impossibility." 
Yet viewed from the subjective standpoint of the actor, the 
intent and purpose were criminal and but for the actor's mis­
taken understanding of the circumstances the crime would have 
been committed. 
"Impossibility" is said to be of two kinds; factual and 
legal. The classic example of factual possibility is posed 
by an attempt to pick a pocket which is in fact empty. Th0. 
Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that such conduct would 
constitute attempted larceny. In Gargan v. State, supra, the 
court adopted the so-called "empty pocket doctrine." However, 
the court's holding was limited to ''factual impossibility." as 
distinguished from legal impossibility and it is not clear 
whether the Alaska court would hold that "legal impossibility" 
is a defense. 
In a number of jurisdictions, "legal impossibility" has 
been made a defense. The commentary to the Model Penal Code 
in §5.01, Tent. Draft No. 10 at 30-31 provided examples of 
the effect of a jurisdiction recognizing the legal impossi­
bility defense: 
[In several jurisdictions] attempt convic­
tions have been set aside on the ground that it 
was legally impossible for the actor to have com­
mitted the crime contemplated. These decisions 
held: 
(1) That a person accepting goods
which he believed to have been stolen, 
but which were not then 'stolen' goods, 
was not guilty of an attempt to receive 
stolen goods; 
(2) That an actor who offered a
bribe to a person believed to be a 
juror, but was not a juror, coul<l not 
be said to have attempted to bribe a 
juror . • . 
The basic rationale of these decisions is that, judging 
the actor's conduct in the light of the actual facts, what he 
intended to do did not amount to a crime. This approacl1, how­
ever, is unsound in that it seeks to evaluate a mental frame 
of reference, but to a situation wholly at variance with the 
actor's beliefs. In so doing, the courts exonerate defendants 
in situations where attempt liability most certainly should be 
imposed. In all of these cases (1) criminal purpose has been 
clearly demonstrated, (2) the actor has gone as far as he could 
in implementing that purpose, and (3) as a result, the actor's 
dangerousness is plainly manifested. 
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In eliminating "impossibility'' as a defense, the proposed 
section follows the lead of all the new code revisions, inclu­
ding New York, Oregon and Illinois code revisions, as well as 
the J\lodel Penal Code. 
Though the Alaska law that factual impossibility is no 
defense seems to be settled by the Gargan case, no Alaska 
decision was found dealing with legal impossibility. As seen, 
the two are not really different as a policy matter. This 
section, like all the other modern codes, treats legal impos­
sibility the same as factual impossibility and allows neither 
as a defense. 
Section 39--Renunciation as a Defense to Attempt 
(3) A person is not liable under (1) if, under circum­
stances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of 
his criminal intent, he avoids the commission of the crime 
attempted by abandoning his criminal effort and, if the mere 
abandonment is insufficient to accomplish this avoidance, doing 
everything necessary to prevent the commission of the attempted 
crime and in fact the attempted crime is avoided. 
(4) A.renunciation is not "voluntary and complete" within
the meaning of this section if it is motivated in whole or in 
part by (a) a belief that circumstances exist which increase 
the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant 
or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which 
render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose, 
or (b) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another 
time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or 
another but similar objective. 
COMMENT 
Subsection (3) is partially taken from ORS 161.430. The 
language "and in fact the attempted crime is avoided" was 
added at the suggestion of the Commission. Subsection (4) 
is taken from New York Revised Criminal Law 40.10(5). There 
is currently no Alaska statute on this subject, and the issue 
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has never been decided in the Alaska courts. This subsection 
provides that a "voluntary and complete abandonment of the 
course of criminal conduct after it has reached the stage 
where it constitutes an attempt is a defense to an attempt 
prosecution. 
In accepting the policy that renunciation is to be a 
defense to the crime of attempt, the Commission considered 
the view in the Model Penal Code which suggests there are two 
basic reasons for allowing the defense. 
First, renunciation of criminal purpose tends to 
negative dangerousness. As previously indicated, 
much of the effort devoted to excluding early 
'preparatory' conduct from criminal attempt lia-
bility is based on the desire not to punish where 
there is an insufficient showing that the actor 
has a firm purpose to commit the crime contemplated. 
In cases where the actor has gone beyond the line 
drawn for preparation, indicating I2E_im� facie 
sufficient firmness of purpose, he should be 
allowed to rebut such a conclusion by showing that 
he has plainly demonstrated his lack of firm pur­
pose by completely renouncing his purpose to commit 
the crime . 
'A second reason for allowing renunciation of 
criminal purpose as a defense to an attempt 
charge is to encourage actors to desist from 
pressing forward with their criminal designs, 
thereby diminishing the risk that the substan­
tive crime will be committed.' 
'On balance, it is concluded that renunciation 
of criminal purpose should be a defense to a 
criminal attempt charge because, as to thP- early 
stages of an attempt, it significantly negatives 
dangerousness of character, and, as to later stages, 
the value of encouraging desistance outweighs the 
net dangerousness shown by the abandoned criminal 
effort. And, because of the importance of en­
couraging desistance in the final stages of the 
attempt, the defense is allowed even where the 
last proximate act has occurred but the criminal 
result can be avoided--e.g., where the fuse has 
been lit but can still be stamped out. If, 
however, the actor has gone so far that he has 
put in motion forces which he is powerless to 
stop, then the attempt has been completed and 
cannot be abandoned . . .  
The Commission concluded that the l\1odel Penal Code's 
justifications for the renunciation defense were persuasive. 
However, the Commission observed that the rationale for such 
a defense could easily be extended to situations where a 
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substantive crime was in fact committed. The example of a 
kidnapper voluntarily returning his victim was raised. Such 
a renunciation certainly "negatives dangerousness of character" 
and encourages "actors to desist from pressing forward with 
their criminal designs." Yet, (with the exception of accom­
plice renunciation pursuant to §20) no member of the commission 
felt that renunciation should be a defense to conviction of a 
substantive crime. 
After much discussion, it was concluded that the most 
persuasive rationale in support of the defense was that it 
coincided with both the actor's and the prosecution's percep­
tion that such conduct was not criminal. An individual who 
"voluntarily and completely" abandoned his attempt and met 
the further requirements of the subsection would probably not 
consider himself guilty of criminal conduct. (Of course, if 
his "substantial step" toward the commission of the crime 
were itself a crime the actor would be guilty of that crime 
[i.e., possession of explosives], but not of an attempt to 
commit the crime [i.e., arson in a building] . �'lore importantly, 
the members of the commission concluded that currently, even 
without this section, an individual who effectively abandoned 
his attempt would not be prosecuted for an attempt. Thus, 
while partially based on the Model Penal Code's rationale for 
the defense, this section more importantly represents what 
should be, and what in fact is, the current treatment of this 
defense in Alaska. 
It should be noted that the Commission has emphasized by 
the inclusion of the phrase "and in fact the attempted crime 
is avoided" that a renunciation will not be effective unless 
the attempted crime is in fact prevented. Thus, if the crime 
occurs despite the actor "doing everything necessary to pre­
vent" it, the defense cannot be raised should the prosecution 
seek an attempt conviction. 
It should also be noted that the requirement of avoidance 
of the substantive crime is not present in the renunciation 
defense to accomplice liability pursuant to §20. Indeed, to 
have required the crime to have been avoided under §20 would 
have made that section meaningless since the defense by its 
very nature will only be raised when the crime is committed. 
Thus, while under §20 the renunciation defense will only be 
raised when a crime is committed, the defense under the sec­
tion can only be successfully raised when a crime is avoided. 
Subdivision 4, which is self-explanatory, denies the 
renunciation defense to one whose preventive efforts were 
motivated by considerations of self inter�st or practicality 
and do not serve to mitigate his culpability. For example, 
it is not sufficient if the actor is frightened into aban­
doning his conduct because of the imminence of police inter­
ference, or because he decides to wait until a later time to 
continue his activity, or because a means he has chosen for 
accomplishing the crime has proved inadequate. 
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Section 43--Multiple Convictions Barred in Inchoate Crimes 
(li It is no defense to a prosecution under Section 39 or 
41 of this Code that the offense the defendant either attempted 
to commit or solicited to commit was actually committed pur­
suant to such attempt or solicitation. 
(2) A person shall not be convicted of more than one
offense defined by Sections 39 and 41 of this Code for conduct 
designed to commit or to culminate in commission of the same 
crime. 
(3) A person shall not be convicted on the basis of the
same course of conduct of both the actual commission of an 
offense and an attempt to cownit that offense or solicitation 
of that offense. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to bar
inclusion of multiple counts charging violation of tl1e substan­
tive crime and Sections 39 and 41 of this Code in a single 
indictment or information, provided the penal conviction is 
consistent with subsections (2) and (3) of this section. 
CU:'-'.l'.'111',L'✓ T 
This section is taken from ORS 161.485. Though there is 
no Alaska statute on this subject, under the common law the 
two inchoate crimes definetl in this section were deem0d to 
merge into the completed crime. The effect was that therA 
could not be cumulative conviction for the inchoate and tho 
substantive crime. This rule of law continues in most juris­
dictions with respect to the inchoate crimes of attempt and 
solicitation. As the common law specifically applies in 
Alaska, this section probably represents the Alaska treatment 
of the subject. 
The effect of this section is well statP.d in the Oregon 
commentary. 
Subsection (1) of this section is designed to permit 
prosecution for inchoate crimes even if the substantive crime 
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has been completed. It should be noted herG that although 
prosecution for the inchoate crime, as well as for the sub­
stantive offense, is permitted by the sAction, subsection (3) 
prohibits conviction for both the inchoate crime and the sub­
stantive offense. 
Subsection (2) precludes conviction of more than one 
inchoate crime defined by this article for conduct designed 
to commit or to culminate in thG commission of the same crime. 
The provision reflects the policy, frequently stated in these 
comments, of finding the evil of preparatory action in the 
danger that it may culminate in the substantive offense that 
is its object. Thus conceived, there is no warrant for cumu­
lating convictions of attempt and solicitation to commit the 
same offense. 
Subsection (3) precludes conviction of both an inchoate 
crime and the substantive offense. 
Subsection (4) is included to emphasize that subsections 
(2) and (3) deal only with convictions, not with prosecutions.
It should be clear, therefore, that the prosecution may be for
one or more inchoate offenses as well as for the substantive
offense.
13=2. 
With few guidelines and many judges we are 
effectively, in the area of sentencing, 
a government of men, not laws. 
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Criminal Sentences 
Judge Marvin Frankel 
New York, 1973 p.17. 
SENTENCING 
Introduction 
Review and revision of the definitions of crime constitutes 
but a part of Criminal Code revision efforts. The work of revision 
also required that the Commission consider three other topics in 
connection with sentencing: 
felonies and misdemeanors; 2. 
1. the classification of crimes as 
the degrees of seriousness within 
those categories; and 3. the appropriate sentences for crimes which 
had been revised by the Commission or would be considered by it in 
the future. 
The Commission is not the first group to delve into sentencing 
in Alaska. In 1974 the Judicial Council initiated a study of sentencing 
patterns in felony cases. In the course of preparing for the study the 
Council's staff interviewed many of the active practitioners of criminal 
justice in the state. All parties agreed unanimously that the existing 
Criminal Code was outmoded.* 
Addressing sentencing as it related to the existing code, 
the study's Final Report noted: 
"The present code is not neatly categorized, and pro­
scribes hundreds of criminal actions in a confusing and 
often inconsistent manner. The code has not had a major 
revision for almost a century despite numerous recent pro­
posals to do so. As a result of the present code, attorneys, 
police and judges often juggle existing provisions and 
sentence authorizations, to obtain results that appear to 
them more consistent with the situation at hand. 
*Cutler, Beverly, Sentencing in Alaska, A Description of the
Process and Summary of StatisticalData for 1973. Alaska Judicial
Council.--garch, 1975. p.20. 
-- -- ---
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Specific problems with the code presently are being 
studied in the Legislature. It might be noted, however, 
that the chief characteristics of the criminal code that 
affect the sentencing process are (1) the breadth and length 
of sentences authorized to the discretion of the judge (many 
offenses carry a range of one to ten, one to fifteen, or one 
to twenty years); (2) the numerous overlapping categories of 
crimes which result in prosecuting officials choosing crimes 
with very different sentence authorizations even in similar 
circumstances; and (3) the many outmoded or irrational 
patterns of sentences authorized, such as the maximum penalty 
for forgery exceeding the penalties for robbery burglary, 
and assault with intent to kill--or the penalty authorized 
for concealing stolen property grossly exceeding that for 
shoplifting the same property." ** 
On the basis of its review of property crimes this Commission 
concluded that the specific problems identified in the Judicial Council 
study still exist and deserve the attention of the Legislature. 
At about the same time that the Commission first began to 
explore issues relating to sentencing the Corrections Task Force 
appointed by the Governor issued its report on conditions existing 
within the Division. One of its recommendations concerned a basic 
change in sentencing procedures and called for the imposition of 
mandatory minimum jail terms for repeat offenders. 
The Commission directed its staff to explore this issue 
and to include recommendations on mandatory sentences in the sentencing 
proposals to be considered by the Commission at its January meeting. 
In searching for solutions to the problems associated with 
existing sentencing provisions the Commission also concluded that 
** Ibid, pp. 20-21 
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practical considerations such as the institutional capacity of the 
Division of Corrections to house sentenced prisoners could not be 
ignored. Consequently, it directed its staff to investigate that 
capacity and to determine what impact a new sentencing structure 
might have on existing capacity. 
Time precluded in-depth research of the question of capacity. 
None-the-less, from existing data and information the staff was able 
to draw some tenative conclusions on the matter. The process used 
entailed looking at data on capacity reported in the 1976 Alaska 
Criminal Justice Plan and drawing inferences from the data on 1973 
sentencing patterns provided in Sentencing in Alaska, supra. 
The Capacity of the Correction System 
In-state Alaska correctional facilities have an emergency 
capacity of 833 units. Of this total, 119 are considered "special 
service holding units" which are of a temporary nature only, including 
drunk tanks, infirmaries, isolation units, admission and orientation 
sections, etc., and are not ordinarily used as housing units capable 
of handling long range, non-emergency situations. Another 148 units 
are designed for handling juvenile offenders, leaving a total of 566 
units for adults. These 566 units hold a combination of sentenced 
and detention populations. 
The 566 units which are available for adult offenders have 
a "rated capacity" of 514. "Rated capacity" is defined as the extent 
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to which institutions can operate efficiently and, at the same time, 
provide programs and rehabilitation for the prevention and reduction 
of crime. It als6 incorporates the elasticity necessary to allow 
the entry, transfer, and discharge of prisoners. The courts cannot 
specify a sentence beginning on the exact day a cell comes open. 
Alaska's ratio of 90.81% reflects a higher efficiency than accepted 
National norms of 80%. 
In FY '75 Alaska institutions had a used capacity of 519, 
up from 483 in FY '74, indicating that existing in-state correctional 
facilities' populations have already reached levels of maximum operating 
efficiency, at least on an annualized basis. 
In addition to in-state facilities for adult offenders, 
approximately 17 institutions outside the state are eligible to accept 
Alaska transfers. These transfers normally take place for one of 
four reasons: 
1. The offender has proven to be dangerous, or a manage­
ment problem within state facilities; 
2. The offender has an extremely long sentence which would
preclude placement in an Alaskan institution; 
3. The offender has special needs that cannot be met by
programs presently available in Alaska institutions, and; 
4. The offender will be better able to maintain family ties
and establish a parole plan for re-entry into an outside community. 
In 1975 approximately 37 adult Alaskan offenders were 
serving sentences in institutions outside the State. However, the 
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Division of Corrections has, over the past few years, embarked on a 
policy of reducing the numbers of prisoners housed outside the state. 
A review of Sentencing in Alaska, provided some interesting 
insights into sentencing practices in Alaska. 
The study analyzed the 749 offenders charged with felonies 
in Alaska in 1973. Of that number 43% were involved in property 
crimes, 29% violent crimes, 25% drug related crimes and 3% other 
crimes. Less than one-fourth (24%) of these defendants had prior 
felony convictions; 19% had prior misdemeanor convictions; 38% had 
no prior records; while for 7% the record was unknown. 
Those charged with drug offenses were least likely not to 
have had a prior criminal record. Those most likely to have had prior 
felony convictions were persons charged with check and fraud crimes. 
Offenders charged with either property crimes or with robbery con­
stituted the next largest groups with prior felony convictions. Of 
the total of 749 offenders studied, 286 - or 38.18%, had no prior 
convictions of any kind. 
Lack of prior convictions is not a clear indicator of the 
absence of prior criminal activity. But, convictions are the gravemen 
of mandatory sentencing schemes for repeat offenders. 
Suspended imposition of sentence was resorted to by judges 
in 54% of all sentences imposed for convicted felony defendants 
in 1973. However, many of these individuals did go to jail, albeit 
for a very brief period of time. Fewer than one-half the convicted 
felons in the state (47%) went to jail for more than 30 days. Only 
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8% went to jail for more than 5 years. Sentences of one year or 
less were given to the vast majority of property offenders (82%); 
check and fraud offenders (83%); and, violent crime offenders (69%). 
Only 32% of robbery offenders, on the other hand, received less than 
a year. 
As might have been expected, prior record played a signifi­
cant role in sentencing. A total of sixty defendants had a record of 
committing the same or very similar felony at least once before, 
including 18 with four or more prior felony convictions. Of these 
60, only 12 (20%) were sentenced to serve 5 or more years. They 
represented 30% of all those sentenced to 5 years or more. However, 
persons with no prior convictions represented 35% of defendants 
sentenced to terms of five years or more. 
After reviewing this information and discussing it in some 
detail the Commission concluded that any change in existing sentencing 
practices which would result a rapid and substantial increase in prison 
population could not take effect without a corresponding in�Lea�e in 
correctional facilities, unless the State was willing to run the 
risk of experiencing the types of prison disorders which had occurred 
in other jurisdictions when efficient operating capacities were 
overloaded. 
The Staff presented a sentencing package which contained 
recommendations for mandatory sentences at the January meeting of the 
Commission. The substance of that package follows these introductory 
remarks. After careful consideration of all the pros and cons of the 
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Staff recommendations the Commission concluded that it could not 
agree unanimously on a proposal which contained mandatory minimum 
sentences, although the majority of those present did·agree that 
there were instances in which mandatory minimum sentences were 
warranted. Accordingly, the Commission directed the Staff to develop 
alternatives which contained no mandatory minimums or limited them 
to third or subsequent offenses. Those alternatives are set forth 
in this report following a discussion of the original staff proposal. 
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AN ALASKA SENTENCE STRUCTURE AND 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS 
The proposals on sentencing structure which follow 
were developed to comply in most instances with the recom­
mendations of the American Bar Association's Standards on 
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures. 
That work set forth a number of general principles for 
statutory structure which our proposal has followed. Among 
them are the following: 
2.1 (a) All crimes should be classified for the purpose 
of sentencing into categories which reflect substantial 
differences in gravity. The categories should be few in 
number. Each should specify the sentencing alternatives 
available for offenses which fall within it. The penal 
codes of each jurisdiction should be revised where necessary 
to accomplish this result. 
(b) The sentencing court should be provided in all
cases with a wide range of alternatives, with gradations 
of supervisory, supportive and custodial facilities at 
its dis.posal so as to permit a sentence appropriate for 
each individual case. 
(c) The Legislature should not specify a mandatory
sentence for any sentencing category or for any particular 
offense. 
(d) It should be recognized that in many instances in
this country the prison sentences which are now authorized, 
and sometimes required, are significantly higher than are 
needed in the vast majority of cases in order adequately 
to protect the interests of the public. Except for a 
very few particularly serious offenses, and except under 
the circumstances set forth in section 2.5 (b) (special 
term for certain types of offenders), the maximum authorized 
prison term ought to be five years and only rarely ten.* 
The A.B.A. Commission noted that one of the most chaotic 
aspects of the laws relating to sentencing is the condition 
of the penal codes themselves. "It is easily demonstrable 
in most states that the sanctions available for different 
offenses are utterly without any rational basis ... Another 
manifestation of this same problem is that too many distinct 
penalties are in use. It is common to find as many as twelve 
to fifteen maximum terms that are available for different 
felony convictions."** 
* A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice:
Alternatives and Procedures" (1968 ) p. 48 
** Ibid., p. 49, 50 
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"Sentencing 
A brief review of Appendix I on current Alaska sentences 
will amply demonstrate that Alaska falls within the area of 
criticism just expressed. 
The A.B.A. Commission also noted that the best method of 
assuring consistency of penalty is by a process which forces 
comparison between offenses. Thus, by reducing unessential 
differences in the penalties available for different offenses, 
and by consideration of the entire penal structure in one pack­
age, draftsmen should be able to avoid much of the illogic 
that is manifested in current sentencing practices. 
The rationalization of the penalty structure by the 
classification of all offenses into a small number of distinct 
sentencing categories should be a matter of highest priority 
in every state the A.B.A. Commission concluded. 
Our proposal attempts to address both these charges in 
a positive fashion. It departs from the recommendations of 
the Commission with respect to mandatory minimum sentences 
but that departure as it relates to second and third offenders 
is not substantially different from other recommendations of 
the A.B.A. Commission (2.5 (b)) with respect to exceptional 
cases. 
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CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES INTO THREE DEGREES 
The Commission was unanimous in its belief that in a 
revised criminal code all crimes should be classified for purposes 
of sentencing into categories which reflect substantial differ­
ences in gravity. Further, the Commission agreed that the sen­
tencing categories should be limited in number. This approach 
follows the guidelines suggested in §2.1 of the ABA Standards 
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (1967). 
With the exception of first and second degree murder, 
all felonies within the Revised Criminal Code are to be cate­
gorized into one of three classes. Though in this part of the 
revision the Commission only considered crimes against property, 
for purposes of formulating a sentencing structure it was helpful 
to consider the probable effect of the recommended classification 
scheme on a cross section of felonies now found in the current 
statutes. This classification was formulated by the Commission's 
staff. In considering which class to place a specified felony, 
the staff was primarily influenced by the current authorized sentence 
for the crime. It must be emphasized that the classifications pro-
vided by the staff below is not a final classification of felonies 
for purposes of a revised criminal code. Instead, the actual class-
ifications will be accomplished when the specific substantive crime 
is revised. 
Class A felonies are those which involve substantial 
violence to the victim or a very substantial threat or potential 
death. When the Commission considers crimes against the person, 
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it will consider including within this classification such crimes 
as rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, attempted murder, first degree 
arson, procuring to murder, and assault with intent to kill. 
Class B felonies are those which involve the likelihood 
of some violence or threat to the person whether the thrust of the 
conduct is against person or property. Also included within this 
category are crimes which threaten the integrity of the justice 
system itself. Examples of offenses which may be considered for 
this category include assault, unarmed robbery, conspiracy to kidnap 
(not carried out), most attempts at class A crimes, burglary, theft 
by extortion, perjury in a criminal case, bribery or rioting. 
Class C felonies are comprised of felonies that are not 
serious enough to be categorized as either Class A or B. Crimes 
which might be included in this category include forms of theft 
not involving personal risk to the victim, blackmail, criminal 
mischief, fraud and forgery, attempts at most class B offenses, 
and most other Title 11 offenses. 
It m�st be emphasized that the categorization of felonies 
described above (with the exception of the substantive crimes 
treated in this report) is not a final classification of crimes 
for purposes of sentencing. Instead, this categorization is pro­
vided as a general guideline for determining the eventual effect 
on prison populations of the sentencing structure recommended by 
the Commission and for assessing the relative value of the recommenda­
tions which the Commission is making on sentencing for property crimes. 
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COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION - FELONIES 
(Unless otherwise indicated, figures read as years.) 
Class of Felony 1st Offense 2nd Offense 3rd Offense 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
0-10
0-5
0-3
5-15
2-7
6 mos. - 5
MINORITY RECOMMENDATION #1 
0-10 0-15
0-5 0-7
0-3 0-5
MINORITY RECOMMENDATION #2 
0-10 0-15
0-5 0-7
0-3 0-5
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION - MISDEMEANORS 
Class of Misdemeanor All Offenses 
A 
B 
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0-1
0-1 mo.
6 
10-20
5-10
1-5
5-20
2-10
mos. 
0-20
0-10
0-5
- 5
HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION - FELONIES 
1. With the exception of special terms of imprisonment
for first and second degree murder there are only three categories 
of felonies for sentencing purposes. 
2. The maximum authorized sentence for a second offense
increases over the maximum authorized sentence for a first offense. 
The maximum authorized sentence for a third offense increases over 
the maximum authorized sentence for a second offense. 
3. All sentences will be of a determinative nature, i.e.,
sentence will be for a definite period. 
4. Probation is allowed as a sentencing alternative for
all first offenses. 
5. Parole has been eliminated and replaced by a good
time statute that will reduce all sentences by one-half if the 
conditions of good time are satisfied. 
6. There are no mandatory minimum sentences that must
be served upon conviction of a first offense. 
7. The mandatory minimum for a third offense increases
over the mandatory minimum for a second offense. 
8. Probation is not available as a sentencing alter­
native for the mandatory minimum sentence that a second or third 
offender must serve. However, probation is a sentencing alternative 
for that portion of the sentence that may be imposed which is great­
er than the mandatory minimum sentence. 
9. Any time a defendant is to be sentenced as a second
or third offender the court is required to impose at least the 
minimum mandatory sentence. The court can impose more than the 
minimum sentence, up to the maximum sentence authorized, but cannot 
impose less than the minimum. 
10. There are only nine sentencing alternatives for all
felonies in the Code as compared to the dozens of alternatives in 
the current statutes. 
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HIGHLIGHTS OF MINORITY RECOMMENDATION #1 - FELONIES 
1. Sarne as Highlights #1-6 of Commission's recommendation.
2. There are no mandatory minimum sentences that must be
served upon conviction of a second offense. However, a mandatory 
minimum sentence must be served upon conviction of a third offense. 
3. Probation is not available as a sentencing alter­
native for the mandatory minimum sentence that a third offender must 
serve. However, probation is a sentencing alternative for that 
portion of the sentence that may be imposed which is greater than 
the mandatory minimum sentence. 
4. Any time a defendant is to be sentenced as a third
offender the court is required to impose at least the mandatory 
minimum sentence. The court can impose more than the mandatory 
minimum sentence up to the maximum sentence authorized, but cannot 
impose less than the minimum. 
5. There are only eight sentencing alternatives for all
felonies in the Code as compared to the dozens of alternatives in 
the current statutes. 
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HIGHLIGHTS OF MINORITY RECOMMENDATION #2 - FELONIES 
1. Same as Highlights #1-6 of Commission's recommendation.
2. Probation is allowed as a sentencing alternative for
all offenses. 
3. There are no mandatory minimum sentences that must
be imposed upon conviction of any offense. 
4. There are only six sentencing alternatives for all
felonies in the Code as compared to the dozens of alternatives in 
the current statutes. 
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PROPOSED STATUTES FOR 
COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION 
150.
I. SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR FELONIES; ORDINARY TERMS
A. Sentences for felonies shall be for a definite term.
Unless the defendant is to be sentenced pursuant to §II or §III, 
the Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of a 
felony within this state to a term of imprisonment within the 
following maximum limitations: 
1. For a Class A Felony, 10 years.
2. For a Class B Felony, 5 years.
3. For a Class C Felony, or for any felony for which
no specific sentence is provided, 3 years. 
This section is based on the current Oregon sentencing provision, 
but requires the sentence to be of a determative nature. 
IA. SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR MISDEMEANORS 
A. Sentences for misdemeanors shall be for a definite term.
The Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of a mis­
demeanor within this state to a term of imprisonment within the 
following maximum limitations: 
1. For a Class A Misdemeanor, 1 year.
2. For a Class B Misdemeanor, or for any misdemeanor for
which no specific sentence is provided, 6 months. 
This section is based on the Oregon sentencing provision. 
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II. SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR FELONIES; SECOND OFFENSE
A. The Court shall sentence a defendant who has been convicted
of a felony within this state to a definite term of imprisonment as 
provided in this section if it finds all the following: 
1. Pursuant to this Code, the defendant has previously
been convicted of a felony committed in this state after 
his 18th birthday that was of the same or more serious 
class than the felony for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced. 
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced
was committed after the defendant was arrested for the 
previously committed felony. 
3. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced
was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction 
of the previously committed felony or within 5 years of 
the defendant's release from a prison sentence or other 
commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for 
a felony, whichever is later. 
4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony
that is necessary for the operation of this section. 
5. A conviction of a felony necessary to the operation of
this section has not been set aside in any post-conviction 
proceeding. 
B. The Court, in conformity with the criteria specified in
subsection (A) shall sentence the defendant as follows: 
1. For a Class A felony, for a definite term of at least
5 years but not more than 15 years. 
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2. For a Class B felony, for a definite term of at least
2 years but not more than 7 years. 
3. For a Class C felony, or for a felony for which no
specific sentence is provided for a definite term of at 
least 6 months but not more than 5 years. 
This section is based on Florida §775.084. 
III. SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR FELONIES; THIRD OFFENSE
A. The Court shall sentence a defendant who has been convicted
of a felony within this state to a definite term of imprisonment as 
provided in this section if it finds all the following: 
1. Pursuant to this Code, the defendant has previously
been convicted of two or more felonies committed in this 
state after his 18th birthday that were of the same or 
more serious class than the felony for which the defendant 
is to be sentenced. 
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced
was committed after the defendant was arrested for the 
two previously committed felonies. 
3. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced
was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction 
of the last previously committed felony or within 5 years 
of the defendant's release from a prison sentence or other 
commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for 
the last previously committed felony, whichever is later. 
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4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony
that is necessary for the operation of this section. 
5. A conviction of a felony necessary to the operation of
this section has not been set aside in any post-conviction 
proceeding. 
B. The Court, in conformity with the criteria specified in
subsection (A) shall sentence the defendant as follows: 
1. For a Class A felony, for a definite term, of at least
10 years but not more than 20 years. 
2. For a Class B felony, for a definite term of at least
5 years but not more than 10 years. 
3. For a Class C felony, or for a felony for which no
specific sentence is provided for a definite term of at 
least 1 year but not more than 5 years. 
This section is based on Florida §775.084 
IV. REDUCTION OF SENTENCE; GOOD TIME
A. A prisoner shall be allowed a good time deduction from his
sentence of 1 day for each day served of his sentence. 
B. The Division of Corrections shall have the authority to
forfeit any good time previously earned by the prisoner, or to deny 
th� prisoner the right to earn good time in any amount, if during the 
term of imprisonment a prisoner commits any offense or violates the 
rules of the institution [taken from Ky. R. S. 197.045]. The Division 
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shall adopt rules and regulations implementing this section and 
graduating rule infractions by their seriousness. 
V. DISCHARGE
A prisoner shall be released from confinement at the expiration 
of his term of sentence less the good time deduction. 
This section is based on AS 33.20.030 
VI. SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE & PROBATION; FIRST OFFENSE
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of misdemeanor or a felony 
for which the defendant may be sentenced pursuant to §I, or at any 
time within 60 days from the date of entry of that judgment of con­
viction, a court, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the 
best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served 
thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution or balance of the 
sentence or a portion thereof, and place the defendant on probation 
for a period and upon the terms and conditions as the court considers 
best. 
This section is taken from AS 12.55.080 
VII. SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE & PROBATION; SECOND & THIRD OFFENSES
A. A defendant who has been convicted of a felony for which he
shall be sentenced pursuant to §II or §III shall be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment for no less than the minimum sentence authorized. 
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B. Upon entering a judgment of conviction for a felony for which
the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to §II or §III or at any 
time within 60 days from the date of entry of that judgment of con­
viction, a court, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the 
best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served 
thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of the portion of the 
sentence greater than the minimum sentence authorized, and place the 
defendant on probation for a period and upon the terms and conditions 
as the court considers best. However, in no event may the court 
place a defendant on probation for the minimum sentence authorized. 
This section is based on AS 12.55.080. 
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DEFINITIONS OF SECOND AND THIRD OFFENSE 
One of the most important aspects of the Commission's 
recommended sentencing structure is the imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentences for repeat felony defendants. Therefore, the 
definition of the type of previously committed felonies which can 
be used to find that the felony for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced is a second or third felony is central to the sentencing 
structure. 
As a preliminary requirement, any previously committed 
felony that is used to trigger the imposition of mandatory minimum 
sentences must have occurred after the defendant reached 18. In 
addition, the defendant must have been convicted of that felony. 
However, the conviction of any type of felony will not be suffi­
cient to require the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. 
Both §II and §III require that the previous felonies that 
are relied upon to require mandatory minimum sentences must have 
been of the same or more serious class than the felony for which 
the defendant is to be sentenced. Thus, if the defendant had pre­
viously been convicted of a Class B felonY, that felony would be 
sufficient to trigger the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence 
pursuant to §II if the defendant is to be sentenced for either a 
Class B or Class C felony, but not if he is to be sentenced for a 
Class A felony as a Class B felony is less serious than the felony 
for which the defendant is to be sentenced. 
The Commissions's recommendation treats all criminal trans­
actions occurring before an arrest as one transaction for the purpose 
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of triggering mandatory minimum sentences. This assures that a 
previously committed felony cannot be one that evolved from the 
same transaction as the felony for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced. By requiring the felony for which the defendant is to 
be sentenced to have been committed after the defendant was arrested 
for the previous felony, the Commission's recommendation eliminates 
the possibility of a defendant receiving a mandatory minimum sentence 
when he commits two felonies during the same criminal act or course 
of conduct. For example, a bank robber who assaults a teller cannot 
be tried first for assault and upon conviction be tried for robbery, 
with the assault conviction used as a previously committed felony 
for purposes of sentencing for the robbery. This occurrence is 
impossible under the Commission's recommendation as the robbery did 
not occur after the arrest for assault. However, a defendant who is 
arrested for assault and while on bail commits an assault the day 
after his first arrest will be treated as a second offender if he 
is first convicted of the first assault and then tried and convicted 
of the second assault. 
The Commission's recommendation requires that to count as a 
prior conviction the previously committed felony cannot have occurred 
more than five years before the felony for which the defendant is to 
be sentenced. However, if the defendant received a jail sentence 
for the previously committed felony the five year period does not begin 
to run until the defendant is released from jail. 
The Commission's proposal also insures that a felony for 
which the defendant was pardoned or for which post-conviction 
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relief was granted in his favor cannot be used to trigger mandatory 
minimum sentences under §II and §III. 
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MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING 
The Commission has recommended a system of mandatory 
minimum sentences. There are wide differences of opinion among 
members of the public, the criminal justice community and 
scholars concerning the desirability of mandatory minimum sentencing. 
These differences of opinion are reflected on the Commission. The 
Commission has tried to steer a middle road avoiding both a premature 
imposition of a minimum sentence or a Draconian measurement of minimum 
terms on the one hand and unfettered discretion in the court to make 
its own determination of offender freedom on the other. 
Some critics of Alaska justice administration have complained 
concerning the lack of use of the "habitual criminal" statute. 
This proposal will build a better, graduated, habitual criminal 
standard directly into all criminal cases, providing for its 
compulsory application and avoiding many of the difficulties associated 
with prosecuting habitual criminality as a separate, status offense. 
The Commission has not recommended mandatory minimum 
sentences out of any idealistic notion that mandatory minimums 
will have a drastic influence as a deterrent in reducing crime. 
Few if any of our citizens committing an offense give serious 
enough consideration to the prospect that they will be apprehended. 
Massive deterrent sentencing is no more likely to be a cure-all than 
any other panacea offered for America's crime problems. The 
Commission does hope that at least a measurable deterrent influence 
will result from a workable system of mandatory minimums if they 
can be maintained over a period of years. The efficacy of such a system 
160.
presupposes the capacity of the prison system to sustain it. Any 
scheme that applies mandatory minimums to broad classes of offenders 
(first offenders, offenders with an unrelated type of crime in their 
past, etc.) or which sets long terms of years for the first level 
of minimum sentence or covers overbroad classes of offenses (bad checks 
and misdemeanors, for instance) will soon jam up the system no matter 
how fast we build new prisons. Any scheme adopted must maximize 
the use of existing space behind bars taking account of plausible 
projections for expansion. This limited space must be allocated 
to protect the public, to reinforce the most plausible deterrent 
influences and to provide custodial rehabilitation to those who 
cannot absorb it any other way. 
But at bottom, the justification of a scheme of mandatory 
maximum sentences does not lie in their utility as deterrents 
alone,but in their justness in the view of the public and possibly 
the offender himself. The average citizen's confidence in the 
fairness and evenhandedness of the justice system is a basic 
bulwark to community support for law enforcement, to the motivation 
to be law abiding and to the system of justice and government under 
law generally. Regardless of the technical facts, there can be little 
doubt that there is a widespread felt perception among the public 
that even repeat offenders go free. The average citizen can 
sympathize with the notion that everyone should be considered for 
one more chance. Few have any sympathy for the prospect that one 
more chance will be available again and again. 
In their defense it might be said that few, if any, judges 
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have any different notion. Yet that one exceptional case where a 
judge feels that yet another chance is due can seriously erode public 
confidence in the administration of justice and is perceived as the 
rule rather than the exception by a disgruntled public. Any scheme 
of mandatory minimums, as with maximums, is a limitation of the dis­
cretion of judges. It is our hope that this very modest limitation 
will inspire greater confidence among the public in the exercise of 
that very broad remaining judicial discretion. 
The same perception of easy justice unfortunately infects 
that certain kind of youth that works out his late adolescence in 
systematic defiance of law enforcement authorities. Police officers 
on and off the Commission are familiar with the attitude of a class 
of offender who thumbs his nose at the law in the belief that if he 
is caught nothing will happen to him. 
When this kind of atmosphere and public mistrust are 
commonplace, certainty of punishment, at least for some limited 
class of recidivists, is a systematic requirement. Almost certainly, 
under any system of mandatory minimums, some will go behind bars 
who could have made it on the outside. If their loss of freedom 
is a sacrifice to assure some credibility to general and special 
deterrence and public confidence in the justice system, the least 
that could be said of the loss in freedom is that it is deserved. 
Under this proposal no mandatory minimums are set forth 
for first time felony offenders. Thus, the judge will have complete 
flexibility to set sentences which, in his judgement, are most likely 
to enhance rehabilitation, or deter further criminal conduct and 
protect society. 
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Practicality as well as justice indicates the reasonable­
ness of this course. Ample statistics indicate that most first time 
offenders do not repeat their crimes. One can safely conclude for 
most of these that they have been sufficiently chastened by the sen­
tence they received or that their crimes were once-in-a-lifetime 
occurences brought on by moment of circumstantial temptation, the 
heat of passion, or other non-recurring circumstances. This con­
clusion is supported, to an extent, by data developed by the Judicial 
Council in their study of sentencing. In 1973 only 41 of 177 indi­
viduals (23%) charged with violent felony crimes (excluding robbery) 
had a prior felony conviction. 65 of those 177 defendants (37%) 
had no prior record of any type. 
The proposal on mandatory minimums is designed to deal 
not with these individuals, but with those whose patterns of 
criminal behavior indicates that this first experience has produced 
no positive results. In assessing the second time,repeat offender 
the Commission took cognizance of the realities of criminal behavior. 
Those realities are that a substantial amount of crime goes unreported; 
that a substantial protion of crime is committed by repeaters; 
that plea bargaining has historically resulted in a substantial 
number of felony crimes being reduced to misdemeanors for conviction 
purposes; and, in too many cases individuals who are arrested for 
crime are not convicted at all. 
Consequently, most of those individuals convicted of a 
second or subsequent felony offense are likely to have more exten­
sive backgrounds in crime. If this is the case, and the available 
Alaska data suggests that it is, then it calls into question the 
163.
proposition that absolute sentencing flexibility for judges in all 
cases is a tool in reducing crime. (The Commission assumes that 
when judges consider sentence alternatives they do so with a view 
towards minimizing the likelihood that the individual will continue 
in a life of crime upon conclusion of the sentence.) 
The Commission considered using out-of-state convictions 
as a basis for second or subsequent offense mandatory sentencing. 
There are many problems with using out-of-state convictions including 
differences in definitions of ''same or similar" crime, proof of con­
viction, the availability of special circumstance information, dif-· 
ferences in judicial processing and others. The Commission concluded 
that, in the end, omission of out-of-state convictions as a basis 
for establishing mandatory minimums is not a source of great concern 
because where they exist those records should be available to the 
sentencing judge. The state having set, by the adoption of these 
mandatory minimums, a standard for its own citizens, it is highly 
unlikely that a judge would treat a person with an outside record 
differently in the exercise of his discretion. The same consequence 
will result. Why lay a foundation for an expensive and time consuming 
evidentiary dispute to establish a technical certainty which will 
not effect the outcome? 
Criticism in many jurisdictions of mandatory sentences 
results from the fact that they are a part of otherwise irrational 
sentencing structures which do not differentiate between types of 
crime and provide for sentences with minimum terms far greater than 
are required. Thus it may be that the problem traditionally 
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thought to exist with mandatory sentences may not be that they are 
mandatory but that they are mandatory for excessive periods of time. 
Additional problems with mandatory minimums arise if there are 
inadequate penal institutions or insufficient space to absorb 
sentenced populations. If these issues, when they exist, are not 
squarely faced, the results can be disasterous. But the failure 
of some other states to deal with these problems should not be 
used as a basis for condemning a workable system of mandatory 
minimums for this state. 
The Commission believes that potential problems have been 
met by the sentencing structure it has proposed because it does 
differentiate between classes of crimes and does attach sentences 
of reasonable length to those crimes. 
Mandatory minimum sentences are unlikely to produce a 
rehabilitative effect on those subject to them. Fortunately they 
need not stand on this ground for support. There is a substantial 
amount of literature which suggests that rehabilitation efforts 
within prison do not reduce recidivism. The Commission's staff 
has not been able to review all these studies, but one example 
might suffice. 
The Spring 1974 issue of The Public Interest carried 
an article by Robert Martinson which outlined the results of 
research he had carried out at the request of the New York State 
Governor's Special Committee on Criminal Offenders. The study 
had commenced in 1966 and was concluded in the spring of 1972. 
Martinson and his colleagues surveyed the literature 
for all reports in English language on attempts made at rehabilitation 
165.
within prisons, here and abroad, between 1945 and 1967. Using a 
rigorous methodology to insure that the studies they reviewed had 
met acceptable social science research standards, they developed a 
listing of 231 rehabilitation studies which they then analyzed. 
In their words they concluded that: "it is possible to give a 
rather bald summary of our findings. With few and isolated excep­
tions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far 
have had no appreciable effect on recidivism. Studies that have 
been done since our survey was completed do not present any major 
grounds for altering that original conclusion." 
the original) * 
Martinson's findings are not unique. 
(Emphasis in 
(Reference is 
made to supporting studies in the Commission's discussion of 
parole which follows.) 
The efficacy of in-prison rehabilitation programs remains 
to be tested under a system where participation is not tied to 
release. While the conclusions of Martinson and others lay a 
basis for almost automatic skepticism of prison rehabilitation 
programs, it should also be noted that Alaska has some unique 
circumstances and one unique institution where evidence of a 
breakthrough in correctional science may develop. However, we 
should approach cautiously any sentencing structure built on a 
rehabilitative prison model. 
If rehabilitation efforts in prison do not result in 
reductions in recidivism then we should not deprive individuals 
* Martinson, "What Works? - questions and answers about prison
reform". Public Interest, No. 35, Spring 1974, pp. 22-54 at p. 25. 
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of their liberty on a theory that it is to their benefit to be 
imprisoned because while confined we can make them better citizens. 
Protection of the public stands as the first justification of 
sentencing to imprisonment. 
Rehabilitation must be conceived of in the broadest 
context - the reduction of recidivism. In this context a deterrent 
sentencing structure can be seen as meeting overall rehabilitative 
goals. There is some data supporting the efficacy of deterrent 
systems. 
The data used to support this conclusion has come not 
from social science researchers but from economists. The leading 
exponent of this theory is Professor Isaac Ehrlich of the University 
of Chicago. Using F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports data for 1940, 
1950, and 1960, Ehrlich, after controlling for factors such as 
income and minority population, concluded that"states with better 
police protection, higher certainty of conviction and imprisonment, 
and longer sentences had lower crime rates that more permissive 
states."* Ehrlich's findings held true from crimes like rape as 
well as crimes which were likely to be economically motivated 
such as robbery. 
An article in the Summer 1974 issue of the Public Interest** 
by Gordon Tullock, a professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
provides additional support for Ehrlich's findings. Tullock 
reviewed an number of studies conducted by other economists along 
* "Crime, A Case for More Punishment'' Business Week, September 15,
1975, p. 92. 
** Tullock, "Does Punishment Deter Crime", The Public Interest, 
Vol. 36, Summer 1974, pp. 103-111. 
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the same lines as Ehrlich's but which focused on a broader range 
of crimes. They, too, concluded that where punishment was higher, 
crime was lower. 
More interesting than these results, however, was Tullock's 
reporting on the results of a number of studies initiated by 
sociologists which were designed to refute the findings of the 
economists. Upon completion of the studies the sociologist ended 
up concluding that the economists were right: that crime can be 
detered by punishment. In addition, because they used research 
methods which were different than those employed by the economists 
their work could be taken as an independent confirmation of the 
economist's approach, Tullock observed. 
The question neither group could answer with any degree 
of satisfaction was whether the severity of the sentence was more 
important than the likelihood that it would be imposed. Tullock 
reports that most concluded that between the two, the frequency 
of imposition was more important than the severity of the sentence. 
Tullock concludes his article with a brief discussion of 
why rehabilitation became the dominant rationale of corrections. 
He found that it was more appealing to opt for a "pleasant" choice, 
i.e. rehabilitation, than for unpleasant choices. He concludes:
"It is clearly more appealing to think of solving 
the criminal problem by means that are themselves not 
particulary unpleasant than to think of solving it by 
methods that are unpleasant. But in this case we do not 
have the choice between a pleasant and an unpleasant 
method of dealing with crime. We have an unpleasant 
method - deterrence- that works, and a pleasant method -
rehabilitation - that (at least so far) never has worked. 
Under the circumstances, we have to opt pi�her for �he 
deterrence method or for a higher crime rate."* (Emphasis 
in the 01�ginal.J 
* Ibid, p. 110.
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We believe that deterrence can be considered as a neglected 
factor in rehabilitation theory and thus that it is consistent with 
Alaska's constitutional limitations to utilize a mandatory minimum 
sentence structure. 
The views expressed above are not held unanimously by the 
Commission's members.* A statement generally reflecting the views 
of a dissenting minority follows. 
* Nor are they stated as a precise representation of any Commission
concensus. Time did not permit detailed textual review of the sup­
porting text though there was general agreement on statutory principles. 
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DISSENTING VIEWS ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING 
No Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
Mandatory minimum sentencing has been offered as a 
panacea to crime problems for many years. It ignores the fact that 
the origins of criminal behavior lie in motivations, criminal 
opportunities and social conditions which are not materially in­
fluenced by the way we process those criminal offenders who are 
caught. 
Our system of justice is based upon an evaluation of 
objective facts and the state of mind of the offender in determining 
guilt but an examination of the individual and the needs of society 
in determining sentence. The verities of human condition are so 
diverse that we need highly trained judges to individually determine 
in each case the appropriate disposition. Every move eroding the 
discretionary authority of the judge in favor of blindly applied 
penalties is a step away from handling the offender in the most 
rational manner possible for the benefit of society as well as the 
individual. 
Contrary to the impression of the uninformed, judges do 
impose substantial sentences on second and subsequent offenders 
when circumstances warrant, as is frequently the case. The imposition 
of mandatory minimums does not effect those offenders who in common 
judgement need incarceration. These offenders receive sentences 
of imprisonment anyway. Those who will be sent to prison under a 
rule of mandatory minimum are those who do not belong there, offenders 
whose incarceration is not necessary to protect the public. These 
offenders will take up space in our institutions unnecessarily and 
may eventually displace offenders for whom there is no room but 
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who are more in need of incarceration. 
Some support for mandatory minimum sentences comes from 
those who would simply like to see more offenders locked up for 
more time. Draconian punishments will not seriously reduce crime 
as is well documented by the record of feudal Anglo-Saxon sentencing 
when execution and other drastic penalties for trivial crimes was 
common. Turning back now to the standards of a less humane era will 
not only exact a heavy toll in human suffering but will influence 
adversely the quality of society generally. Nor does this mood 
reflect the real feelings of the public which, while exasperated with 
crime, is not prepared to invest vast sums of money in facilities and 
operating costs to keep a larger portion of Alaskans behind bars. 
Opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing is the prevailing 
viewpoint of every major investigation of sentencing conducted since 
1965. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals in its report on Corrections, offered the following reasons 
in support of this position. 
"There are two important factors in fashioning 
sentencing provisions: the offender and the offense. 
The legislature, in enacting a penal code with penalty 
provisions, can only deal with the offense; the offenders 
who will be convicted under the provision over the history 
of its enactment will span the spectrum of guilt. No 
legislature can determine in advance the nature of the 
offender who will be prosecuted under the particular 
penalty provision. 
* * * * 
Legislators should not impose mandatory sentences. 
They are counter productive to public safety, and they 
hinder correctional programming without any corresponding 
benefit. To the extent that the mandatory provision 
requires an individual offender to be incarcerated longer 
than necessary, it is wasteful of public resources. 
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To the extent that it denies correctional programming 
such as probation or parole to a particular offender, 
it lessens the chance for his successful reintegration 
into the community. To the extent that mandatory sen­
tences are enforced, they have a detrimental effect on 
corrections. 
However, mandatory sentences generally are not 
enforced. The Crime Commission's Task Force on Courts 
found persuasive evidence of nonenforcement of these 
mandatory sentencing provisions by the courts and prosecu­
tors. Prosecutors who find that an unusually harsh 
sentence in a particular case is unjust will, through 
plea negotiations, substantially circumvent the provision. 
Where lengthy mandatory sentences are imposed, under­
manned prosecutors may be forced to alter the charge 
to obtain guilty pleas, since mandatory sentences leave 
little incentive for the offender to plead guilty. 
Mandatory sentences in fact grant greater sentencing 
prerogatives to prosecutors than to courts. The result 
increases rather than decreases disparity in sentences 
and subverts statutory provisions by a system designed 
to enforce them. The resulting disrespect for the system 
on the part of both the offender and the public tends 
to undermine our system of criminal justice."* 
The American Bar Association had the following comments 
on mandatory sentences in its recommendations on Sentencing Alter­
natives and Procedures. 
"It follows clearly from subsection (b) that the 
legislature should not specify in advance sentences which 
must be imposed regardless of the circumstances of the 
offense. Yet the incidence of such sentences is so 
prevalent that the Advisory Committee is led to state 
specifically in subsection (c) that such provisions are 
unsound. 
The real evil of existing mandatory sentences con­
sists of their impact at two points: on the question of 
whether the defendant is a suitable subject for proba­
tion or some other disposition short of total confine­
ment in an institution; and, assuming an institutional 
* Corrections, National Advisory Commissio� on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals. (G.P.O. Washington, 1973) pp. 545-546. 
172.
commitment, on the question of whether he is a suitable 
subject for release on parole. It is thus a characteristic 
of such sentences that they deny the sentencing court 
authority to place an offender on probation or to select 
some other sentence which is less severe than total 
incarceration, or they deny or unduly delay the power of 
paroling authorities to conditionally release the defen­
dant at the point where it is most likely to produce a 
satisfactory result. 
Each of these problems is considered at length in 
the sections below which are devoted to them. See §§ 
2.3,3.2, 3.3, infra. Suffice it to observe here that 
mandatory sentences rarely accomplish the ends they seek. 
The certainty of punishment which is sought by such pro­
visions is illusory. There are numerous discretionary 
devices--ranging from acquittal of the guilty to reduction 
of the charge--by which the judge, if that is his purpose, 
can frustrate the effect of a mandatory sentence. The 
experience with such sentences shows that such devices 
are very commonly employed, sometimes to the point of 
conviction of the defendant for an offense which could 
not possibly have occurred under the circumstances of the 
case in order to permit the imposition of a more realistic 
sentence. See, e.g., Newman, Conviction: The Determina­
tion of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 101 (1966). 
The only alternative in many instances is imposition 
of a sentence which under the circumstances of the case 
is much too harsh. Neither emasculating the statute nor 
acquiescing in an injustice is to be commended. Both 
effectively and understandably breed disrespect for the 
system."* 
SUPPLEMENTARY DISSENTING VIEWS: 
Mandatory Minimums but with Less Frequency 
Limitations on judicial discretion are imposed for too 
easily in the Commission's principal recommendation on this subject 
for the reasons generally set out above. 
Particularly in the case of the second offender, mandatory 
minimums take insufficient account of the variety of circumstances 
that can bring an offender before the bar for a second offense. 
* A.B.A. Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, (Chicago, 1968)
pp. 55-56. 
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Frequently the second offense is not an indication of a criminal 
bent of mind at all, particularly when the second offense is not for 
the same offense. A burglar once caught may be cured of the pursuit 
of crime for personal gain but may get caught later in a serious 
assaultive situation as a result of a drinking problem or a family 
argument. Yet under the Commission's recommendation, the offender 
in this situation would receive a mandatory minimum sentence despite 
the fact that the offender was completely rehabilitated under the 
circumstances in his first offense. He is not a true recidivist. 
If the legislature is disposed to apply a mandatory minimum 
structure limiting the authority of judges to dispose of cases in 
the manner they think best meets the needs of society and the indivi­
dual, that mandatory minimum requirement should come into effect only 
on the third offense. A second offense is frequently not an indicator 
of a pattern of criminal behavior. A third offense usually is. 
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THE PAROLE SYSTEM 
The Commission has considered the purpose and administra­
tion of parole systems and recommends that, in its present form, 
parole be abolished in Alaska. It is recommended that some of the 
functions purported to be served by parole be abandoned and that the 
board be eliminated in its entirety. 
To provide protection to the public in the sensitive post­
release period and guidance to the newly released offender, the 
Commission recommends that every prisoner serve a period of condi­
tional release akin to probation. 
Under the proposal, a convicted offender may serve up to 
half of his sentence on this conditional release, which may be called 
"mandatory probation", depending upon his behavior in prison and out. 
For a model prisoner, half the sentence will be "good time", served 
on mandatory probation. Any revocation of such release will be 
handled according to the standards and procedures for probation, 
generally. Cancellation of "good time'' for an offender in custody 
will be handled according to procedures now mandated by law. 
Before exploring further the mechanics and merits of the 
proposed new system, a review of the principal objections to the 
present system of parole is in order. 
David Fogel, Executive Director of the Illinois Law 
Enforcement Commission, in a monograph entitled "We are the Living 
Proof ... " written while in residence at the Harvard Law School Center 
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for Criminal Justice commented on the fact that confusion and aimless­
ness in sentencing and parole are reflected in the quality of prison 
life: 
"Like both, it too is effectively ruleless. How 
could it be otherwise with 95% of its prisoners unable 
to calculate when they will be released or even what, 
with a degree of certainty, is demanded of them for 
release candidacy by parole authorities?"* 
The uncertainty created by the present system of parole 
makes parole a serious enemy of the rehabilitative process and 
contributes significantly to problems otherwise inherent in depriving 
individuals of their liberty . 
. Those who favor the parole system generally offer two 
grounds in support of their position. 
"First, virtually everyone convicted and sent to 
a correctional institution is destined to return to 
live in the community. He can be discharged either 
with no continuing responsibility on his part of that 
of the state, or he can be released under supervision 
at an optimal time and given help in finding a way to 
live within the law. From this perspective, parole is 
simply a form of graduated return to the community, a 
sensible release procedure. 
"A second major argument is that a parole board can 
better judge the precise time at which an inmate should 
be released. The sentencing judge cannot foretell what 
new information may be available to a parole board or what 
*Fogel, We are the Living Proof, p. 18, Chapter 4.
Unpublished Monograph, 1975.
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circumstances might arise which would render one time more 
favorable than another for an inmate's release. A paroling 
agency also has the advantage of being able to observe the 
behavior of the offender when he is in confinement. A 
corollary to this argument is the idea that a parole board 
can more objectively appraise the offender when the passions 
aroused by his offense have cooled."* 
While these are undoubtedly valid arguments for the 
existence of some form of reconsideration of sentence, there are 
those who offer another reason for parole. 
"Though it is seldom stated openly, parole boards 
often are concerned with supporting a system of appro­
priate and equitable sanctions. This concern is reflected 
in several ways, depending upon a jurisdiction's sentencing 
system. One of the most common is through parole decisions 
seeking to equalize penalties for offenders who have 
similar backgrounds and have committed the same offense 
but who have received different sentences." (Emphasis 
added)** 
Briefly stated, parole finds its raison d'etre in the 
concepts of proof of rehabilitation, leniency or sovereign grace, 
or equity. Implicit in these concepts are the assumptions that 
judges are human and will from time to time err in their sentencing 
decisions and that offenders as humans can change in character and 
behavior. 
The question remains, however, whether or not a parole 
system is the only means to these ends. The Commission has con­
cluded that the parole board is a poor instrument for measuring 
rehabilitation, dispersing charity or equalizing sentences. 
* O'Leary, "Issues and Trends in Parole Administration in
the United States." 11 Am. Crim. Law J. 100-101. (1972) 
** "Corrections" National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals (G.P.O. 1973) pp.393-394. 
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These arguments for parole assume that a parole board 
is in a position to judge the arrival of an "optimal time". One 
can legitimately question the efficacy of this assumption. Measuring 
the success of parole judgements by the frequency of return to 
prison by those released, the validity of this assumption is highly 
questionable. 
In 1974 the "Citizens Inquiry on Parole and Criminal 
Justice in New York City" reported the results of their investiga­
tion of that state� parole system. Over four years they looked at 
those who were returned to prison within a year of release. The 
study groups included those who were released on parole and those 
who were denied parole and served their full sentences. Overall, 
there was no significant difference in the return rates for the 
two groups: 
time.* 
about 10-11 percent in each went back within a year's 
Findings of a similar nature have occurred in other 
jurisdictions.** The results call into serious question the ability 
of a parole board to judge who is and who is not rehabilitated and 
the fairness of a discretionary system which cannot meet this criteria. 
This result can be only partly blamed on the guality of 
parole board membership, if at all. In nearly every state one 
* Citizen's Inquiry on Parole and Criminal
on New York Parole." (New York City, 1974) 
** See also, Kastenmeier and Eglit, "Parole 
Making" 22 Am. u. L. Rev. (Spring 1973) 477-525. 
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board sits to review the records of all prisoners incarcerated within 
the state. Interviews with the prisoner are usually held, but 
what do they really reveal? Most involve substantial game playing 
by the prisoner. But even when this is not the case, the incentive 
to tell the board what it wants to hear is very strong. Parole 
board members, generally speaking, are not full-time employees of 
the criminal justice system. 
When not proceeding on dubious intuitive judgments derived 
from the interview process, the parole board relies upon corrections 
officials for their information on the progress, or lack thereof, 
of the prisoner. Since most prisoners must serve a minimum period 
of time (anywhere from one-third or more of the sentence) before 
they become eligible for parole, thousands of events transpire upon 
which corrections officials can form a judgement. Obviously, reporting 
of this behavior is, inherently, highly selective and thus of question­
able reliability. 
Even if the board is presented with good information it 
must still decide how the prisoner is going to act when released to 
the community. Therein lies the crux of the matter. Predicting 
human behavior is no small feat under any circumstances. The hard 
fact is that attitude and behavior behind bars is not an indication 
of attitude and behavior on the street. 
Parole as a moderating influence on sentence assumes 
that the parole board can more objectively appraise the offender 
when the passions aroused by his offense have cooled. While this 
179.
may sometimes be the case, the opposite result occurs too frequently. 
Individuals who committed particularly notorious crimes who may 
in fact be ready for release are denied it because pressure is 
brought to bear on the board. 
That parole decisions are not made on the basis of sentence 
equalization is inferentially supported by a 1965 survey conducted 
by the National Parole Institute. A questionnaire was sent to 
all parole board members in the United States and returned by 
over half. They were asked to rate the top five factors they con-
sidered in making parole decisions. 92.8 percent of those responding 
listed the risk that the prisoner would commit another serious 
crime. 87.1 percent listed the feeling that the prisoner would 
benefit from further institutional experience, or at least become 
less of a risk if confined longer. 71.9 percent felt that if con-
fined any longer the prisoner would become a worse risk.* The 
possibility that the sentence may have been too long originally 
was not given as a reason by a significant number of respondents. 
Despite its low significance in practice, sentence equali-
zation provides perhaps the strongest argument for a discretionary 
parole system. As was pointed out in other sections of this 
report,** wide disparities do exist among sentencing practices, both 
nationally and in Alaska. But, is a parole system the real solution 
to that problem? The Commission has concluded that it should not be 
the answer. 
*"Corrections", Op. Cit. p. 394 
** See page 135 
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Alternative methods for providing sentence equalization 
include strengthing of appellate sentence review ,* extension of 
the time or the creation of new time intervals (with appropriate 
safeguards)within which application may be made to the court for 
sentence revision under the rules of court; and,executive clemency. 
In general a detailed examination of these recourses if beyond the 
scope of our report this year. It is sufficient to note that they 
are all legitimate avenues for modification of sentence and , in our 
present view, all better adopted to this purpose than parole deter­
mination. 
Societal charity or "giving the offender a break" is 
frequently considered as one of the basic concepts underlying parole 
systems. This role may explain why clergymen are frequently appointed 
to parole boards, presumably as official dispensers of the sovereign's 
grace. However , there is no statistical data supporting the ration­
ality with which charity is dispersed. Offenders released on parole 
appear just as likely to be recidivists as those released uncondi­
tionally according to one survey. A 1967 study by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons of all prisoners released in the United States 
in 1964 revealed that the median time served by paroles was 21.1 
months , while those discharged unconditionally served only 20.1 
months. Moreover , these figures do not indicate how much additional 
time was served by the parolees for violation of parole conditions. 
* As extensive review of experience under the 1969 Alaska
sentence review legislation is set out in "Five Years of Sentencing 
Review in Alaska" , Erwin , Robert C., 5 UCLA-Alaska Law Rev. 1 at page 1. 
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The arbitrariness of parole procedures as well as the 
substance of parole decisions has come increasingly under attack. 
A recent survey conducted by O'Learly and Nuffield* found that: 
"Parole boards were found to be moving away from their 
roles as autonomous decision makers and instead are developing 
an expanded function as part of larger departments of 
corrections. Parole board members are now, to a greater 
degree than a few years ago, full time personnel serving 
longer terms of office - perhaps an indication of a trend 
towards increased professionalism. Procedures at parole 
release hearings have not changed much in recent years, 
except for the manner of informing the inmate of the 
board's decision. On the other hand, procedures at 
revocation hearings have shown an increased tendency 
to accord the offender the right to a number of due 
process safeguards, a trend that was clear even before 
the requirements set forth in the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Morrissey v. Brewer."** 
As Alaska's prison population has grown, and the weakness 
of charitably oriented parole has been more manifest, the national 
trend towards full time boards and staff for the parole system has 
increasingly discussed as an option for this state. The Commission's 
proposal for abolishing parole would obviate the necessity of funding 
for an elaboration of parole professionals. 
In lieu of a parole system, the Commission is recommending 
a system of "good time" served as mandatory probation. For every 
day a prisoner spends in an institution following its rules his 
sentence is reduced by a day. Nothing else a prisoner does will 
result in faster release. 
* O'Leary and Nuffield, "A National Survey of Parole
Decision Making." Crime & Delinquency July 1973 pp. 378-393. 
** Ibid, at 378. 
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This system will require the Division of Corrections 
to establish where they have not done so, specific rules of conduct 
and guides to behavior providing adequate notice to inmates concerning 
their nature and the penalties which can be imposed for violations. 
This is not an unreasonable burden on the institution and should 
result in a more orderly life within institutions; both for inmates 
and correctional personnel. 
Revocation of "good time credit" should result only after 
an administrative hearing at which the inmate can defend himself 
according to procedures now generally applicable to good time loss 
hearings. While we do not propose the adoption of all standards 
applicable to a probation revocation to an administrative hearing 
on loss of good time, almost any process would be a clear advance 
over parole denials at which inmates have almost no procedural 
rights. Both sides will know in advance what their rights and 
responsibilities are, and what consequences will flow from disregard 
of those factors. This system will introduce a new degree of 
certainty to prison life. 
Moreover, because "good time" under this proposal would 
be the only avenue to early release, the Division of Corrections 
may find that its rehabilitation programs will become more relevant 
or even undergo changes in their basic nature. Unquestionably, 
inmates gravitate towards rehabilitation programs within institutions 
which they perceive as having current favor with parole boards 
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rather than those which might be most appropriate to their need 
or real personal interest. Too frequently, an individual who has 
no desire to honestly participate in a rehabilitation program 
will do so because it will look good on his record at parole hearings. 
These kind of participants inject a motivational distortion disrup·­
tive to those who are participating for more sincere reasons. 
Elimination of parole con games would create an atmosphere 
in which it would be desirable to give a more substantial voice in 
the type of programs offered within institutions to inmates. The 
result might be an improvement in over-all rehabilitation programming. 
At the very least one might assume that day-to-day conditions 
within institutions should improve since the inmates would be engaged 
in activities serving their goals as opposed to activities serving 
the ends of the correctional system. 
In sum, under a "good time" procedure a prisoner knows 
the day he enters prison how much time he will have to serve and 
under what conditions. If his behavior conforms to institution 
rules and regulations he knows when he will be released. This system 
removes most release-related incentive for an inmate to participate 
in rehabilitation oriented programs and allows the programs to 
operate and be evaluated according to their real justification. 
As earlier indicated, though a prisoner may be a model, 
the special jurisdiction of the criminal justice system over him 
does not end until his until full sentence is served. Earned good 
time converts to mandatory probationary time in which the state 
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can both assist in and evaluate the offenders readjustment to 
society for up to two years. 
It is contemplated that the offender will serve his 
mandatory probation according to general conditions of probation 
similar to those now used in Alaska but subject to piecemeal release 
of condition at the discretion of the division of corrections, 
based upon the necessity of close supervision and other criteria. 
The condition that no offense be committed during the period of 
probation would be unreleasable. Just as with probation as now 
administered, this would give the prosecutor the option of proceeding 
on a lesser standard of process and proof for minor offenses which 
could be served within the remaining mandatory probationary time. 
There is no extension of mandatory probation however without a 
fresh conviction. 
This system of mandatory probation should in many cases 
relieve the judge of the necessity of imposing a sentence of proba­
tion on condition that the offender first serve a certain amount 
of time in jail, an existing practice which causes some confusion 
among the public. It is not intended to restrict existing judicial 
prerogatives to impose additional terms of probation, probation 
in lieu of imprisonment etc. (except where barred by mandatory 
sentence requirements.). 
Granted, the proposal does not meet the complaint of those 
who point out that straight time allows an individual who simply 
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follows the rules to be released from prison in precisely the same 
condition character-wise as he entered. However, all the data 
currently available on the success of prison-run rehabilitation 
programs strongly suggests that straight time would produce no major 
change in current results.* It should be clear, however, that the 
Commission is not questioning the validity of rehabilitation programs 
currently being offered in Alaska or suggesting that they be abandoned. 
We are only pointing out that elimination of a system which offers 
the wrong incentives to participate in such programs is not likely 
to result in increases in recidivism among inmates after their 
release from prison. 
* While evaluation of rehabilitation programs is not of
immediate concern to the Commission, we can not ignore the impressive 
array of studies which indicate the general failure of rehabilita­
tion programs within prisons, whatever their nature, to have any 
appreciable impact on recidivism rates. See generally: Martinson, 
"What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform" The Public 
Interest (Spring 1974) pp. 22-54; Hood, "Research on the Effective­
ness of Punishments and Treatments," in Crime and Justice, ed. Leon 
Radzinowicz and Marvin Wolfgang (New York: Basic Books, 1971), vol. 3 
pp. 159-182; Barley, "Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 
Reports," in Crime and Justice, supra, vol. 3, p. 190; and, Wilkins, 
Evaluation of Penal Measures (New York, Random House, 1969), p. 78. 
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GOOD TIME AND ITS RELATION TO PAROLF. 
The Commission has recommended that the system of credit 
towards early release from sentence, usually called "good time", 
replace the present parole system. (A detailed explanation of the 
Commission's reasons supporting this decision can be found in the 
preceding comments on parole.) 
Though Section 21 of Article III of the Alaska Constitution 
mandates that a system of parole be provided by the legislature by 
law, �e take the view that enactment of the good time system as 
modified in this proposal includes sufficient characteristics of 
parole to meet the constitutional standard even though we concluded 
that the use of the term "parole" in the contemporary context might 
be misleading. 
The Commission recommends that A.S. 33.20.010 - 50, be 
modified or repealed should legislative action be taken on this pro­
posal to conform with those recommendations. 
The Commission recommends that the Legislature provide 
for a good time system by statute, leaving the matter of development 
of administrative guidelines to the Division of Corrections. 
To facilitate administration of the good time system the 
Commission recommends that the statute establishing it provide for 
a day of credit towards release for each day of the sentence served 
in conformity with division rules and regulations. This standard 
should apply to all sentenced prisoners, regardless of the crime 
for which they were convicted. 
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The Commission also recommends that the Division of 
Corrections review its rules and regulations governing inmate con­
duct and the penalties attached thereto in the event a new system 
of good time is enacted by the Legislature to insure that those rules, 
regulations and penalties conform to the spirit and intent of the 
new system. 
While the Commission recommends that the Legislature simply 
provide for the earning of good time and for its forfeiture by 
statutory enactment, leaving to the Division of Corrections respon­
sibility for the development of guidelines and procedures governing 
these matters, the Commission does recommend that the decision of 
the Alaska Supreme Court in McGinnis, et. aL v. Stevens, et.· al. 
(No. 1207, December 1, 1975), as it applies to good time, serve as 
a model in developing guidelines and procedures for administration 
of the recommended system. 
The Division's current practice of maintaining a "time 
accounting sheet" on each inmate should be continued and the practice 
of making it available to the inmate upon request maintained under 
the new recommended system. Similarly, the Division should continue 
under the new system its practice of providing all new arrivals 
at institutions with written copies of the rules, regulations and 
procedures for that institution. 
In so far as release from sentence resulting from good 
time served is concerned, the Commission recommends that such release 
not be unconditional since it is a new form of parole. The balance 
of the time remaining on the original sentence should be served by 
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the inmate under conditions established by the Division of Corrections. 
Those conditions should be set on a case by case basis. They should 
be designed to reduce the likelihood that the inmate will recidivate 
upon release. The range of options open to the Division should 
correspond with those normally associated with conditions of probation. 
Violations of the conditions set at the time of good time 
release should be dealt with in the same manner as violations of the 
conditions of probation. That is, procedures for the revocation 
of probation which are in use at the time of violation of conditions 
of good time release should govern revocation of the latter. 
During the period of release on good time, an individual 
should not be subject to search and seizure except upon issuance 
of a warrant or a showing of probable cause. 
�,11.e i'or·,n.ission rec....,,.;1;1nr:r,s that regardless of the length 
of tiP1.c.c, :e1 ,ainincr ur t.he '3P 11t8n 1�,� Fts ;::, resnl t of good time release, 
a maximum of two years be the limit of supervision under good time 
release. 
Lastly, the Commission is aware that an occasion may arise 
in which an inmate, in view of corrections personnel, should be 
released from prison prior to the time at which he would be eligible 
for release under a good time system. In those circumstances, the 
Commission feels it would be appropriate for the Division to petition 
for executive clemency under A. s. 33.20.070. 
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Proposed draft act 
for an 
Alaska Criminal Law Revision Commission 
For an act entitled: An Act 
relating to criminal law revision 
and providing for an effective date 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA: 
Section 1 AS 24.20 is amended by adding new sections to read: 
AS 24.20.071. ESTABLISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION. 
There is established as a legislative advisory commission of the 
Alaska Legislative Council a Criminal Law Revision Commission. 
AS 24.20.073 MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION. 
is composed of: 
(a) The Commission
(1) one member of the state house of representatives and one
member of the state senate to be appointed by the Legislative 
Council; 
(2) the Attorney General;
(3) the Commissioner of Public Safety;
(4) the Director, Division of Corrections, Department of
Health and Social Services; 
(5) a judge of the Superior Court appointed by the Chief
Justice; 
(6) a judge of the District Court appointed by the presiding
judge of the Superior Court; 
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(7) the Public Defender;
(8) one social worker appointed by the Legislative Council;
(9) two Alaska mayors from municipalities designated by
the Legislative Council; 
(10) an attorney appointed by the President, the Alaska Bar
Association; 
(11) two representatives of the public at large appointed
by the Legislative Council; 
(12) two representatives of the public appointed by the
Governor. 
(b) An appointing authority or a designated Commissioner may
name an alternate to serve in his stead when the member may be 
unable to attend. 
AS 24.20.075. TERMS, REMOVAL, COMPENSATION. (a) Members serve
ex officio or at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The 
term of an appointed member is four years. 
(b) Members receive no salary but appointed members are entitled
to per diem and travel expenses authorized by law for other boards 
and commissions. 
AS 24.20.077. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION. The commission shall 
(1) advise the governor and the legislature on necessary
revisions in the criminal laws; 
(2) prepare a comprehensive revision of Alaska criminal law
including but not limited to necessary substantive and topical 
revisions of the criminal law �nd of criminal procedure, 
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sentencing and the parole and probation of offenders; 
(3) conduct studies of criminal justice practices and
procedures necessary to perform its duties; 
(4) receive and expend grants and appropriations from private
and governmental sources for the purpose of carrying out its 
duties under this section and may contract with other agencies 
or persons for the performance of necessary services; 
(5) submit a report and recommendations to the first session
of the Tenth legislature concerning substantive or topical 
revisions to the criminal laws by February 1, 1977; 
(6) submit a report and recommendations to the second
session of the Tenth Legislature by February 1, 1978 concerning 
revision of the laws governing criminal procedure and such other 
pertinent matters concerning the criminal law on which no previous 
report has been made together with any recommendations concerning 
the future existence, purposes or composition of the commission. 
AS 24.20.078. CHAIRMAN, MEETINGS, QUORUM. (a) The commission
shall select two of its members as chairman and vice chairman. 
It may hold meetings and public hearings throughout the state 
and may determine a proper quorum for conducting business. 
Section 2. EFFECTIVE DATE 
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:r.,'l;_()'" 
SENTENC:ING IN ALl\SK.:"., Alasko. cTudj c::_ril �onncil 
STATUTORY MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM FELONY PENALTIES 
AS DESIGNATED BY THE CRIMINAL CODE ** 
(Effective in 1973) 
**See footnote on 
page IV-11, this 
section 
*M = Misdemeanor to which
a Felony Commonly Reduced 
J = Jail Sentence 
P = Penitentiary Sentence 
[Historically the penitentiary was for 
felons and the jail for misdeme�nants 
and persons awaiting trial.] 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
Offense 
1st Degree murder 
Obstructing or injuring R.R. or aircraft 
2nd Degree murder 
Manslaughter 
Procuring another to commit self-murder 
(manslaughter) 
Abortion (illegal} 
Physician administering poison or causing 
death while intoxicated (manslaughter) 
Negligent homicide (manslaughter) 
Rape (defendant 19 yrs or older, female 16 yrs 
or younger, or daughter or sister) 
Minimum 
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
15 yrs 
1 yr 
l yr
1 yr 
l yr
(defendant less than 19, female 16 yrs or --­
younger, or daughter or sister) 
(aJl others) 
Lewd and lascivjous acts toward children 
I-".ayhem 
Shooting, stabbing or cutting with intent to 
kill, wound, maim 
Ass�ult with intent to kill, rape or rob 
Due]ing 
Posting another for not engaging in duel 
Assault while armed 
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1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
l yr
1 yr 
Maximum 
life 
life 
life 
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
$1000 or 
5 yrs 1 both
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
Penitentiary 
unlimited 
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
10 yrs 
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
15 yrs 
10 yrs 
2 yrs 
10 yrs 
Offense 
•� Careless use of firearms
Assault with dangerous weapon 
*M Assault and battery
Robbery 
Larceny £rum a person 
Kidnapping (and conspirace to kidna� 
carried .out by any overt act) 
Receiving, possessing or disposing of 
ransom 
Child stealing 
Use of firearms during commission of 
robbery, assault, murder, rape, 
burglary, kidnapping 
Blackmail 
*M Libel and Slander
Sodomy 
1st offense 
2nd offense 
Threat and false report of bombing 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
1st Degree arson 
2nd Degree arson 
3rd Degree arson 
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IV-2
Minimum 
P 6 mo 
J 1 mo 
$100 
1- yr
1 yr
an\· term 
of years 
1 vr 
P 6 mo 
J 
10 yrs 
25 yrs 
p 6 rr.o 
3 mo 
J 6 mo 
$50 
l yr
1 yr
2 yrs 
l yr
l 1·r
Moximum 
1 yr or 
$1000 ) both 
10 yrs 
l yr
$1000 
G mo or 
$ 500 l botl1 
15 yrs 
5 yrs 
life 
10 yrs or 
$10,000 ) both 
10 yrs 
1 yr or 
$500 )both 
5 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
.$ 500 
10 yrs 
$5000 
yrs 
20 yrs 
10 vrs
1
or
$5000 both 
3 yrs or 
$3000 )both 
Offenses I�gainst f'roperty Cont. 
4th D. arSOli 
Burning to d8fruud insure:::-
Burglary 1n a dwelling 
Burglary in a dwelling at night 
Burglary in a dwelling if occupied 
Burglary r.ot in a dwelling 
Burglary in leaving dwelling 
�M [Unarithorized use, entry or occupation] 
Larceny of money or 
Larceny of morjey or 
?rone:::-t,.-. .., 
property 
more than 
less than 
$100 
$100 
[Drivina o:::- takina venicJe without consent) 
l,c..rc�ny ·in bui J a i,.g or vessel 
:;_,.1rc<::?n�' (...'f Jin ima ls worth more thc:n $ 50
Making, alterin� or defacing mur�s on brands 
( l arco.ny)
t-i:Jrcer 1 y of minerals (9rand larceny)
Issuing ��nec}:s witnout funds or crec;it 
T • �SS\lll1�� c n 2 ck s v: j �- h i;-it.cnt to de.:r2ud 
;.;J:-:our.t cre?a�er ':.r,an $50
(unclear-) 
Retention o� lcs� pro?e�ty �o�th m�re than 
$JOO (larce�y o� money or property) 
:'::;nbezzlement hy e:nployee or servant more than 
$1 () (' 
::��bcz71Eff,en .... }:,v :.:;;:d lee or servant. more than 
s l O 0 
[!T:bezzl,: n,::-:,,t. of �;i;blic money or ser-vi:tnt nore 
tr.c1.-: S�:OC' 
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IV--3 
Minimum 
J yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 Yl:"
1 yr 
2 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
J 1 mo 
$25 
1 yr 
l yr
l yr
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
l yr
Maximum 
2 
s1ooci J 
5 
S3000 )
10 yrs 
15 v:;.-s
20 yrs 
5 yrs 
3 yrs 
10 yrs 
1 yr 
$100 
or 
bolh 
or 
bo:.h 
l yr
] 
or
$1000 both 
7 yrs 
10 yr::: 
5 yr::: 
10 yrs 
10 yrs 
10 yrs 
10 yrs 
lO yrs 
1 yr 15 yrs 
(plus double fine of 
amount converted) 
Offenses against property, cont. 
Embezzlement bv trustee 
Embezzlement by fiduciary 
Buying, receiving or concealing stolen 
property 
Obtaining money or property by false 
pretenses 
False invoice to defraud insurer 
Fraudelent conveyance 
Fraudelen� sale of personalty subject to 
security interest 
Fraudelently producing heir 
Substituting another child for infant 
Defrauding innkeeper, more than $100 
1 Defrauding innkeeper, less than $100 
Malicious or wanton injury to animals or 
other personalty 
Stealing, removing or damaging parts of 
aircraft 
Destroying boats 
Fitting out boat with intent that it be 
destroyed 
Forgery of credit card 
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IV-4
Minimum 
3 mo 
$50 
J mo 
$50 
1 yr 
1 yr 
6 mo 
6 mo 
1 yr 
1 yr 
P 6 mo 
J 3 mo 
$50 
3 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
Maximum 
l yr
$)000
1 yr 
SlCJ0 
3 yrs 
s1000 1
5 yrs 
3 yrs 
2 yrs 
1 yr 
ssoo l 
10 yrs 
10 yrs 
5 yrs 
$1000 ] 
3 yrs 
1 yr 
$1000 
plus 
or 
both 
or 
both 
10 yrs 
SiO,Ouul or 
botJ-
10 yrs 
5 yrs 
3 yrs or 
$3000 ) both 
Offenses against p��erty, cont. 
Fraud more than $500 in 6 mo period, µcrson 
authorized to provid0 goods or services 
upon presentation of credit card 
Possession of incomplete credit cards with 
intent to complete 
Forgery of record or certificate and uttering 
forged instrument 
Forgery of evidence of debt or uttering forged 
evidence of debt 
Making or ·possessing tool designed for 
counterfeiting 
Making or possessing tool designed for 
counterfeiting coins 
Making or passing counterfeit coins 
Joining parts of genuine instruments (forgery) 
Making false receipts or altering receipts of 
goods in warehouse 
Affixing fictitious signature 
Adulterating gold dust 
Possession of mixed or adulterated gold dust 
with intent to pass or sell 
Punishment on subsequent conviction of all 
forgeries 
OFFENSES �GAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE, 
Perjury and subornation of perjury - in crirainal 
Minimum 
1 yr 
l yr
2 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
2 yrs 
p 1 
J 3 mo 
2 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
l yr
action punishable by life 2 yrs 
Perjury and subornation of perju�y - in other 
court action 3 yrs 
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1V-5 
Mnximum 
3 yrs or 
$30oo 1 both 
3 yrs
1 
or 
$3000 both 
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
5 yrs 
10 yrs 
10 yrs 
20 yrs 
5 yrs 
1 yr 
20 yrs 
5 yrs 
5 yrs 
5 yrs 
20 yrs 
10 yrs 
Offenses against public justice, cont. 
Perjury and subornation of perjury - not in 
court action, or subornation of perjury 
Endcuvor to procure fX'r jury 
Bribery 
Minirnum 
1 yr 
yr 
2 yrs 
Accepting bribe (judicial or executive officer) � yrs 
Aiding escape from confinement 
·ugitive escape from custody or confinement
(if felon) 
*M Fugitive escape from custody or confinement
(if mis.demeanor) 
Offioer allowing escape or refusing to 
receive prisoner 
Rescue of prisoner 
Assault on officer in penitentiary 
Assault by" person aiding escape from 
penitentiary 
Assault on officer in jail 
Assault by person aiding escape from jail 
Act of officer having custody (destroying 
evidence) 
Act of other than officer destroying evidence 
Filing (�r offering) false or forged 
instruments 
False certificate by public officer 
Offering false evidence 
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l yr 
l yr
1 yr 
$200 
2 yrs 
3 yrs 
2 yrs 
10 yrs 
3 yrs 
1 yr 
l yr
l yr
l yr
1 yr 
Maximum 
5 yrs 
J yrs 
15 yrs 
-3 yrs
3 yrs or 
$5000 1t,och
1 yr or 
$1000 ] both 
5 yrs
$1000 ] plus
10 yrs 
20 yrs 
15 yrs 
20 yrs 
10 yrs 
5 yrs or 
$5000 ]both 
3 yrs
1
or
$2000 both 
2 yrs or 
$2000 ]both 
2 yrs1or 
$5000 both 
2 yrs or 
10,uoo 1 both 
Offenses against public justice, cont. Minimum 
Preparing false evidence 1 yr 
Influencing witnesses,judges,jurors, etc. or 
obstructing the aci!ll.1nistration of justice 1 yr 
CRIMES AGAINST MORALITY AND DECENCY 
Cohabiting in state of adultery or fornication 
Polygamy 
Seduction 
*M Lewd and lascivious 
Incest 
Sodomy 
Contributing to delinquency of minor 
Taking female under 16 for prostitution or 
marrjage 
�M Prostitution (soliciting, receiving) 
Male employed in house of prostitution or 
1 yr 
1 yr 
J 3 mo 
P 1 yr 
$500 
J 3 mo 
3 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
J 3 mo 
1 yr 
$100 
living off earnings 2 yrs 
Importing or exporting females for prostitution 2 yrs 
$1000 
Placjng [cma]e 1n house of prostitution 
Procuring or attempting to procure female 
for prostitution 
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2 yrs 
$1000 
2 yrs 
$1000 
Maximum 
2 yrs or 
$10,000 ] both 
5 yrs or 
$5000 ] both 
2 yrs or 
$500 ] both 
7 yrs 
1 yr 
5 yrs 
$1000 
1 yr 
15 yrs 
10 yrs 
2 yrs 
1 yr 
yrs 
$500 
5 yrs 
20 yrs or 
$5000 ] both 
21 yrs) or
$5000 both 
20 yrs 
l 
or
;Joth 
M 
Crimes agai�st mor�lity and decency, cont. 
Procuring chaste female for prostitutjon 
(single act) 
Receiving money for placing female in house 
of prostitution 
Detaining female to pay debts 
Accepting earnings of prostitute 
Male living with or on earnings of 
prostitute 
Pimping 
OFFENSE AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE 
Riot (if felony or misd. results, punished 
as a principal accordingly) 
Riot with dangerous weapon or encouraging 
force and violence 
Threat and false report of bombing 
Disorderly Conduct 
SYNDACALISM 
Advocacy of criminal syndicalis� 
Participating in assembly to advocate 
criminal syndicalism 
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Minimum 
2 yrs 
2 yrs 
$1000 
. 2 yrs 
·s1000
2 yrs
$1000
· 2 yr�
J 3 mo
P 6 mo
3 yrs 
1 yr 
1 yr 
1 yr 
M<tx i..mum 
5 yrs 
20 yrs 
$50UO ) 
20 yrs
1$5000 
20 yrs 
$50JU l 
20 yrs 
1 yr 
2 yrs 
15 yrs 
or 
both 
or 
both 
or 
both 
5 yrs or 
$5000 ] both 
10 dnys 
$300 
10 yrs
1 
or
?5000 both 
10 yrs
1 
or
$SOOO both 
WEAPONS 
Possession of weapon by convict 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
Conspiracy against rights of person 
DRUG OFFI:NSES 
H/\RD DRUGS 
Violation of UNDA - {heroin) 
Violating UNDA record keeping 
1st offense 
2nd offense 
3rd offense 
Illegally selling to minor (under 21) 
1st offense 
2nd offense 
3rd offense 
Minimum 
1 yr 
2 yrs 
10 yrs 
20 yrs 
$500 
10 yrs 
$5000 
15 yrs 
(no suspended sentences allowed, and imprisonment for 
minimum required before parole eligibility) 
SOFT DRUGS 
Depressant, Halucinogenic, Stimulant Drugs 
(grass, speed, etc.) - violation of 
possession or control laws 
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[misd] 
M.:1::-- tnmm 
5 yrs] or
$500 both 
2 yrs or 
$1000 ) both 
10 yrs
]$5000 plus 
20 yrs 
$7500 ] plus 
40 yrs
$10,000 ] plus
5 yrs or 
$5000 ] both 
30 yrs 
$10,ooolPlus
30 yrs
$25,000]plus
life 
1 yr 
Qrug offcnscs,cont. 
Violation with intent to sell or dispose 
to another: 
Selling to minor (under 19) 
ALCOHOL 
Minor in possession 
Sale to a Minor 
PARTIES TO CRIME 
Accessory 
1st offense 
2nd offense 
1st offense 
2nd offense 
3rd offense 
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M.inimum M,l'-: i l\\lllll 
25 vrs or 
$20,00ol both 
any term 
including 
life J or 
$25,000 both 
any term 
inc.iuding 
life ]or 
$25,000 both 
1 yr 
$500 
1 yr 
$500 
(plus possible license so 
revocation if Judge sends 
to board) 
10 - 45 days 
30 - 90 days 
revocation 
P 1 - 5 
J 3 mo 1 y­
$1 UO- -$'JOO 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
*M Driving while intoxicated 
*M Leaving scene of accident 
Failure to render assistance 
PAROLE, PROBATION VIOLATIONS 
Parole 
Probation 
Minimum Maximum 
$1000 
1 yr 
(plus possible 1 yr. susµ. 
of license) 
l yr
$500 
10 yrs 
$10,000 
up to original 
sentence 
up to original 
sentence of 
probation or 
if imposition 
suspended any 
sentence that 
might have been 
imposed 
**The Commission staff has made no attempt to check the accuracy 
or completeness of this table nor to update it from the date of 
its preparation. Prior to any enactment into law, these tasks 
should be undertaken though there is no reason to suppose that 
this work is not generally accurate. 
203. 
IV-11 
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY 
POUCH Y, STATE CAPITOL 
JUN�AU, ALASKA 99811 
(907) 465-3�00
23 November 1975 
SUBJECT: Criminal Provisions of the Alaska Statutes 
TO: Criminal Code Revision Commission 
FROM: Gerald L. Williams, Legislative Intern 
The following is a compilation of the criminal provisions of 
the first sixteen Titles of the Alaska Statutes. These provi­
sions are listed by AS number, title and penalties. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the penalty listed is a maximum that may 
be imposed by the court. 
02.05.230 - Violation a misdemeanor - Misdemeanor, $500. 
02.05.231 - Civil penalties for violation - $150. 
02.15.240 - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $500, 90 days, both. 
02.20.060 - Enforcement and penalties - $500, 6 months, or both. 
02.30.020 - UnauthorizP.d operation - Misdemeanor. 
02.30.040 - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $500. 
02.35.120 - Penalties for violation of this chapter - $500, 
6 months, or both. 
02.35.130 - Penalty for violation of §§90 or 110 of this chapter -
Misdemeanor, $500. 
03.05.090 
03.17.090 
03.35.060 
- Penalty for
- Penalties -
- Penalty for
90 days, or
violation - $1000, one year, or both. 
Misdemeanor, $100-2000. 
removing impounded animal - $25-100, 
both. 
03.40.060 - Penalty for use without certificate - Misdemeanor, 
$50-300. 
03.40.100 - Penalty for branding another's livestock - Felony, 
2-5 years.
03.40.150 - Penalty for sale without power of attorney or bill 
of sale - Felony, 2-5 years. 
03.40.170 - Penalty regarding slaughter permit - Misdemeanor, 
03.40.210 
03.40.240 
03.40.260 
03.45.040 
$10-100. 
- Recording branded
- Penalty regarding
- General Penalty -
- Penalties - $500.
hides - Misdemeanor, 3 months, $100. 
spayed heifers - Misdemeanor, $10-100. 
$25-100, Misdemeanor. 
04.05.070 - Violations of regulations of the board - Misdemeanor, 
punished according to AS 04.15.100. 
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04.15.080 - Giving of intoxicating liquor to persons under the 
age of 19 years - Misdemeanor, one year, $500; or both. 
04.15.100 - Penalties for violation of title or municipal ordi­
nance - Misdemeanor, one year, $500. 
04.15�110 - Sale in violation of local option - Misdemeanor, 
one year, $5000, or both. 
05.10.160 - Penalty for conducting contests without license -
Misdemeanor. 
05.10.170 - General penalty - Misdemeanor 
05.15.200 - Penalty - Misdemeanor 
05.25.090 - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $500, 6 months, or both. 
05.30.110 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, $100. 
06.05.490 - Receipt of deposits while insolvent - Felony, $5000, 
one-three years, or both. 
06.05.500 - Unlawful deceit of department or its employees -
1-5 years.
06.05.510 - Unlawful false report to department - Misdemeanor, 
$5000, 1-5 years, or both. 
06.05.515 - Slander and libel of bank - Felony, $5000, 1-5 years, 
or both. 
06.05.520 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, $5000, one year, or both. 
06.20.320 - Criminal penalties - Misdemeanor. 
06.25.060 - Penalty for false representation - Felony, $1000-
5000, 1-5 years, or both. 
06.25.070 - Penalty for obtaining fraudulent certificate - Felony, 
$1000-5000, 1-5 years, or both. 
06.25.320 - Penalty for violations not specifically provided for -
(a)person violations receive: misdemeanor, $1000, one
year, or both; (b) corporate violations receive:
$1000.
06.30.075 - Penalty for violation of S 70 of this chapter - $5000. 
06.30.210 - Penalty for violation of§ 205 of this chapter -
Misdemeanor. 
06.30.875 - Defamation of institutions prohibited - $1000, one 
year, or both. 
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08.08.230 - Unlawful practice a misdemeanor - Misdemeanor, 
$1000, one year, or both. 
08.12.250 - Failure to possess license - $500, 30 days, or both. 
08.18.141 - Misdemeanor - Misdemeanor. 
08.20.200 - Violation of§ 100 of this chapter - Misdemeanor, 
$1000, one year, or both. 
08.24.360 - Fines and penalties - $500, 3 months, or both. 
08.28.310 - Penalties - 90 days, $300, or both. 
08.32.180 - Violation - Misdemeanor, $100. 
08.36.340 - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $500, 6 months,or both. 
08.40.180 - Violation of chapter - Misdemeanor, $300, 60 days, or both. 
08.48.291 - Violations and penalties - Misdemeanor, $10,000, 
one year, or both. 
08.52.080 - Violations and penalties - $1000, one year, or both. 
08.54.210(a) - Unlawful acts - Misdemeanor, $1000, one year, or both. 
08.54.210(b) - Unlawful acts - (a) person violation receives: 
Misdemeanor, $1,000, one year or both; (b) guide 
with license suspended receives: Felony, $5,000, 
1-3 years, equipment confiscated. 
08.56.030 - Penalty for noncompliance - $10-25, 10 days, or both. 
08.60.020 - Violation of chapter a misdemeanor - Misdemeanor, 
$100, 90 days. 
08.60.090 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, $500, one year, or both. 
08.62.190 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, $500-1,000. 
08:64.360 - Penalty for practicing without a license or in vio­
lation of this chapter - Misdemeanor, $50-100, 10-
90 days, or both. 
08.66.080 - Penalties - (a) failure to register receives: $100; 
(b) wilfull violation receives: Misdemeanor, $300.
08.68,350 - Punishment for misdemeanor - Misdemeanor, 10 days-
one year, $10-500, or both. 
08.70.170 - Penalties - $500, one year, or both. 
08�71.180 - Practicing without a license - Misdemeanor 
08.72.275 - Lenses and frames for eyeglasses and sunglasses -
$50-500. 
08.72.290 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, $50-500, 10-90 days, or both. 
08.76.030 - Criminal liability - Misdemeanor, $500, 6 months, 
or both. 
08.80.460 - Violation - Misdemeanor, $1,000, 3 months, or both. 
08.84.140 - Penalty for fraud in obtainig registration - Misdemeanor. 
08.84.170 - Peaalty - Misdemeanor, $50-500, 30 days. 
08.86.210 - Penalty - Misdemeanor. 
08.88.401 - Prohibited conduct - Misdemeanor. 
08.99.120 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, $500. 
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10.05.786 - Penalties imposed upon officers and directors -
Misdemeanor, $500. 
10.20.645(b) - Penalties imposed upon corporation - Misdemeanor, 
$500. 
10.20.650 - Penalties imposed upon officers and directors -
Misdemeanor, $500. 
14.20.110 - Penalty for violation of§ 100 of this chapter -
$100. 
14.30.020 - Violation - Misdemeanor, $50-200, costs of prosecution. 
14.47.050 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, 30 days, $1,000, or both. 
14.47.140 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, 30 days, $1,000, or both. 
15.07.160(c) - Unlawful action - Misdemeanor. 
15.07.190 - Violations - Misdemeanor, one year, $1,000, or both. 
15.15.215(b) - Disposition of challenged and questioned votes -
Misdemeanor, 30 days, $100, or both. 
15.45.100 - Statement of warning - $1,000, one year, or both. 
15.45.330 - Statement of warning - $1,000, one year, or both. 
15.45.570 - Statement of warning - $1,000, one year, or both. 
15.55.010 - Undue influence by force - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.020 - undue influence by offer - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.030 - Publication without identification - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.040 - Publication of false statement - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.050 - Improper possession of ballot - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.060 - Counerfeiting of ballot - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.070 - Refusal to allow employees time off - Misdemeanor, $50. 
15.55.080 - Improper disclosure of vote - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.085 - Divulging ballot count, penalty - Misdemeanor, one 
year, $1,000, or both. 
15,55.090 - Writing of false statement - Felony. 
15.55.100 - Voting in false name - Felony. 
15.55.110 - Undue influence of election official - Felony. 
15.55.120 - Improper change of election returns - Felony. 
15.55.130 - Improper delay in sending of election materials -
Felony. 
15.55.140 - Voting more than once - Felony. 
15.55.150 - Improper subscription to petition - Misdemeanor. 
15.55.160 - Improper printing and distribution of ballots - Felony. 
15.55.170 - False swearing - Felony. 
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15.55.180 - Improper influence of election by election officials -
Felony. 
15.55.190 - False count by election officials - Felony. 
15.55.200 - Concealment_ of returns by election officials - Felony. 
15.55.210 - General penalty for misdemeanor - $1,000, one year, 
or both. 
15.55.220 - General Penalty for felony - $3,000, 1-5 years, or both. 
15.55.230 - Penalty for corrupt practice - Deprived of office. 
15.55.245 - Vot�ng after disqualification - Misdemeanor. 
15.65.010 - Electioneering prohibited near polling places -
$500, 6 months, or both. 
15.65.030- Penalty for violation of S20 of this chapter - $50. 
15.65.040 - Offenses against election laws - (a) Persons receive: 
$100-500, 1-3 years, or both, �l�s costs of prosecu­
tion; (b) officials receive: $200-1,000, 1-5 years, 
or both, plus costs of prosecution. 
16.05.430 - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $1,000, 6 months, or both. 
16.05.665 - Falsification of application for license - Misde­
meanor, $1,000, 6 months, or both. 
16.05.720(a) - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $5,000, one year, or both. 
16.05.720(c) - Penalties - In addition to 16.05.72o(a), the value 
of the fish, upon third conviction three times 
value of fish or $10,000. 
16.05.827(a) - Sale of subsistence salmon roe - $10,000, 6 months 
or both. 
16.05.83l(c) - Waste of salmon - $10,000, 6 months, or both. 
16.05.860 - Penalty for violation of SS840 and 850 of this chapter -
Misdemeanor, $1,000. 
16.05.880 - Violation of S§870-895 of this chapter - Misdemeanor. 
16.05.895 - Penalty for causing material damage - Misdemeanor. 
16.05.900 - Penalty for violations - Misdemeanor, $1,000, 6 months, 
or both. 
16.05,910 - Penalty - Misdemeanor, forfeiture of vessel, one 
year, $10,000, or any two of above. 
16.10.030 - Violation of S§ 10-55 of this chapter a misdemeanor -
Misdemeanor, $100-500. 
16.10.090 - Penalties for vioaltion of S70 of this chapter -
Misdemeanor, one year, $5000, Or both. 
16.10.110 - Penalties for violation of S 100 of this chapter -
Misdemeanor, oner year, $5,000, or both. 
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16.10.130 - Penalties for violation of 8120 of this chapter -
Misdemeanor, 6 months, $1,000, or both. 
16.10.220 - Penalties for violation of 88200 and 210 
chapter - Misdemeanor, $5,000, one year, 
- Penalty - Misdemeanor, $5,000, one year, 
- Penalty - Misdemeanor.
of this 
or both. 
or both. 16.10.250 
16.20.200 
16,35,120 - Criminal liability for false claims or statements -
Misdemeanor, $1,000, one year, or both. 
16,35,170 - Criminal liability for false certificate - Misde­
meanor, $100 first offense, $250 for each successive 
offense, 6 months for first offense, one year for 
each successive offense, or both. 
16.43,360(a) - Penalties - Misdemeanor, $5,000 for first, $10,000 
for second, forfeiture of permits for third. 
16.43,360(b) - Misdemeanor, Forfeiture of permits. 
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S\JDJEC'.r: Cr:Lmlnal P:.r·ovi;:::�:,:'7.s of the Alaska Statutes 
FROM: 
Criminal Code Re�ision Commission - --· 
(\ 1 
Gerald L. H� lli_2:-:s, LegislaU.ve Intern;>· 
The following is a complla�ion of the crimln�l provision� 
of Titles 17-30 of the Al���a Statutes. These provisions 
are listed by AS number, ��tle and penalties. Unless 
othcrw:Lse j_ndicated, ti1e ;--2nalty listed j s a maxil!mm that 
may be imposed by the cou��-
It appears that the ,-rorl-: c:� the Commission j_s d:i.rectecl 
tO\,rard a completed draft C.?.:::ling w:L th crimes against 
property. In order to fa8ilitate Rccomplishment of this 
goal, a further stat u tor/ S:)2.rch for all cr1mes wi J 1 be held 
in abeyance unt:Ll such t:i ::·.::: as it becomes necessary to 
utilize such a search. I� this assumption is incorrect, 
please adv:tsc me, and I 1.-1�.1.l attempt to cont:i nue the 
search on a.regular basis. 
l '(. 0 5. 010
17.05.020 
17. 05. 0LI 0
17.05.050 
J '(. 05 .15 0 
1 ·1 • 1 0 • ?. O 0 ( a ) 
Sale of dise2�ed, corrupted or unw½olesome 
provisions prohibited - 3 months - 1 year 
$50 - 500. 
AdulterA.tic-:1 prohib-ited - 3 months - 1 year, 
$50 - 500. 
Penalty fo� violation of §30 of this chapter -
$200, 90 days, or both. 
Re-servjns nrohibited - 6 months, $100, or 
both. 
Penalty fo� vjoJations - $200, 30 days. 
Ponalties: 
( 1 ) f :i. r s t c :·:::�ens c rec e :iv c i:, $ 5 , 0 0 O , 2 - 5 y cars ;
(;J) scccnd. c:f'i'ensc receives �-;7,500, 10-20 
�.rea1�::,; 
( 3 ) t \1 j rel -:· :-"':�en�; c r cc e .i. v cs $10 , 0 0 0 , 2 0-11 0 
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2.7. J.5. 050 
17.20.310 
l7.12.110(a) 
7�, ,� 110(')- I , -- c. • 0 
17.12.llO(c) 
l'{.12.llO(d) 
18.05.060 
2 8. 06. 0110 
18.15.100 
18.15.180 
13.20.110 
18.20.250 
lS.35.050 
12,.3�.080 
Pcn�t:! 1. i c:;: 
(1) f':LJ·�; iJ c,"'S-c:rn;c- h'CC:i.V(''.; Hl--30 yca2r;,
:J; '.:i , fl CJ CJ -- 10 , 0 Ci CJ _; 
( 2 ) ::; c c ()J : c 1 u f' f.' c n �; e:: r e c (' i v (: : ·, J '.) - 3 0 y Nll' s , 
$ ?. :> ' CJ Cl CJ ; 
(3) th:Lrc'l o.C f'cn�;e rC::cr:ivc� li f'c i.rnpr-.i;..;0�1!'l()nt.
Penalty for violat:i.on:; - !�]00 - 500, lBO CbyD 
or both. 
s C l J. :i. n ['; p O :L s O !1 \·J :i_ th Out lab C 1 - . �; ? 0 - 1 0 0 
1-' en a 1 t j (! :, : 
(a) 6 months, $500, or both
(b) 1 year, $500, or both
Penal tics - m:Lsdcmcanor, l ycai·, $1,000 or 
both 
Felony: 
(1) first offense receives 25 years, $20,000
or both
(2) second offense receives up to l:i.fe,
*25,000 or both
Felony - up to life, $25,000 or both 
M:Lsdemeanor - $1,000 
Penalty for violation - misdemeanor, $500, 
1 year 
Penalty for denying rights - misdemeanor, 
$1,000, Go days or both 
PenaJ.ty for violation - misdemeanor, $500 
Penalty: 
(1) Physici2n receives misdemeanor, $500
(2) M:Lsdemcanor
Misdemeanor to establish or conduct ho�pJ.tal 
without license - mj_sdcmeanor, $500 
Recc1pt of services w1thout inte��.t to pay 
a mi sdemea.nor - misdemeanor-, 1 � :1r, �; l, 0 0 0 
or both 
f•'la:l.nta1r.·i nc: accoinuc1atlons \'Li thout pcrP1-Lt or 
after su.·.:,,_,r1s:i.on of ncrrn:l.t a rn:isdcmr�c11 1 ci1• -
m:isclcmcanor, $500, 6. rnontl11_;, or- both 
Penalty for noncCiup Llancc - :[; :I 00, 30 days, 
or both 
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J.S.jlJ.360 
18.60.085 
18.fio.160
18. 60. }� 50
18.60.6�0 
18.6ci.685 
18.60.730 
18.60.765 
18.62.080 
18.65.070 
18.70.1.00 
13. 7 2. 0ll 0
13.80.270 
19 . 0 5 . 1 1.1 0 
19.10.250 
19.25.030 
l';J.?.3.130 
lS.?7.120 
l'1·0Jdb:iLcd ,icts ancl pcnn.ltics - �;JOO - '..;'.lo, 
3 111ont Ii:, -· l year, or both 
Proh:i 1: i tell c·.ctr; and pcrlaltic::; - m:U:,clemcc�nor, 
$1,000, 1 year or both 
ProhJ.bition of unauthorized notice of inspection 
$1,000, 180 days, or both 
Violatj_on a misdemeanor - m:lsdemeanor 
Violations and penalties - misdemeanor, 
$50 - 500 
Penalty for violations - $1,000 
Pcnaltjcs - misdemeanor, $500, 6 months 
or both 
Penalty for violation - $1,000 
Penalty - misdemeanor, $500 - 1,000, 1 year 
or both 
Penalty - m:lsdemeanor, $500 
Destruct:lon of department files a misdemeanor -
m:isdemcanor, $500, 1 year, or l 0 oth 
Violation - mj_sdemeanor, $500, 6 months, or 
both 
Violation - misdemeanor, $500, 6 months, or 
both 
PcnaJ.ty - misdemeanor, $500, 30 days or both 
PenalU.es - misdemeanor, $10 - 500, 1 year 
or both 
Penalty for failure to erect warning signs 
$10 - 50, 60 days, or both 
D:1,11ar.;es to obstructions, signs, and construction 
- miGdenw::rnor
�cnalty for violatJ.on rnlsdcmeanor, $50 - 1,000 
Pc n alt y for v j o 1 at l on - m :i �; c1 e u �an or , $ 5 0 - 1 , 0 0 0 
He [';ula t :Lc,n s and pcnn 1 tics - 1-::i sdemea.r,or, �-; 10,000 
?1? 
? l . :_i �:. ? G 0 
;>] • �''/. ()1 (l 
2J..33.0G'.> 
21.36.200 
21. l[ 8. 2 30
21. 51. 311 O
21. 5 '(. 150
21.66.lG0 
21.69.210 
21. 69. 510
21.90.020 
21.33,180 
23.05.280 
23.10.010 
23.10.020 
23.10.025 
23.10.037 
23.10.0110 
23. l 0. 0LI 5 
23.10.1110 
?.3.10.180 
U11(! ll u,01 · i. :;; :<1 j i I:; 1.n·u· f� ( lnt,:!(i '.;.i:. t c(i C:Uiil]>cl: I :i C :; ) 
�-. !_i Cl -- l , 0 D Cl 
P c 11 ci:I t y f' , 1 r- ll 1 1 ct U t.l 10 C :\ '.- '. C c1 :1. n ;, ll. l' an C: C · · �; 1:, () 0 0 
or �; �00 
Fal::-e appl: i cci t:Lons, clairn�;, p:coof of los�, 
3 - 6 months, $250 - 500 or both 
V :l o 1 at :i on s - p u rd sh men t per AS 21 . 9 0 . 0 2 0 
V:Lola.tlons - punishment per AS 21.90.020 
Penalties - up to $250 or $1,000 
Penalties - misdemeanor, $500, 6 months, or 
both 
Penalty fo1· exh1b-Lting false accountf3, etc. 
- 5 years, $10,000 or both
I 11 e e;al d:L v:Lclc nds - rn:i sdernc:a;:,or-
General penalty - $50 - 1,000, 30 - 90 dRys, 
or both 
F:Lnanc:i.al r-..:.�quirc111cnt�; for :Lnsur-ers of 
surplus lines - $50 - 250 
PenaJ.tics - $1,000, 1 year, or both 
Penalty for vloJ.atjon of §5 of this chapter 
- misdemc, .. nor, $25 - 100, 10 - 30 days, or
both
Penalty for violation of §15 of this chapter 
- $2,000, J. year, or both
Use of arrncc1 gu2.rds - felony, l - 5 years 
Lie-detector tests - misdcmconor, $1,000 
1 ye:: r> or lloth 
Payment of' \·:2.c;cs :in state - n,.i.sdcmeanor 
Payments :Lnt:o bencf'·i L fund - pun:lshmc:nt as 
per AS 2 3. JO. LU 5 
Penalty - $JOO - 2,000, J.O - 90 days, or toth 
213.
:::'J .. ! '.!. 3'(() 
? :\ . ! (l . l; () CJ 
2 3. 10. /� 20 
23.20.255 
23.20.lI85 
23.20.490 
23.20.1195 
23.30.250 
23.30.255 
23.30.260 
23.110.180 
211.25.060 
211.25.080 
?.II. ii'.,, .120 
l'cn°,J ty -- r,:\ �,dcr;;(:•anc.n· 
( 1) Li.rst o:f'fcn�;c rcccj ,_,c�·. �;100 - 500,
60 days - G rnont.l1s or bot11
(2) second off8nse receives 60 days - 1 year
Train crews - $500 
V:Lo lat iorn., - mi sctcmeanor', �; 1, 000, 6 months 
or both 
Co�promise of contributions - $5,000, 1 year 
or both 
False statement to secure benefits - $200, 
60 days or both 
Acts of employer prohJbited - $200, 60 days 
or both 
Noncompliance with subpoena of agency -
$200, 60 days, or both 
Violation of law, rules or regulations -
$200, 60 days, or both 
Penalty for misrepresentation - misdemeanor, 
$1,000, 1 year, or both 
Penalty for failure to pay cokpensation -
misdemeanor, $1,000, 1 year or both 
Penalty for receiving unapproved fees and 
soliciting - misdemeanor, $1,000, 1 year 
or both 
Penalty for violation of order or decision -
misdemeanor, $500 
Oath and pen�.l ty for violation of oath -
perjury, 1 - 5 years. 
Pu.nj_�3l1mu1t ;'or d:Lsobedi.ancc to subpoena or 
refusal to testify - $100 - 500, 30 days -
6 months 
Penalt:lcs 
(1) EJ. pcP:,on receives $200 - 1,000., l year
(2) assoc::iation rcccJvc;; $200 - 5,000.
Violaljo� by lccjslative counsel or agent -
�;}()0 - 1,000 
214.
? i:i . (1 �; • 3 J l 
2).05.371 
26.20.180 
27.05.130 
27.20.051 
27.20.290 
27,20.300 
27. 20. li 95
2C.10.600 
28.10.610 
28.10.620 
28.10.630 
28.l0.GII0
28.15,290 
28.15,300 
28.15,305 
\i;:J,n,ru·i i ;::;·_1:,. 1·::: ) (Jf' rcf'u:;:: :! ,. :t ·i ccn:;r' 
!:,·i_:··,c1c,,;•:: :-:;-i(,: .. , C, F!Ol1ti 1r;, �;�j(JCJ, c:-· i.Joth 
;-:i.i.�:.·:''-'l\}·•r•:::,:.·. :··' .. ·'on ;-,nd yj()J,·1l-:c,·1 of COltl':;_,1.·.-1·!CC: ·­
!rt:I ;.:(1(:f;J::c?l!'.' '.·, :;;j()(I 
V:l.oJ:- t :i Oi! \'.()�·�:.!Cl"'l)) }")[_� lfl':.i.r-1., J�·.?��:· Jj cc•ri:-:n 
dc)e}·�c�t -- r:�-�--�-;.jr_�f!lC'CUl()J'' �;;�jO
Unln 1.-if'u.l ::.c;J�:rnn:i.zal;:i.on of 111nrr-:;c1£·;c - ni:i.�,-­
demco.nor, 6 ::1onth�;, �;'.)CJO, or bo'c.h 
Solcrnn:i.1/.ation of marr:i.agc oy unn.uthor·l zed 
person - misdemeanor, 1 yenr, $1,000 or both 
Pcnalti�s - $500, 90 days, or both 
Penalties - $1,000, 1. - 2 years or both 
Penalties - $1,000, 1 year, or both 
PcnaJ.ties - misdemeanor, $J,000, 1 year or 
both 
Pen.:,.lty fol' violnt:i.on of' §295 o.f' thj_s cha;)tcr 
- mi sdemec:in�ir, $ 5 00, 60 days 01� both 
Penal t:i.es - rnj_sdemcanor, �;l, 000, 1 Yf·iar 
or both 
Fraudulent snnlications - felony, 1 - 2 years, 
$2,000 or bot.i1 
I<'alsc cvic1c-;-ic:c of t1.tle and PS::f�istratjon -
felony, 1 - 2 years, $2,000 or both 
Removal of vehicles from state - felony, 
2 years, $2,000 or both 
Rcprescnto.tion by dealers a�; to vehicJc of 
another state - felony, J. - 2 years, $2,000, or 
both 
Other vJolations - m:i.sdemonnor, $100 
Unlm·.1ful U�'.c-: of Li.ccrn:,e - mJsdelilcanor, 10 
days - l yc2r, $1,000 or both 
Dr1vin1_:; 1:I]i.;1� l:iccn�.;c canet::J.:lecl, suspcnd��c.1
rc�vol-::ecl -- L,:L 1.::de::mcn. 10r 
Dl'.i.v:i.nL :in •.r:'iu]."t :ion of a liP1·it, it-.:i..on cir ·  license 
- m:i sdcnF_::�:1c,!", �;JOO - 1,000
215.
�· ... ·.::. �no 
?.,�.jj.030 
23.35,040 
28.35.0115 
2S.35.060(b) 
28.35.060(c) 
2S.3].ll0(d) 
2E:.35.11o(b) 
2c:.35.130 
28.35,230 
29,33,190 
3c:.10.070 
�,::,.30.010 
f.,,;\;:1 n[': i':-,·1 ;_;c• s':.,:-d;c·mcnL 
jlL)r',jl..ll':,' 
1'c'.i1i:1.lt:i c:--. - rn:i �;-:lt)ir!::mwr, �:;) r_ ,:i, :iCJ day:; or bot.h 
0 b t a :i n-\ n L: r- · : n L a l v cl i:l c l c 1.-1 <: l, :1. n � (� n L t o 
c1(:.f.'r;:wd - � yc,,rc;, :);J, 000 c,;• Ll(!'c.h 
Fa.i.lure to rctv:,'n rental vd1 i 1;10 - 5 year�,, 
�il _, 000 or l.Jotli 
DrJv:Lng ,-,li:Lle uncler the :i.11fluencc of :in 
toxicat:i.nc liquor or drucs; 
(1) first offense receives $1,000, 1 year
or both
(2) second offense receivea not less than 3
days
(3) third offense receives not less than 10
days
Reckless driving - misdemeanor, $1,000, 1 
year or both 
Negli.gent drivin� - misdemeanor, $300 
Duty of operator to give information and render 
assistance - 1 year, $500 or both 
Duty of operator to g:l.ve :information and render 
assistance - J.O years, $10,000 or both 
PenaJty for givinc false information in 
report or failing to report - $1,000, 1 year or 
both 
Penalty for giving false information in 
report or failing to report - misdemeanor, $200, 
90 days or both 
Fnlsc report or destruction of evidence -
perjury, $500, 6 months or both 
Penalty for vioJations of law or regulations -
misdemeanor, $200, 90 days, or both 
Penalties - misdemeanor, $500 
Penalty - no pU.ot offense receives mj_s-­
demcanor, �;1, 000 
J\ba.nc1011rnc11t of vor;tH.')J unlmvfuJ. - misdemeanor, 
$500, 6 months or· both 
216.
31.05.020 
31.05.090 
31.05.15o(a) 
32 
33 
34.05.030 
34.05.040 
34.06.047 
34.35.380 
34.35.390 
34.55.028 
(b) 
(c) 
Waste of oil and gas prohibited1 up to $1,000 
for each act and each day violation continues 
Drilling of a well prohibited unless a permit 
to drill is obtained, up to $1,000 for each 
act and each day violation continues. 
General violation section for any provision 
of the chapter, Up to $1,000 for each day 
and act unless otherwise provided for. 
Violations for false entries in records, 
ommissions from records, destruction or 
alteration of records - misdemeanor up to 
$5,000, up to 1 year, or both. 
Knowingly aiding or abetting a •violation 
of the chapter - same as (a). 
None 
None 
Obtaining rental equipment with intent to 
defraud - 1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Failure to return rental equipment - 1 year, 
$1,000 or both. 
Penalty for violation of provision of 
Emergency Residential Rent Regulation and 
Control Act (AS 34.06) and falsification of 
an eviction notice application - $2,500, 
1 year or both. 
Removal of property under lien from state -
6 months, $2,000 or both. 
Embezzlement of lien property (punishable 
as for embezzlement in AS 11). 
Failure to furnish required written statements 
to employees - 6 months, $2,000 or both. 
Penalty for violation of Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act or making untrue statement of 
a material fact - 6 months, $1,000 ( or double 
the amount of gain from the transaction, 
whichever is larger up to $50,000) or both. 
217.
35.10.150 Damage or destruction of public works -
1 year, not less than $10 nor more than $500, 
or both. 
36.05.060 Penalty for Violation of Wage and Hour 
laws - not less than 10 days nor more than 90 
days, not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, 
or both. 
36.10.100 Penalty for contractor or his agent violating 
a provision of chapter on employment preference 
law (AS 36.l0) - 90 days, $500 or both. 
38.05.355 Bargaining by unfair method for the purchase 
of state land offered at a public sale - 1 
year, $1,000 or both. 
38.05.360 Waste or injury to land - $1,000. 
40.15.130(a) Owner of land within a subdivision who 
transfers, sells, or enters into a contract 
to sell land before a plat is prepared - $500 
for each lot or parcel transferred or sold. 
(b) filing or recording plat of subdivision
without approval - 6 months, $500 or both.
41.15.060-150 Failure to obtain permit for fires or 
41.20.040 
41.35.210 
42.10.389 
42.10.393 
42.15.281 
violating condition of the permit and violation 
of other provision relating to fires and fire 
suppression. 
Violating a provision of chapter relating to 
parks and recreational facilities - 6 months, 
$1,000 or both. 
Violation of a provision of the Alaska 
Historic Preservation Act (AS 41.35) -6 
months, $1,000 or both. 
Accepting or receiving rebate for a violation 
of Alaska Motor Freight Carrier Act - misdemeanor. 
Violation of provision of Alaska Motor 
Freight Carrier Act or of the commission 
relating to rates or to aid and abet such 
violation - $500 for each offense and costs 
of prosecution. 
Violation of provision of chapter relating to 
bus transportation - $500 for each offense 
and costs of prosecution. 
218.
Ll2.20.020 
Ll2.20.030 
42.20.040 
112. 2 0. 050
42.20.060 
42.20.070 
42.20.080 
42.20.090 
42.20.110 
42.20.120 
42.20.130 
42.30.020 
42.30.050 
42.30.080 
42.30.090 
Refusal to transmit communication or falsificat:lon 
of official co;-:-irnunication - 1 year, $1,000 
or both. 
Punishment for injury or interference with 
Telegraph, Telephone, etc. - 6 months, 
$500 or both. 
Removal of instrument or meter or disconnecting 
wire - 30 days, $200, or both. 
Altering message - l year, $1,000 or both. 
Sending or delivering false or forged message, 
1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Use of information derived from message, 
1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Delaying or refusing to send or deliver 
message, 6 month, $500 or both. 
Opening or obtaining message addressed 
to another, 1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Bribing operator or employee to disclose 
private message, 1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Refusal to yield to emergency calls. 30 
days, not less than $50 nor more than 
$500 or both. 
Use of party line on pretext of emergency -
30 days, not less than $50 nor more than 
$500 or both. 
Violation of public utilities duty to serve 
without discrimination and violation of 
regulations. 90 days, $1,000 or both. 
Failure to file annual report. $1,000 
Violation of prohibition of explosives on 
vessels or vehicles carrying passengers (060) 
or marking packages containing explosives 
(070), 18 months, $2,000 or both. 
Causing death or injuPy from violation of 
60-100 (above) - not less than 1 year nor
more than 10 years.
-3-
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42. 30 .1110 Violation of safety regulations e;overning 
transportation of passenger in vehicles 
(§§42.30.110 (Escape doorway), 42.30.120
(standin� passengers) - $300.
42.30.180 Failure to file notice of killing or injuring 
livestock on railway - $200 for each offense. 
43.05.130 Violation of §§43.05.010-130 (department 
of Revenue and its duties and responsibilities), 
$1,000 for each offense. 
43.05.190 Commissioner or person in his office 
embezzling - penalty for embezzlement in 
AS 11. 
43.10.200 Person or officer of a non-resident business 
who fails or neglects to comply with provisions 
of §§43.10.160-200 (filing statement and 
tax bonds) - 1 year, $1,000 or both. 
43.20.335(a) Wilful attempting to evade taxes, five years, 
$5,000 or both. 
(b) Person required to collect or account for
or pay over tax, or account for a tax -
five years, $10,000 or both.
(c) Wilful failure to pay, keep records, supply
information, 1 year, $50,000 or both.
(d) Wilful making of false return, or subscribing
when written declaration that it is under
penalty of perjury, 3 years, $5,000 or both.
(e) Wilful and knowing aiding or assisting in
violation of tax laws. 3 years, $5,000 or both.
(f) Wilful delivering or disclosing to department
false list or statement, 1 year, $1,000 or
both.
(i) Supplying false information to an employer,
1 year, $5,000 or both.
43.26.060 Fraudulently representing facts upon which tax
credit is based, 1 year, $1,000 or both.
45.030.050 Violation of mobile home standards (45.30)
$1,000.
43.31.360 Failure to make estate return, 1 year,
$10,000 and costs of prosecution.
43.31.370 False estate return - 5 years, $10,000 and
costs of prosecution.
43.31.380 False statement in return - 1 year, $5,000.
43.31,390 Failure to pay tax, evasion, 5 years, $10,000
and costs of prosecution.
220.
43.35.080 
43.35.150 
43.40.020(a) 
(b) 
43.40.090 
Violation of chapter on Coin - Operated 
devices and puchboards, $100. 
Violating provision of §§100-150 relating 
to punchboards - $500. 
Violating &&10-100 relating to motor fuel v
oil tax - 1 year, $50-500, or both. 
Claim of nonpropulsion use fuel tax exemption 
- $5,000.
Use of motor fuel knowing tax not paid -
1 year, $500, or both. 
43.45.06o(a)&(b) Penalty for violation of school tax provisions 
- 1 year, $1,000 or both.
43.50.16o(a) 
(b) 
43.55.120 
43.55.130 
43.56.190 
43.60.040 
Penalties for violations of tobacco tax 
provisions (§§10-180 with intent to defraud..,.,.. 
or aid or testifying falsely under oath 
at a hearing - 1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Violation of §§10-180 other than specified 
in (a) above - $250. 
Noncompliance with chapter on Oil and Gas 
properties production tax - misdemeanor. 
False report (oil and gas properties production 
tax) - perjury under AS 11. 
Knowingly failing to file return or making 
false statement relating to oil and gas 
exploration, production and pipeline trans­
portation property taxes - 6 months, $1,000 
or both and costs of prosecution. 
Person failing to obtain license certificate 
or permit, paying the excise tax, displaying 
records, etc. - 1 year, $1,000 or both, 
and cost of prosecution. 
43.65.050(f)&(g) Penalties relating to failing to pay 
mining license tax - 1 year, $1,000 or both 
and costs of prosecution. 
43,70.100 
43.75.050 
43.75.090 
Violation under the Business License Act -
1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Penalties relating to fisheries taxes; 
failure to pay, keep records - 1 year, 
$1,000 or both and costs of prosecution. 
Penalty for cold storages and other processors 
for failing to pay taxes, etc. (same as 
prescribed in business license law for 
canneries. 
221. 
-S-
1, 3. 75 .120 
43.80.020 
114. 21. 050
44.23.060(f) 
45.10.200 
45.10.210 
45.50.320 
45.50.450 
45.50.490 
45.51.010 
45.52.120 
115.55.210 
45.65.060(a) 
45,75,360 
(b) 
(c) 
Penalties for failing to pay tax on fish 
products sold outside jurisdiction (same 
as in business license law for salmon 
canneries). 
Prosecution for failure to secure license -
6 months, $500. 
Penalty for allowance of false, unjust 
or illegal claims, Department of Adminis­
tration - not less than 1 year, or more 
than 2 years, $10,000 or both. 
Providing Attorney General with information, 
contempt - $5,000. 
Penalty for violation of order or injunction 
issued under Retail Installment Sales Act -
6 months, $1,000 or both. 
Penalty for violation of Retail Installment 
Sales Act - 6 months, $1,000 or both. 
Penalties for fraudulent branding timber -
6 months, $1,000 or both. 
Violations of chapter (aiding abetting or 
conspiring) - 6 months, $500 or both. 
False, deceptive or misleading advertising 
prohibited - 90 days, $5,000 or both. 
Reproduction, sale without consent prohibited. 
(sound recordings, etc.) - 1 year, $1,000 
or both. 
Violations in restraint of trade, if a 
natural person 1 year, $20,000 or both or 
if not a natural person, $50,000. 
Violation of chapter with knowledge -
1-5 years, $5,000 or both. Upon conviction 
for a felony under the chapter imprisonment 
for not less than 1 year is mandatory. 
Penalties for knowingly attaching identifica­
tion seal to an article knowing it is not 
authentic - 1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Offering same for sale with·knowledge -
1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Changing, altering identification -
1 year, $1,000 or both. 
Hindering or obstructing officer and 
penalty - 3 months, $20-200 or both. 
222.
45.75.370 
45.75.380 
45.80.050 
46.03.760(a) 
46.03.790 
46.03.800 
46.03.810 
46.03.840 
!16.15.180
47.10.090 
47.25.290 
47.25.403 
47.25.405 
47.25.600 
(d) 
47.25.610 
47.25.760 
Impersonation of officer and penalties -
1 year, $100-500, or both. 
Penalties for violation of weights and 
measures provisions; 1st conviction -
3 months, $20-200, or both; 2nd conviction 
- 1 year, $50-500, or both.
Penalty for deceptive advertising -
6 months, $500 (alternative civil 
penalty not more than $5,000). 
Pollution penalties. Violation of 
Sec. 710, 730, 740, or 750 of chapter -
1 year, $25,000, or both. 
Falsely certifying information required 
under Sec. 750 - 1 year, $25,000, or both. 
Wilful violation of a provision of 
chapter - 1 year, $1,000 and costs of 
prosecution, or both. 
Water nuisances, misdemeanor - penalty 
same as § 790. 
Air and land nuisances - penalty same 
as § 790. 
Radiati0n penalties - 6 months, $100, 
or both. 
Crimes relating to water use - misdemeanor. 
Records. Violation of section - 1 year, 
$500, or both. 
Penalty for violation of General Relief 
Assistance provisions ( §§ 120-300) -
1 year, $1,000, or both. 
Reporting change of status, misdemeanor -
1 year, $1,000, or both. 
Obtaining assistance by fraud - 1 year, 
$1,000, or both. 
Obtaining assistance by fraud - 6 months, 
$500, or both. 
Violation of provision of old age assis­
tance law - 6 months, $500, or both. 
Obtaining assistance by fraud - 6 months, 
$500, or both. 
223. 
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Ll?.25.770 
Ll?.25.950 
Ll?.30.260 
L17.30.330 
47.35.070 
47.45.140 
Penalty for violation of aid to blind 
law ( §§ 620-780) - 6 months, $500, 
or both. 
Obtaining assistance by fraud (aid to 
the permanently and totally disabled) -
6 months, $500, or both. 
Food stamp penalties - 1 year, $1,000, 
or both. 
Disclosure of information - 1 year, 
$500, or both. 
Criminal penalties for unlawful hospital 
committment - 1 to 10 years, $10,000, or 
both. 
Violation of provision relating to 
foster homes, boarding homes, and 
institutions for children - $200. 
Penalty for false statements (longevity 
bonus) - 6 months, $500, or both. 
224. 
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PROPOSED BUDGET 
( summary) 
Personal Services 
Contractual Services 
Travel 
Supplies 
Equipment 
Printing 
Indirect Costs 
Total 
Twelve Month Total 
225. 
$140,184 
3,500 
23,150 
5,000 
600 
10,000 
14,018 
$196,452 
(157,162) 
WORK SCHEDULE1 FOR A REVISED 
CRIMINAL CODE 
WORK ORDER -- BLOCK 1: Part I of General Provisions, Offenses 
against Property and Sentencing Structure 
SCHEDULE 
BLOCK 2: Crimes against the Person 
BLOCK 3: Offenses against the Family 
Offenses against Public Administration 
Offenses against Public Order 
BLOCK 4: Offenses against Public Health and Decency 
BLOCK 5: General Provisions Part II and Miscellaneous 
Jan. 31, 1976 Legislative Presentation of Preliminary Report and 
Block one drafts, submission to Commission of first 
drafts, Block 2 
Feb. 28, 29 
March 20, 21 
April 3, 4
April 24, 25 
May 15, 16 
May 24, 25 
June 7, 8 
June 28, 29 
July 1 2, 1 3 
July 26, 27 
Aug. 9, 10 
Aug. 16 - 31
Sept. 15 -
Nov. 1 5 
Commission presentation and first review of first 
drafts, Block 2 
Presentation of first drafts, Block 3 
Commission first review of first drafts, Block 3 
Commission second review of first drafts, Block 2 
Commission second review of first drafts, Block 3 
Commission presentation of first drafts, Block 4 
First review of first drafts, Block 4 
Commission presentation of first drafts, Block 5 
Commission first review of first drafts, Block 5 
Second review of first drafts, Block 4 
Second review of first drafts, Block 5 
First round public hearings 
Commission reviews (according to emphases emanating 
1contingent upon timely funding 
226.
Nov. 29 -
Dec. 10 
Work Schedule (continued) 
from hearings and the Commission'· s sense of the 
firmness of each block), each block to be brought 
to a third review. 
Six meetings, one on each block, every two weeks 
Final hearing round 
Dec. 10, 1976 -
Feb. 1, 1977 
Final draft revision presented to legislature -
substantive code 
Feb. 1, 1978 Presentation of Final draft, procedural code 
revision 
227.
